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INTRODUCTION
I f the three rules of real estate are "location, location, location," the
three rules of law are '"jurisdiction, jurisdiction, jurisdiction."
Jurisdiction comes in a number of different forms: civil jurisdiction,
criminal jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction, and subject matterjurisdiction. Withoutjurisdiction,
a legislature's rules are useless, as they cannot govern a person's conduct.
Withoutjurisdiction, a court cannot hear a particular case or issue a ruling
that governs the parties' conduct.
American courts have developed a wide variety of rules explaining and
exploring the concepts of jurisdiction, and both court rules and statutes
have been promulgated to further define these concepts. Most civil
procedure, conflicts, and federal courts classes discuss these concepts, at
least insofar as they affect the federal and state governments. Rather fewer
of these classes mention the fact that a third category of sovereigns, tribal
governments, exist within the boundaries of the United States.' A com-
' Occasional mentions of Indian law do surface. See, e.g., Cynthia Ford,
Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1243 (1996); Wendy Collins Perdue, Conflicts andDependent Sovereigns:
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pletely different set of jurisdictional rules has developed to govern this
third set of sovereigns.
This Article will explore the basic jurisdictional rules for state
governments and how those rules differ from the jurisdictional rules
binding tribal governments. The Article will then illustrate the impact of
these differences, and ignorance of these differences, by exploring the
full faith and credit requirements of the Violence Against Women Acts
("VAWA") of 19942 and 2000,' particularly as those rules apply to tribal
govern-ments.
To help set the stage for thejurisdiction discussion, Part I of the Article
looks briefly at the background of domestic violence and protection orders
and at the full faith and credit requirements of the Violence Against
Women Acts. Part II takes a step back and looks at basic jurisdictional
rules, examining both the rules for state governments and those that apply
to tribal governments. Finally, Part IH explores the issues faced by tribes
who must now implement the federal requirements.
Incorporating Indian Tribes into a Conflicts Course, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 675
(1996); Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in the Context ofFederal Courts
and Tribal Courts: 4n Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and Scholarly
Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123 (2000); Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671
(1989) (discussing what Indian law has to offer to federal courts jurisprudence);
Symposium, Incorporating Indian Law into Other Law School Courses, 37 TULSA
L. REv. 481-571 (2001).
2 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) (amended 2000).
3 Id (2000).
4 In the Fall of 1999, I was invited to participate in the Michigan Working
Group on Full Faith and Credit, ajoint federal/state/tribal working group charged
with developing and proposing the statutes, regulations and training procedures
needed to implementthe VAWA's full faith and credit provisions in Michigan. The
Working Group consisted of attorneys, police officers, judges, and domestic
violence advocates from all the involved governments-the federal government,
the state of Michigan, and the tribal governments located within Michigan's
geographic borders. I was invited to participate in the group in my role as a law
professor specializing in federal Indian law (at the time, I was a visiting professor
at Wayne State University Law School in Detroit). My primary role within the
Working Group was as co-chair of the tribal jurisdiction subcommittee. The tribal
jurisdiction subcommittee explored several possible courses of action, but decided
that the primary need was for us to draft a model tribal code, which could then be
adapted and adopted by the various tribes in Michigan. This Article arises out of
that work. The fill model code is set out in the appendix infra.
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I. SETTING THE STAGE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PROTECTION ORDERS, AND THE
VAWA'S FULL FAITH AND CREDIT PROVISIONS
Domestic violence is a pervasive problem that invades all aspects of
society, a problem that society has only relatively recently begun to
recognize andtake seriously.6 It is only in the last one hundred years that
our culture has stopped actively condoning a husband's use of physical
force, and it is only in the last thirty years that society has stopped viewing
such actions as "private family matters."7
The statistics are staggering.' Although both men and women are the
victims of domestic violence, women suffer in greatly disproportionate
numbers. In 1998, almost "one million violent crimes were committed
against persons by their current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girl-
friends.... About 85% of victimizations by intimate partners... were
against women."9 Domestic violence occurs in all ethnic and socioeco-
nomic groups"° and is the leading cause of injury to women in this country,
' Domestic violence "cuts across all economic, cultural, religious, geographic,
educational and vocational lines ... [and] is not a problem restricted to any one
socio-economic group or area." Christopher Shu-Bin Woo, Comment, Familial
Violence and the American Criminal Justice System, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 375, 380
(1998) (footnote omitted).
6 See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, II YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 3,4 (1999).
' See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197 (1991);
Epstein, supra note 6, at 4, 10-11. For a look at how the criminal justice system has
dealt with domestic violence, see generally Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice
System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the
Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267 (1985). For a historical look at how various
cultures have dealt with the issue of domestic violence, see Virginia H. Murray, A
Comparative Survey of the Historic Civil, Common, and American Indian Tribal
Law Responses to Domestic Violence, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 433 (1998).
" This summary just touches the surface. For a more detailed look atthe history
and current status of domestic violence law, see DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A
PRIVATE MATrER TO A FEDERAL OFFENSE (Patricia G. Barnes ed., 1998).
9 CALLE MARIE RENNINSON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000).
'o See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCEAND STALKING: THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
UNDERTHE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 1, 5-6 (1997) [hereinafter VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE]; Kathleen Waits, Battered Women andFamily
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accounting for more injuries than auto accidents, stranger rapes, and
muggings combined." "At any given time, at least 10% of women are being
abused by a current or former husband or boyfriend .... "12 Twenty-five
percent of all marriages have included physical abuse, 3 one-third of all
women who seek treatment from hospital emergency rooms do so because
of domestic violence, 4 and approximately one-third of all female homicide
victims are killed by their husbands or boyfriends.'5
The consequences carry far beyond the women who are the immediate
victims-children exposed to domestic violence are also its victims, in a
number of respects. First, children suffer the shock and trauma of actually
witnessing the violence. 6 In addition, however, children exposed to
domestic violence can suffer more longterm effects, as they are more likely
to become both batterers and victims of batterers. 7 Studies show that
approximately "sixty-three percent of young men between the ages of
Lawyers: The Needfor an Identification Protocol, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1027, 1034-35
(1995). It is interesting to note, however, that from 1976 to 1998, the number of
intimate partner homicides fell for all racial and gender groups except white
women. RENNINSON&WELCHANS, supranote 9, at 3. The number ofwhite women
killed by an intimate partner increased. Id
"S. REP. No. 103-138; S. REP. No. 102-197. See also Epstein, supra note 6,
at 8; David M. Fine, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Proper
FederalRole in PolicingDomestic Violence, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 252,256 (1998);
Leonard Karp & Laura C. Belleau, Federal Law and Domestic Violence: The
Legacy ofthe Violence Against Women Act, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW.
173, 174 (1999); Woo, supra note 5, at 379-80.
12 See Waits, supra note 10, at 1027. For a look behind the statistics at the
effects of domestic violence, see Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their
Children: Lessons From One Woman's Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29 (1998).
" Epstein, supra note 6, at 3; Woo, supra note 5, at 380. See also Karp &
Belleau, supra note 11, at 174 (putting the figure at fifty percent).
'4 Epstein, supra note 6, at 8; Woo, supra note 5, at 381.
'5 S. REP. No. 103-13 8, at 41; S. REP. No. 102-197. See also RENNINSON &
WELCHANS, supra note 9, at 1 ("The percentage of female murder victims killed
by intimate partners has remained at about 30% since 1976."); Fine, supra note 11,
at 256; Karp & Belleau, supra note 11, at 174; Johnathan Schmidt& Laurel Beeler,
State and Federal Prosecutions of Domestic Violence, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP.
159, 159 (1998); Woo, supra note 5, at 381.
16 Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette,
6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 341-42 (1995).
1 S. REP. No. 103-138, at41. See also Barry, supranote 16, at 342-43; Epstein,
supra note 6, at 8-9; Woo, supra note 5, at 389. For further discussions of the
impact of domestic violence on children, seethe materials compiled in 3 DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 8, at 149-240.
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eleven and twenty who are imprisoned for homicide have killed their
mother's batterers. These boys also have higher rates of suicide, violent
assault, sexual assault, and alcohol and drug use."' 8 Annual medical
expenses stemming from domestic violence total $3 to $5 billion.' 9
Domestic violence is a problem among American Indians just as it is
among other groups within the United States2 The causes of domestic
violence among Indians are similar to those for the rest of American
society, although they are complicated by the often dismal social and
economic conditions on reservations, as well as by the disruption of
traditional cultures.2 American Indians are in a unique position, however,
in that tribal governments are just that-governments, possessing sover-
eignty and the ability to govern their territory. Tribal government efforts in
this area, however, are hampered by the limitations that have been imposed
upon their sovereignty. These limitations, and their consequences, will be
the focus of later sections of this Article.
One of the methods used by both states and tribes to combat domestic
violence is the protection order, also known as the personal protection order
or PPO. Protection orders are injunctive remedies and can be either civil
'8 Epstein, supra note 6, at 8.
' Schmidt & Beeler, supra note 15, at 159. See also S. REP. No. 103-138, at
41 (putting the estimate even higher, at between $5 and $10 billion).
20 See Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P. Zuni, Domestic Violence and
Tribal Protection ofIndigenous Women in the UnitedStates, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
69 (1995); James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho'Sokee "-Stay TogetherNicely:
Domestic Violence Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 407 (1993).
21 See, e.g., Donna Coker, Enhancing A utonomyfor Battered Women: Lessons
From Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 16-32 (1999); Zion & Zion,
supra note 20, at 416-17 ("Statistical measures of social conditions show that
Indians fall at the very bottom of every indicator of well-being .... Crime on
Indian reservations is the product of an environment created by the disruption of
traditional lifestyles and economies."); see also Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra
note 20, at 83-96. Not all Indians live on reservations. For a brief look at domestic
violence and urban Indians, see id at 130-32. For a historical look, see Murray,
supra note 7, at 443-46.
22See Barry, supra note 16, at 348-61; Epstein, supra note 6, at 11; Woo, supra
note 5, at 382, 392-93. See also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990)
[hereinafter NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE]. For an example of a model code for civil
protection orders, see Civil Ordersfor Protection in 3 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra
note 8, at 1-17. For a look at the process used by some tribal courts who issue
protection orders, see THE N.W. TRIBAL COURT JUDGES ASS'N, TRIBAL COURT
BENCH BOOK FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES (1999); see also Valencia-Weber
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or criminal.' They can be ex parte, temporary, or permanent, and they can
direct a respondent to cease threatening or harassing the petitioner, to stay
away from the petitioner, and can alter custody and/or visitation arrange-
ments, among other things.24 Most states allow individuals to directly
petition the court for a protection order, but these orders may also be issued
as part of a divorce or child custody action, any other civil proceeding, or
even as part ofa criminal case.' In this last situation, the court may include
the protection order or keep away provisions as part of pretrial release or
bond conditions, as part of an anti-stalking case, as part of a probation
order, or even as part of parole conditions.'
While protection orders have proven quite effective and useful,27
they are only as effective as the enforcement mechanisms that are in
& Zuni, supra note 20, at 122-23.
' For an overview of state laws regarding civil protection orders, see FREDRICA
L. LEHRMANDOMESTIC VIOLENCEPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE §§ 4:1-4:41(1997).
For an overview of criminal protection orders, see id. at §§ 8:2-8:5. For earlier
examinations of civil protection orders, see Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the
Use andEnforcement ofCivil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 43 (1989); Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective
Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not, 67 IND.
L.J. 1039 (1992).
There is no central collection ofinformation abouttribal protection order codes.
More than 550 tribes exist within the United States, and approximately half of
those have tribal courts. Thus, there is potentially a great deal of diversity among
the tribes with respect to protection order laws. For an overview of selected tribal
domestic violence laws, see Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 20, at 96-132.
24 See Barry, supra note 16, at 348; Epstein, supra note 6, at 11; Woo, supra
note 5, at 392-94. See also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 1-3, 33-47.
For a discussion of the types of behaviors that can be the subject of a protection
order, see Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: AnAnalysis ofState Statutes and Case Law 21 HoFsTRA L. REV.
801 (1993); see also LEHRMAN, supra note 23, §§ 4:11-4:17 (civil) and §§ 8:2-8:3
(criminal). For a discussion of the terms and conditions of civil protection orders,
see id §§ 4:19-4:31. For a state by state break down of civil protection order laws,
see id at app. 4A.
' See, e.g., Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, Enforcing Orders of Protection Across
State Lines, 88 ILL. B.J. 452, 453-54 (2000). See also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 22, at 1.
26 Foran overview of the terms and conditions of criminal protection orders, see
LEHRMAN, supra note 23, § 8:3.
27 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 111 n.23 (1993) ("Several studies suggest that two-
thirds to three-quarters of perpetrators subject to protective orders do not repeat
their violent behavior during the period of the order.").
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place.28 Enforcement has two, and often three, parts: police officers, the
courts, and prosecutors.29 The police and the courts are almost always
involved in the enforcement of protection orders, but prosecutors may not
be involved in the typical protection order case. If the violation of a
protection order leads to separate charges, or if the protection order was
issued as part of criminal proceedings, the prosecutor may be involved in
the efforts to impose sanctions upon the violator. In other cases, however,
enforcement may rest on the shoulders of the police called to the scene of
an altercation and the court confronted with a petitioner's allegations that
the respondent has violated the protection order. Depending on the state,
the penalties for violating a protection order can range from civil contempt
to criminal contempt to a misdemeanor and even occasionally to a felony.30
Traditionally, protection orders were good only within thejurisdiction
that issued the order. Mostjurisdictions did not provide full faith and credit
to otherjurisdictions' protection orders. This limitation created a number
of problems for many individuals with protection orders, ranging from
bureaucratic hassles and inconvenience to much more serious conse-
quences.32 A woman may live in one jurisdiction, work in another, take a
vacation, change jobs, or move to flee her attacker.33 At a minimum, she
2 Woo, supra note 5, at 394. For a discussion of enforcement problems, and
some suggested reforms, see Epstein, supra note 6. For an examination of victims'
perceptions of the effectiveness of protection orders, see VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE, supra note 10, at 37-44.
29 For an examination and comparison of different states' enforcement
procedures, see NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 49-64.
30 See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE, supra note 10, at 37. See
also Barry, supra note 16, at 348, 356-60; Epstein, supra note 6, at 12-13. For an
overview of the different types of sanctions for violating protection orders, see
LEHRMAN, supranote 23, § § 4:334:40 (civil protection orders) and § 8:4 (criminal
protection orders). For a state by state break down of the possible penalties for
violating a civil protection order, see id, app. 4A.
"' Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of
Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,29 FAM. L.Q.
253, 254, 257 (1995); Victoria L. Lutz & Cara M. Bonomolo, How New York
Should Implement the Federal Full Faith and Credit Guarantee for Out-of-State
Orders ofProtection, 16PACEL. REV. 9, 10(1995); Woo, supra note5, at 394-95.
32 See Klein, supra note 31, at 255.
33 See Lutz & Bonomolo, supra note 31, at 20-21. Attorney General Janet Reno
declared that "victims of domestic abuse frequently have to flee to another state,
and batterers often try to come after them. If a protective order can't follow them,
it is worthless." Janet Reno, Address to the Kentucky Legislature (Feb. 21, 1996),
quoted in Pamela A. Paziotopoulos, Violence Against Women Act: Federal Relief
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would often have to apply for a second (or sometimes a third or fourth)
protection order, show up in court, and sometimes even pay additional
fees.' These additional proceedings will also, for due process reasons,
mean that the respondent will be given notice of the petitioner's current
location and attempt to obtain an additional protection order.
35 For the
woman who has fled her attacker, this notification could prove deadly. It
is well documented that the most dangerous time for an abused woman is
when she attempts to terminate the relationship. 6
All these hassles presuppose that the petitioner will be able to obtain
an additional protection order. The new jurisdiction, however, may not
have the authority to issue a new protection order, for a number of reasons
ranging from lack ofjurisdiction over the respondent to lack ofjurisdiction
over the case, either for statutory or factual reasons.37 Each jurisdiction's
protection order laws contain some variations regarding who is eligible for
an order and what types of relationships are covered. These can range from
married parties to cohabitants to dating relationships, and may vary
depending on whether the relationship is heterosexual or homosexual.3 In
addition, some courts may lack jurisdiction if no threat or harassment has
occurred within its borders.39
In 1994, the federal government addressed these concerns with the full
faith and credit requirements of the Violence Against Women Act.4 The
for State Prosecutors, 30 PROSECUTOR 20 (May/June 1996).
' See Klein, supra note 31, at 255.
31 Id.; Lutz & Bonomolo, supra note 31, at 13; Woo, supra note 5, at 395.
36 Fine, supra note 11, at 257; Woo, supra note 5, at 395. For a fuller treatment
of this issue, see Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991 ).
37 See Klein, supra note 31, at 254-55.
38 For an examination and comparison of different states' protection order
statutes, see NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 7-18. For an overview of the
different types ofeligible relationships, see LEHRMAN, supra note 23, § § 4:4-4:10.
For a state by state breakdown, see id, app. 4A.39 Klein, supra note 31, at 255; Lutz & Bonomolo, supra note 31, at 13.
o The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.). See also S. REP. No. 103-138 (1993). This Article focuses on full faith
and credit only within the context ofthe Violence Against Women Act. For a more
general look at full faith and credit in the context of federal Indian law, see, e.g.,
Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments:
A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311 (2000); see also the work of
Professor Robert Laurence.
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Violence Against Women Act was one section ofan Omnibus Crime Bill.4"
The VAWA itself is a diverse statute, containing a number of provisions
targeted at reducing all aspects of violence against women. Among other
things, the Act created new crimes for interstate domestic violence and
interstate violation of a protection order,42 required all states and all tribes
to give full faith and credit to valid protection orders," created a civil rights
remedy for gender-motivated violence, and created a number of grants for
education and training to combat violence against women.4 5 For purposes
of this Article, the most important sections of the VAWA are its full faith
and credit provisions.46 These provisions are among the least controversial.
The most controversial provision, and the one most associated with the
VAWA, was the civil rights remedy.47 The civil rights remedy allowed
women who had been subjected to gender motivated violence to file a civil
suit in federal court. In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the civil
rights remedy portion of the VAWA.48 The Supreme Court did not,
however, strike down all of the VAWA.49
" See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
42 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-62 (1994); see also id § 922(g)(8) (1994). For a look
at some cases prosecuted under these provisions, see Julie Goldscheid, The Second
Circuit Addresses Gender-Based Violence: A Review of Violence Against Women
Act Cases, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 457 (2000).
43See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2265-66, amendedby id. §§ 2265-66 (2000).
"See id § 13981.
' See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, ch.
2, 108 Stat. 1796, 1910. A certain percentage of these grants must be awarded to
tribal governments. For an examination of the programs undertaken pursuant to
these grants, see Eileen M. Luna, Impact Evaluation ofSTOP Grant Programs for
Reducing Violence Against Women Among Indian Tribes (Apr. 10, 2000) (project
report submitted to the National Institute of Justice).
' Those provisions were amended by the Violence Against Women Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. Unless specifically mentioned
otherwise, this article discusses the currently existing version of the VAWA's full
faith and credit requirements.
47 18 U.S.C. § 13981.
48 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4' For an analysis of the constitutionality of the various parts of the VAWA, see
Fine, supra note 11, at 259-89. See also Gamrath, supra note 25, at 452-55; Karp
& Belleau, supra note 11, at 183-90; Renee M. Landers, Prosecutorial Limits on
Overlapping Federal andState Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SC. 64 (1996).
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The full faith and credit requirements are still valid law and are much
less controversial, largely because they were enacted pursuant to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, 0 rather than the Commerce
Clause.5 The Full Faith and Credit Clause declares that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof."' 2 Obviously, this provision explicitly
gives Congress the authority to prescribe methods for implementing the
clause. Arguably, the pertinent portions of the VAWA are an exercise of
that authority.53 The key section of the VAWA declares that
[a]ny protection order issued that is consistent with subsection (b) of this
section by the court of one State or Indian tribe (the issuing State or
Indian tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another
State or Indian tribe (the enforcing State or Indian tribe) and enforced as
if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.'
Since a protection order would in all likelihood qualify as a "judicial
proceeding," and this statute instructs states and tribes to treat other
jurisdictions' protection orders as if they were issued by the enforcing
jurisdiction, Congress has stayed within the Full Faith and Credit Clause's
provision that "Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
"0 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5'/d at art. , § 8, cl. 3.
52 Id at art. IV, § 1. There has been some question as to whether this clause is
limited to final orders or whether it can also apply to temporary or interim orders.
See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 963 (2d ed. 1992). See
also DAVID D. SIEGEL, CONFLICTS IN ANuTSHELL 345 (2d ed. 1994). A protection
order may qualify as any or all of the above, depending on the context in which the
order was issued. A full resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
The constitutional clause, however, speaks of"judicial proceedings," not of"final
orders." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Accordingly, this Article will proceed on the
assumption that the federal statute is constitutional under this clause. Even if the
clause is limited to final orders, however, the VAWA's full faith and credit
requirements are likely constitutional under the Commerce Clause, as discussed in
the text. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. In addition, the statute could
be viewed as a protection of the right to travel, which is in turn protected by the
Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
53 See Gamrath, supra note 25, at 454.
54 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000).
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which such... [judicial] Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."'55 The only possible question would be Congress's authority to
include Indian Tribes within this provision, in addition to states. The
Supreme Court has routinely held, however, that Congress possesses
plenary authority over Indian Tribes and has upheld statutes that are
rationally related to this authority. 6
Even if the Supreme Court were to analyze the VAWA's full faith and
credit requirements under the Commerce Clause, they would likely pass
constitutional muster. In UnitedStates v. Lopez,57 the Supreme Court ruled
that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate three
categories of activities: the use of channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate
commerce (even if the threat is from purely intrastate activities), and
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.58 The full faith and
credit requirements of the VAWA are intended to protect those people who
possess a valid protection order and move from one jurisdiction to
another.59 Thus, the statute should fall squarely within the Court's second
category, protecting persons in interstate commerce.
To summarize, then, states and tribes must enforce all valid protection
orders issued by any other state or any other tribe.' The statute defines
"protection order" as:
any injunction or other order issued for the purpose of preventing violent
or threatening acts or harassment against, or contact or communication
with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or
final order issued by a civil and criminal court (other than a support or
child custody order issued pursuant to State divorce and child custody
laws, except to the extent that such an order is entitled to full faith and
5 5 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
56See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886). See also FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIANLAW 207-28 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal
Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195
(1984).
57United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
58Id. at 558-59.
'9 See Klein, supra note 31, at 254-57.
6 For information about the methods used by the various states to implement
these requirements, as well as other documents related to the VAWA's fill faith
and credit requirements, see Violence Against Women Online Resources, at
http://www.vaw.umn.edu (last modified Sept. 13, 2001).
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credit under other Federal law) whether obtained by filing an independent
action or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding so long as any
civil order was issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed
by or on behalf of a person seeking protection."
A valid protection order is one for which the issuing court possessed
jurisdiction and provided due process to the respondent.62 The VAWA's
full faith and credit requirements also put limitations on the enforcement
of mutual protection orders,63 prohibit requiring registration of foreign
protection orders as a prerequisite to enforcement," and if a foreign
protection order is registered, prohibit the enforcing state from notifying
the respondent that the protection order was registered.6'
61 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000).
62 See id § 2265(b), which reads:
PROTECTION ORDER.-A protection order issued by a State or tribal court
is consistent with this subsection if-
(1) such court hasjurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law
of such State or Indian tribe; and
(2) reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the person
against whom the order is sought sufficient to protect that person's right
to due process. In the case of ex parte orders, notice and opportunity to
be heard must be provided within the time required by State or tribal
law, and in any event within a reasonable time after the order is issued,
sufficient to protect the respondent's due process rights.
63Mutual protection orders are sometimes issued by courts. Some courts issue
them virtually automatically. A mutual protection order commands both parties to
stay away from each other and cease harassment. A mutual protection order is
entitled to full faith and credit when enforced against the respondent. It is not
entitled to full faith and credit when enforced against the petitioner unless the
respondent petitioned for a protection order and the court explicitly found that both
parties were entitled to such an order. See id § 2265(c). For a discussion of mutual
protection orders and their problems, see Jennifer Paige Hanft, What's Really the
Problem With Mutual Protection Orders?, 22 WYO. LAW. 22 (Oct. 1999); Klein,
supra note 31, at 266-68; Topliffe, supra note 23, at 1053-64.
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(d)(2) ("Any protection order that is otherwise
consistent with this section shall be accorded full faith and credit, notwithstanding
failure to comply with any requirement that the order be registered or filed in the
enforcing State or tribal jurisdiction.").
6s See id § 2265(dXl) ("A State or Indian tribe according full faith and credit
to an order by a court of another State or Indian tribe shall not notify or require
notification of the party against whom a protection order has been issued that the
protection order has been registered or filed in that enforcing State or tribal
jurisdiction unless requested to do so by the party protected under such order.").
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The language of the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements appear,
on their face, to be straightforward mandates. These mandates, however,
conceal a wealth of complexity. First and foremost, the general command
"give a valid protection order full faith and credit" leaves a great many
details regarding the procedures and methods of enforcement to each state
and each tribe. In addition, states and tribes are not equally situated when
it comes to enforcing protection orders, due to differentjurisdictional rules
developed by the Supreme Court. The next part of the Article explores the
differences in those jurisdictional rules.
II. JURISDICTIONAL RULES
Each jurisdiction, state and tribe alike, must now take steps to
implement the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements. As in all legal
matters, however, a given government must first possess jurisdiction before
it can enforce a foreign protection order--"jurisdiction" both in the
legislative and the adjudicative sense. "Legislative jurisdiction" is the
ability of a given government to pass laws regulating an individual's
conduct, and "adjudicative jurisdiction," or "judicialjurisdiction," is the
ability of a court to hear a given case and issue a ruling that binds the
parties.67 Both aspects are important to implementing the VAWA's full
faith and credit requirements.
Most governments who have enacted a statute to implement these
requirements have generally made violation of a foreign protection order
an offense punishable by an established set of sanctions.' A government
must possess legislative jurisdiction over a specific person before the
government can require that person to comply with these laws. In addition,
that government's courts must possess adjudicativejurisdiction in order to
find an individual guilty of violating that law and impose one of the
possible sanctions.
This part of the Article explores the legislative and adjudicative
jurisdiction rules governing both states and tribes. In doing so, it focuses on
6 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "legislative
jurisdiction" as "A legislature's general sphere of authority to enact laws and
conduct business related to that authority, such as holding hearings").
67 See id (defining "judicial jurisdiction" as "The legal power and authority of
a court to make a decision that binds the parties to any matter properly brought
before it").
" For the most current look at state actions to implement the VAWA's full faith
and credit requirements, see Violence Against Women Online Resources, supra
note 60.
[VOL. 90
A JURISDICTIONAL QUANDARY
the situation where both parties, the person holding the order and the
person restrained by the order, are physically located in the same jurisdic-
tion. Not all violations of a protection order occur face to face; much
depends on the terms of the protection order itself. If the order prohibits
certain types of telephone or internet harassment, clearly a violation of the
order can occur from a remote location. But most violations ofa protection
order occur when both parties are physically present, and these are certainly
the most dangerous violations. In addition, these types of situations
highlight the most crippling differences in thejurisdictional rules governing
states and tribes.
,4. Jurisdiction Rules for States
State legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction rules can be complex,
particularly when a state is pushing the boundaries to extend its jurisdiction
as far as possible. As the following discussion will demonstrate, when both
parties are physically present in the same jurisdiction, the relevant state
legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction rules are straightforward and
simple. To illustrate the basic nature of these rules, each section will
discuss the impact of the jurisdictional rule by applying it within the
context of the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements.
1. Criminal Jurisdiction
State criminal jurisdiction is essentially very basic and is centered
around a territorial principle.69 A state may apply its criminal laws to any
activities for which there is a significant local element, that is, when some
significant portion of the crime occurs within the state's boundaries."0 By
longstanding tradition and custom, no state court will hear a criminal case
prosecuted by another sovereign.7 Thus, the question of a state's judicial
and legislative jurisdiction tend to collapse into one inquiry-did a
significant portion of the crime occur within the state's territory?72 If so,
then the state may punish the offender in a criminal proceeding, and once
69 ROBERTA. LEFLARETAL., AMECANCONFLCTSLAW 307-11 (4th ed. 1986);
see also LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 152 (2d ed. 1995).
70 LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 308.
71 See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 152 ("[S]tates customarily decline
to adjudicate criminal . . . cases arising under other states' laws.") (footnote
omitted); see also LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 307-08.72 See LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 309.
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a criminal proceeding begins, the state conducting the prosecution will
apply its own laws during the proceeding. As will be demonstrated in a
moment, this unitary approach is not followed in civil proceedings.' In
civil matters, a state may possess judicial, but not legislative, jurisdiction
and visa versa.
Within the context of the VAWA, these basic rules have two conse-
quences. Remember, when we discuss the VAWA's full faith and credit
requirements, we are talking about one jurisdiction enforcing another
jurisdiction's protection order. The plain language of the federal statute
directs the enforcing jurisdiction to enforce the protection order "as if it
were the order of the enforcing State or tribe."74 Each jurisdiction may have
a different method of enforcing protection orders, including a different set
of sanctions. One state may treat the violation of a protection order as civil
contempt and another may treat it as a misdemeanor. What matters is how
the enforcing jurisdiction chooses to handle violations of protection orders;
the approach of the issuing jurisdiction is irrelevant. Even if both the
issuing and enforcing jurisdiction treat violations as a misdemeanor, the
enforcing jurisdiction is prosecuting a criminal action occurring within its
own borders according to its own laws. It is not enforcing the issuing
state's criminal laws. Within the context of a typical (civil) protection
order, then, the rules of state criminal jurisdiction are easily applied.
But what if the protection order was issued as part of a criminal
proceeding? What if, for example, the issuing jurisdiction included the
protection order as part of the conditions of pretrial release? The issuing
jurisdiction is likely to treat a violation of those conditions as a separate
crime and/or as grounds for revocation of pretrial release. All of these
actions, including the original issuance of the protection order in these
circumstances, are part of the issuingjurisdiction's criminal laws. And has
just been discussed, one state will generally not enforce another state's
criminal law.
There has been a great deal of dispute about the interstate enforce-
ability of a criminal protection order.' The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") has taken the
position that the Constitution does not permit one state to enforce another's
criminal laws. I address this issue much more fully below, but the short
' See infra notes 77-109 and accompanying text.
74 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000).
" This issue is discussed more fully below. See infra notes 288-90 and accom-
panying text.
76See UNIF. INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE PROTECTION
ORDEMs ACT (2000) (authored by NCCUSL).
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response is that NCCUSL misunderstands the nature of criminal protection
orders, leading it to recommend a position that is contrary to federal law.
A state can enforce another state's criminal protection orders without
enforcing another jurisdiction's criminal laws. Rather, the enforcing
jurisdiction will be enforcing a combination of its own laws and federal
law.
2. Civil Jurisdiction
The principles of civil jurisdiction are more complicated than those for
criminal jurisdiction, and the discussion must be broken into two major
parts: judicial or adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction.
Generally speaking, the first issue to arise will be whether a particular
state's court possesses jurisdiction to hear the dispute at bar.' Once it is
determined that the state court can hear the case, attention turns to which
state's law will be applied to resolve the dispute.7" Both of these questions
are standard issues for constitutional law and conflicts of law scholars, as
well as for courts. As is discussed below, the test for each issue can be
rather vague, but the answers are well accepted when the case involves
parties physically present in one state's territory.
a. Judicial or Adjudicative Jurisdiction
Judicial jurisdiction, also called "adjudicative" or "adjudicatory"
jurisdiction, concerns a court's power to hear a particular case and breaks
into two subparts: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.79
Each will be addressed separately.
i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matterjurisdiction means essentially what it says-whetherthe
court possesses the power to hear the subject matter of the case."° When
dealing with states, the answer is fairly straightforward, as state courts are
typically deemed to be courts of general jurisdiction." ' That is, they can
hear cases involving virtually any topic. I say "virtually," as there are two
potential sources of limitations. First, federal law may reserve a given
subject, such as patent infringement litigation, exclusively to federal
7 SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 31-32.7181d at 32.
79 d at31.8o LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 5; SCOLES & HAY, supra note 52, at 221; SIEGEL,
supra note 52, at 32-33.
81 SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 33-37.
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courts. 2 Second, state law itself may limit a particular court's jurisdiction,
either by designating a given court to hear particular types of cases (such
as a probate or family court) or by setting limitations based on the dollar
amount in controversy (such as a small claims court). 3 When it comes to
enforcing protection orders, however, the only potential hazard for subject
matter jurisdiction lies in making sure that the action is filed in the proper
state court. There is no question that some state court will be empowered
to hear these types of cases.
ii. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction examines the court's power to make rulings and
issue a judgment that is binding upon the parties." There is generally no
problem with the court's personal jurisdiction over a plaintiffor petitioner,
as that person is typically said to have consented to personal jurisdiction by
filing suit with the court.' Determining whether a court possesses personal
jurisdiction over a particular defendant requires an examination of both the
U.S. Constitution and of state law.
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution sets limits on state attempts
to exercise personal jurisdiction over particular parties.8 6 It is standard
canon that due process means notice and an opportunity to be heard."7 The
Due Process Clause, however, also has a third component-basis of
jurisdiction.8 In other words, a state must have a legitimate basis for
extending its jurisdiction overthis particular defendant. That basis can take
one of two possible forms.
The first basis for personal jurisdiction harkens back to the territorial
rule 9 and has been criticized as lacking a theoretical basis. ° Under this
SId2 at 35; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARYON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
116 (4th ed. 2001).
83 LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 5, 59; SEIGEL, supra note 52, at 33-37;
WEINTRAUB, supra note 82, at 115-16.84 BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 267; SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 40.
85 SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 40.
' Id at 41-43. Other clauses of the Constitution, such as the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, can also play a role in
personal jurisdiction inquiries. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has made the
Due Process Clause of paramount importance in this area. See, e.g., BRILMAYER,
supra note 69, at 13549; SCOLES & HAY, supra note 52, at 78-109.
87 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 52, at 220.88 SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 41-43.
89 For a discussion of the traditional territorial basis for jurisdiction, see
LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 39-43.
90 Id at 65-66; SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 46.
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prong, a state acquires personal jurisdiction over a person if that person is
served with notice while physically present within the state 1 It does not
matter whether the defendant is domiciled within the state or just present
on an airplane as it flies over the state; physical presence within a state
gives the state the right to hold a person accountable in the state's court.'
Although at one point the continuing validity of this basis had been
questioned, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the "tag you're it" variety
of personal jurisdiction in 1990," and it now appears unlikely to disappear.
Under the second basis, a state may acquire personal jurisdiction if the
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state.95 The minimum
contacts test traces back to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the critical inquiry (provided
the defendant was not physically served in the state) is whether the
defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' " The Supreme Court has continued to be vague about
precisely what facts are sufficient to satisfy this test, but rather conducts a
case by case inquiry examining the relationship between the defendant and
the forum state, with an eye to whether it is "fair" for the forum to require
the defendant to answer in its court." Most of the subsequent Supreme
Court cases applying this test have focused on situations where the
defendant is a corporation or has never actually set foot in the state." It is
generally accepted that when a defendant physically comes into a state and
commits some action while present in the state, that state can exercise
9 1 BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 268-69; LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 65; SCOLES
& HAY, supra note 52, at 218; SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 44-46; WEINTRAUB, supra
note 82, at 200-01.
9 See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
93See WEINTRAUB, supra note 82, at 200-01.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
9sBRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 268; SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 58-64. It should
also be noted here that I am addressing what is often called "specific" as opposed
to "general"jurisdiction. General jurisdiction focuses on whether the defendant's
contacts with the forum are so extensive that the forum can hear any litigation on
any subject concerning the defendant. Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, looks at
whether the defendant's contacts on a particular issue (e.g., violation of a
protection order) are sufficient to allow the forum to adjudicate a dispute
concerning that issue. Id at 281-86.
s Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
97Id at 316 (citations omitted).
9 LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 4445.
9 See, e.g., id at 49-58; see also BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 268-75.
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personal jurisdiction overthe defendant, at least with respect to the actions
that occurred within the state's boundaries.'" The implications for
enforcement of foreign protection orders are clear. Ifa person is physically
present within a state at the time he or she violates a protection order, the
Due Process Clause would allow the state to exercise personal jurisdiction
over that person for purposes of determining whether the protection order
was violated, and if so, to impose sanctions.
As mentioned above, however, personal jurisdiction cannot be resolved
without also looking at state law. State law regarding personal jurisdiction
is generally easy, as most, if not all, states have some version of a long arm
statute, allowing the state to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by the U.S. Constitution.'"' It is always important, however, to
actually check the long arm statute of the state in question, as it may be
limited to particular subjects." It is quite likely, however, that all state
long arm statutes would allow the state to reach out and haul a person into
state court for violating a protection order, even if the alleged violator has
left the jurisdiction. What is important, both in terms of the Constitution
and state law, is that the violation occurred within the boundaries of the
state.
b. Legislative Jurisdiction
Once a state has authority to hear a particular case, it must decide what
law to apply. In most cases, that will simply be the law of the forum. In
other instances, however, the parties may argue for application of another
state's law, contending that it is the more proper law to govern the case or
that the application of forum law is unfair. This issue is known in conflicts
jurisprudence as "legislative jurisdiction," the power of a given state to
apply its law to the case at hand. 3 Stated somewhat differently, legislative
jurisdiction is the power of a state's legislature to enact laws governing a
particular person's conduct. As with personal jurisdiction, the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is the touchstone. 10 4
100 See BRILMAYER, supranote 69, at 285 (These illustrations "suggest a general
principle: specific jurisdiction is constitutional where the costs of litigating in the
forum are merely the costs arising out of the defendant's choice to enter theforum
or to engage in conduct having consequences there.").
10 SIEGEL, supra note 52, at 58-64.
'02 Id at 60-61.
103 LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 163.
o4 Id at 163-64. As is also true with personal jurisdiction, other constitutional
clauses may have some relevance, but the Due Process Clause is the most
important. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 135-49; SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 52, at 78-109.
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In the context of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court (through the
rubrik of the Due Process Clause) focuses on the relationship between the
defendant and the forum state. 03 In the context of legislative jurisdiction,
however, the Supreme Court focuses on the relationship between the
particular subject matter or underlying factual circumstances of the
litigation and the state who seeks to apply its law."° Again, the test is
vague, examining whether a state has "a significant aggregation of contacts
with the parties and the occurrence, creating interests, such that application
of its law [is] neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."0 7 The Court has
provided no theory to explain how it evaluates the contacts, but two major
lines of analysis have evolved.
The first examines whether applying a given state's law would work an
unfair surprise, that is, whether there are some contacts indicating, or
making it "foreseeable," that state law might apply."' The second line of
analysis focuses on a quid pro quo, on whether the contacts are such as to
give the defendant the benefit of state law. In some sense, it is not clear
whether these are two separate lines of analysis, since the existence of
some sort of quid pro quo, of the defendant taking advantage of state law,
surely means that it is foreseeable a court might apply that law to resolve
a dispute. In any event, there is a strong territorial bent to this area of law.
If certain key events happen within a state's borders, that has usually
proven sufficient for application of that state's laws."° Again, the test and
the answers may be vague around the margins, but they are straightforward
in the context central to this Article. Ifa person is physically present within
a state at the time that person violates (or is alleged to violate) a protection
order, that state will have legislative jurisdiction over the alleged violator;
the state has the power to evaluate the alleged violator's conduct under
state law and impose any prescribed punishment if indeed a violation
occurred.
Clearly, then, the alleged violator's physical presence within the state
at the time of the violation, and the fact that the violation occurred within
the state's boundaries, is all that is necessary to give a state both judicial
and legislativejurisdiction for both criminal and civil purposes. As the next
'0' See supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
106 LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 164; SCOLES & HAY, supra note 52, at 96.
'0 7 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981). See also BRILMAYER,
supra note 69, at 140; SCOLES & HAY, supra note 52, at 79-88.
'
0& See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 69, at 143; WENTRAUB, supra note 82, at
605-06.
109 BiLMAYER, supra note 69, at 154-55.
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section makes equally clear, matters are not so simple in the context of
tribal governments.
B. Jurisdiction Rules for Tribes
The tribal jurisdiction rules are not nearly as easily stated."0 The
modem history of tribal jurisdiction traces back twenty-five years and, as
is also true for statejurisdictional rules, the Supreme Court has been largely
responsible for the development and creation of these rules. The Court has
not, however, made reference to state jurisdiction in the process of creating
the rules for tribes. "' Rather, the Supreme Court has embarked on a wholly
separate track, including creating different rules for tribal criminal and civil
jurisdiction, for a time splitting tribal civil legislative and civil adjudicative
jurisdiction into two tests, and finally merging tribal civil jurisdiction back
into one test. This part of the Article explores the development and current
status of tribal jurisdiction."' Because the application of these rules to the
"' This Article does not purport to address tribal jurisdiction in Public Law 280
states, but rather limits its focus to non-Public Law 280 jurisdictions. Public Law
280 is a federal statute granting states the power to assume certain types of civil
and criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. Only a handful of states have taken
jurisdiction under Public Law 280, and the rules forjurisdiction in those states thus
contain an extra layer of complexity. For a closer look at Public Law 280 and its
effects, see Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of
Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1405 (1997).
This section may also surprise some who did not realize that tribal courts
existed and exercised such a wide range of authority. Most law schools fail to teach
their students about the existence of these courts, much less what they do. For a
brief history of tribal courts, see Melissa L. Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The
Boundaries Between Federal and Tribal Courts, 29 ARmZ. ST. L.J. 705 (1997)
[hereinafter Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction]. For a more current look at the workings of
tribal courts, see FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN
LAWAND CONTEMPORARYTRBAL LIFE 57-135 (1995); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 285 (1998).
' Seegenerally Resnik, supra note 1. For an explanation ofthe Court's rulings
from a different perspective, see Deborah A. Geier, Essay: Power and Presump-
tions; Rules and Rhetoric; Institutions and Indian Law, 1994 BYUL. REv. 451.
I2 Because my purpose here is to explore the existing rules and how to work
within them, I will take a similar approach to explaining the jurisdictional rules
binding tribes as I did when exploring the rules binding states. That is to say, I have
attempted to take a'middle of the road" expository approach, setting forth the rules
themselves as they currently exist with minimal critique and commentary on those
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VAWA's' full faith and credit requirements is quite complex, that
application will be deferred until Part m.
1. Criminal Jurisdiction
The modem history of tribal criminal jurisdiction started in 1978 with
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe."' That case involved two non-Indian defendants charged in the
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court 4 The first defendant was charged
with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest; the second with
recklessly endangering another person and injuring tribal property after he
allegedly led tribal officers on a high-speed chase that ended when the
defendant crashed into a tribal police car."6 Neither case had proceeded to
trial, as they were stayed pending a resolution of whether the tribe
possessed authority to pursue criminal charges against a non-Indian.""
The Supreme Court ruled against the tribes, declaring that "[b]y
submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes
... necessarily [gave] up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the
rules. In the state section, I was able to rely on standard conflicts of law treatises.
There are no similarly complete, up to date sources for Indian law. The standard
treatise in the field, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, is twenty
years out of date. The other two potential sources have built-in limitations. While
Judge Canby has done a wonderful job with the American Indian Law in a
Nutshell, it is limited by the nutshell format. The American Indian Law Deskbook
contains similar restrictions in that it is a streamlined overview, but more critically,
the Deskbook is written from a biased perspective. See, e.g., Joseph William
Singer, Remembering What Hurts Us Most: A Critique oftheAmerican Indian Law
Deskbook 24 N.M. L. REv. 315 (1994). Thus, this section will explore the
jurisdictional rules by looking primarily at the key Supreme Court opinions them-
selves, as well as some of the law review literature examining those opinions.
Because Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001), was newly decided at the time
of this writing, and there is yet no existing body of work examining it, that opinion
will receive a bit more detailed treatment. For a more historical look at federal
policy and tribal jurisdiction, see Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdic-
tion Over Matters Arising in Indian Country: 4 Roadmap for Improving Inter-
action Among Tribal, State and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 973
(2000).
.. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
114 1d at 193-94.
"I Id at 194.
117I d
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United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress...".8 In reaching its
decision, the Court explored, somewhat imperfectly, the history of relations
between the United States and American Indians on the issue of criminal
laws and criminal punishment."9 In so doing, the Court split tribal civil and
tribal criminal jurisdiction into two distinct areas, with tribes flatly
prohibited from exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Oliphant opinion did the
Court discuss standard principles of criminal jurisdiction as applied to
states. Rather, the Court carved out a unique test specific to Indian tribes,
a test which seems to flow from the Court's presumption that all tribes lost
territorial sovereignty when they were merged into the United States. This
presumption is based on the Court's analysis of federal Indian policy. The
Court, however, is a notoriously poor historian, 20 and its approach in
Oliphant has been roundly criticized by a number of scholars.' The
Court's conclusion that tribes are not territorial sovereigns also marks a
distinct split from its approach to state sovereignty. As Professor Dussias
has noted, this approach is particularly unusual in the context of criminal
jurisdiction, as a criminal offense has always historically been treated as an
offense against the sovereign, not just against the particular individual
victim." Nevertheless, Oliphant is clearly the first in a series of Supreme
Court decisions limiting tribal sovereignty to issues concerning tribal
members.'2
8Id. at 210.
". For another examination of this history, see Allison M. Dussias,
Geographically-Based andMembership-Based Views ofIndian TribalSovereignty:
The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 18-43 (1993).
'
2
1 See, e.g., Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme
Court andDiscriminationAmong Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
49 (1998) [hereinafter Koehn, The New American Caste System].
... See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The
Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63
MINN. L. REv. 609 (1979); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The
Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391 (1993). See
also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism
of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1595-99 (1996).
'2 Dussias, supra note 119, at 37-38.
", See, e.g., id at 1; Philip P. Frickey, 4 Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian TribalAuthority Over Nonmem-
bers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter FrickeyA Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism]; Getches, supra note 121, at 1573; L. Scott Gould, The Consent
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 809 (1996).
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It is also interesting to note that the Court did not specifically indicate
whether the restrictions it created were based on a lack of tribal subject
matter jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes or a lack of tribal personal
jurisdiction over non-Indians accused of crimes. In any event, the ultimate
result is the same-no tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The Court carried that ruling a step further twelve years later in the
case of Duro v. Reina."2 Albert Duro, a member of the Torres-Martinez
Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians, lived on the Salt River Indian Reserva-
tion.12 Duro was thus a "nonmember Indian;" he is an Indian, but is not a
member of the Indian community on whose land he lived. Duro was
accused of killing a fourteen year old boy on the Salt River Reservation and
was charged in tribal court with illegally firing a weapon on the
reservation.126 The Court extended its earlier ruling in Oliphant, holding
that nonmember Indians should be treated the same as non-Indians, since
nonmembers were also, by definition, outside the internal governance
structure of the tribe.127
In Duro, the Court did explicitly recognize that "[a] basic attribute of
full territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who
come within the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or aliens.' 2' The
Court held that tribes, however, no longer possess full sovereignty in this
area, as it would not be consistent with the tribes' status as dependent
sovereigns. 29 There is no explicit discussion of why tribes lost this part of
their sovereignty when they became part of the United States, but individ-
ual states did not.
The Court did obliquely address this argument at two points, first
during its discussion of why tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
is inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status, and second, when
addressing one aspect of the lower court's ruling. As to the first point, the
114 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
1 Id at 679.
126 Id at 681. At the time of the alleged shooting, the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA") limited tribes to imposing criminal penalties of no more than six months
imprisonment and a $500 fine. Those limitations have since been increased, see 18
U.S.C. § 1302 (1994), but "major" crimes, including murder, committed by Indians
against Indians, fall primarily within federal jurisdiction. Tribes can also prosecute
without offending double jeopardy restrictions, see United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978), but they usually choose to charge defendants with misdemeanors,
given ICRA's restrictions.
127 Dwo, 495 U.S. at 686-92.
12SId at 685.
'29 Id at 685-86.
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Court engaged in a brief examination of the history of federal Indian policy,
concluding that the legislative and executive branches deliberately removed
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, just as with non-Indians. 3'
Probably more important, however, is the Court's discussion ofthe "special
nature" of tribal courts and its obvious concerns about turning non-Indians
over to a political entity in which they have no voice and that is not bound
by the strictures of the federal constitution.'
As to the second point, the lower court sought to adopt a version of a
"contacts" test. The Supreme Court dismissed this attempt out of hand,
declaring:
The contacts approach is little more than a variation of the argument that
any person who enters an Indian community should be deemed to have
given implied consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction over him. We have
rejected this approach for non-Indians. It is a logical consequence of that
decision that nonmembers, who share relevant jurisdictional characteris-
tics of non-Indians, should share the same jurisdictional status.'32
If the Court had adopted this test, it would have brought tribal criminal
jurisdiction more in line with state jurisdiction.
Congress quickly passed a statute overturning the Duro decision,
explicitly stating that tribes have always possessed criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians, member and nonmember alike.' That statute, however,
did not alter the status quo regarding non-Indians.
"0 Id at 686-92.
"' Id at 692-94. While tribes are not bound by the Constitution, they are bound
by the strictures of the ICRA, which does contain many of the same protections,
most notably the requirement of due process. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994). It is true
that the ICRA does not mandate appointment of counsel, but as is discussed above,
tribes are generally limited to misdemeanor charges. The federal constitution also
does not require appointment of counsel for misdemeanors, unless the defendant
is sentenced to time injail. Even if atribe were to impose such a punishment, most
tribal proceedings are not conducted with the evidentiary formalities that make
attorneys so necessary in state courts.
132 Duro, 495 U.S. at 695-96.
"' Defense Appropriation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat.
1856, 1892 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994)). One
currently simmering controversy concerns the intersection of this statute and
Wheeler's double jeopardy ruling. Is the so-called "Duro fix" legislation a
delegation of federal power to tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians (thereby meaning that the federal and tribal governments are
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Much has been written about the ultimate division of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country. Criminal jurisdiction now turns on a
complex calculus of determining the identity of the victim (Indian or non-
Indian), the identity of the alleged perpetrator (Indian or non-Indian), and
the nature of the crime (i.e., its seriousness).' Regardless of who possesses
actual jurisdiction, however, tribes repeatedly report difficulty getting
federal or state prosecutors to act on the crimes in Indian Country over
which they possess jurisdiction.3 The result has been many instances of
lawless behavior, with the tribal police and prosecutors unable to directly
prosecute offenders and unable to obtain enforcement from those with
authority.'36 These problems are particularly acute in domestic violence
situations, which often involve both an Indian and a non-Indian.'37 As
discussed more thoroughly below, tribal police are put in the situation of
maintaining law and order in the face of no tribal ability to prosecute
offenders.'
2. Civil Jurisdiction
The history of tribal civil jurisdiction has taken a different path than
tribal criminal jurisdiction. While the Court clearly set out rules for tribal
civil legislative jurisdiction in 1981, the rules for tribal civil adjudicative
jurisdiction have been more imprecise, although the Court clarified that test
with its 2001 decision in the case of Nevada v. Hicks. ' The tests for tribal
civil legislative and tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction ate now the same.
the "same sovereign" for purposes of double jeopardy) or is the statute simply a
recognition ofpreviously existing authority (preserving the difference between the
federal and tribal sovereign power for purposes of doublejeopardy)? This dispute
is currently percolating through the federal courts. Compare United States v. Enas,
255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 925 (2002) (finding no
double jeopardy bar), with United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
1998) (reversing the trial court and finding that double jeopardy is a bar), vacated
by 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (the equally divided en banc court simply
affirmed the trial court with a per curiam opinion). See also Pommersheim, supra
note 1, at 175-80.
'31 See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 142-
68 (3d ed. 1998); COHEN, supra note 56, at 335-41.
"' See Dussias, supra note 119, at 38-43.
136 See, e.g., id. at 38-43.
137 See, e.g., Edward Reina, Jr., Domestic Violence in Indian Country: .4
Dilemma ofJustice, 5 DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE REP. 33, 47 (2000).
'
31 See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
3 Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
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Since these tests only recently have merged, however, each is explored in
turn.
a. Legislative Jurisdiction
The modem history of tribal civil jurisdiction traces back to the
Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United States.'4 The
relevant portion of that litigation revolved around attempts by the Crow
Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing within its reservation. As
part of resolving that controversy, the Supreme Court established a test for
tribal legislative jurisdiction. Since the test depends heavily on the history
of federal Indian policy, a brief detour through that history is required.
As part of its dealings with the Indians, the federal government chose
to separate whites and Indians, first by removing Indians westward and
later by confining them to reservations.' These reservations were
generally set aside for the tribe itself, and not for any particular individual
member(s) of the tribe. In the latter part of the 1800s, however, the federal
government shifted its policy toward the Indians, attempting to dismantle
the tribes and assimilate individual Indians into the mainstream of
American society. The primary vehicle for accomplishing this task was the
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887.42 With this statute, Congress
began the process of assigning reservation lands to individual Indians, a
process known as "allotment."'43 The extra or "surplus" lands left over
within the reservation borders, after all allotments were assigned, were
generally sold to non-Indians (thus conveying fee simple title to the non-
Indian).I" Land allotted to individual Indians was generally subject to some
restrictions, with the federal government holding the title for a certain
period of time before issuing the fee patent to the individual Indian
owner. 1
45
The allotment policy was a total failure, and Congress officially
repudiated it in 1934 with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act
("IRA"),"' which encouraged tribal governments and provided mechanisms
'40 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
141 See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7
(1995).
142 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-34, 339,341-42, 348-49,354, 381 (1994)).
,43 See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed 2000).
'" Royster, supra note 141, at 13-14.
,41 Id at 10-12.
'" Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
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for re-establishing those governments. Although the IRA halted the
allotment policy, it did not roll it back. Land sold to non-Indians remained
in non-Indian hands, unless explicitly purchased back by the tribe.147 By the
time of the IRA, fee patents to many allotted parcels had been released by
the federal government, and many Indians either sold their allotments to
non-Indians or were swindled out of their land.'" Any allotted land still
subject to restrictions at the time of the IRA was conveyed into trust."
Thus, reservations subject to allotment now possess a variety of different
types of land tenure. Some land is held in trust by the federal government
(either on behalf of individual tribal members or the tribe itself), some land
is held in fee by Indians (who may or may not be members of the tribe), and
some land within the original boundaries of the reservation is held in fee by
non-Indians.
One more bit of information concerning the definition of Indian
Country is needed before turning back to the Montana decision. As with all
sovereigns, tribal sovereignty is tied to a particular geographic area, one
known as "Indian Country." Congress established a definition for Indian
Country as part of the Major Crimes Act, a statute assuming federal
authority over certain enumerated crimes occurring within Indian Country.
That definition, however, has been extended to apply to all types of
situations, in both civil and criminal contexts. Indian Country is:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof; and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same. 5°
Thus, "Indian Country" is broader than "reservation," although the term
"reservation" is often used as a shorthand term.
With this history, we are now ready to turn back to our examination of
Montana v. United States. The Crow Reservation in Montana was subject
to allotment, and at the time of the litigation, approximately sixty-nine
percent of the reservation was held in trust by the federal government,
'47 Royster, supra note 141, at 15-18.
14' Id at 10-18.
149 Id at 17.
1'o 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
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twenty-eight percent was owned in fee by non-Indians, two percent was
held in fee simple by the state of Montana, and less than one percent was
owned in fee simple by the United States. 1 '
One of the central disputes in the litigation concerned the ability of the
Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers' within the
reservation. This attempted exercise of power by the Tribe is (as should be
obvious by now) an issue of legislative jurisdiction. Within the context of
Indian law decisions, however, the Court repeatedly uses the term
"regulatory jurisdiction," as opposed to "legislative jurisdiction."153 The
Court, again using a somewhat shaky and incomplete historical analysis of
federal Indian policy, held that trust land and fee land owned by non-
Indians must be treated differently."' According to the Court, when the
allotment policy caused reservation lands to be sold to non-Indians, those
lands were removed from tribal authority, and Congress never evidenced
any intent to reverse that change.'55 Thus, after Montana, tribes were
deemed to have regulatory jurisdiction overall persons present on trust land
within the boundaries of the tribe's Indian Country. " Tribes, however,
151 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 548 (1981).
152 As was referenced supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text, the universe
of people for purposes of tribal jurisdiction can be divided into three categories:
members of the tribe in question; persons who are Indians, but are not members of
the tribe in question; and non-Indians. One underlying issue has often been how to
treat nonmember Indians. This issue was explicitly addressed in Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676 (1990), with the Supreme Court concluding that nonmember Indians are
in the same position as non-Indians. Congress disagreed with that interpretation
when it enacted the "Duro fix" legislation. See supra note 133 and accompanying
text. Thus, for purposes of criminal jurisdiction, all Indians are treated alike. The
Court, however, has continued to referto "members" and "nonmembers" in its civil
jurisdiction cases, see, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001), but has not
been explicitly confronted with the need to analyze whether that is the correct
division for purposes of civil jurisdiction, or whether civil jurisdiction should also
speak in terms of "Indians" and "non-Indians." For a look at some of the
consequences of defining jurisdiction based on tribal membership, see Dussias,
supra note 119, at 78-96.
"' It is not altogether clear why the Court has used different terminology. It
might be because the Court views tribal territorial sovereignty as more limited than
state territorial sovereignty, and thus has deliberately adopted a different term. On
the other hand, it could simply be because the Court has not focused on the fact that
tribal "regulatory jurisdiction" and state "legislativejurisdiction" are in essence the
same issue.
'-4 Montana, 450 U.S. at 557-66.
' Id at 559-63.
'56 Id at 557.
[VOL. 90
A JURISDICTIONAL QUANDARY
presumptively had lost regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee land
located within the boundaries of the tribe's Indian Country.' s7 That
presumption could be rebutted if the tribe could establish that the non-
Indian had entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe or its
members"' or if the non-Indian's "conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."' 9 The Court recently reaffirmed this basic approach
to tribal regulatory jurisdiction with its decision in Atkinson Trading Co.
v. Shirley.1
6
b. Adjudicative Jurisdiction
For a number of years, the Supreme Court appeared to take a much
more supportive view of tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction than it did of
... Id at 565-66. For a critique of the Court's decision, see Getches, supra note
121, at 1608-12; Gould, supra note 123, at 872-75; Royster, supra note 141. Cf
Frickey, supra note 123, at 25.
The first problem with the Court's work is that Congress has repudiated the
allotment policy. The Court has never explained why an obsolete general
congressional purpose lacking specific statutory text or clear legislative
intent purporting to bind future generations deserves respect today.
Moreover, by refusing to admit that it is implementing a general (and
repudiated) congressional purpose rather than explicit congressional intent,
the Court has sought to shift the blame for the erosion of tribal authority to
a century-old Congress rather than where it belongs-the current Court.
Id
1s8 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
's Id at 566. Montana and later cases have demonstrated that the Supreme
Court takes a particularly crabbed approach to the direct effects test. See, e.g.,
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997); Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). For
a closer examination of the flaws in the Court's approach, see Royster, supra note
141, at 43-63. For a particularly egregious application of the direct effects test by
a lower court, see Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2000),
rev'den banc 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1296 (2002);
see also Royster, supra note 141, at 49.
The "direct effects" testthat the Court constructed to provide exceptions for
conduct on fee lands begged the question. Territorial integrity-the right of
the sovereign to control persons and activities within its territory-is a
central tenet of sovereignty. Any loss of territorial integrity necessarily has
a direct effect on tribal sovereignty: it trenches upon a basic sovereign right.
To argue, as the Court did, that the loss of power to regulate activities
within the sovereign's territorial borders "bears no close relationship" to
self-government is oxymoronic.
'66 Shirley, 121 S. Ct. at 1825.
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tribal civil legislative jurisdiction.6 In the cases of Williams v. Lee 62 and
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," the Court held that certain types of
cases must be brought in tribal court. In the mid-1980s, the Court twice
held that disputes about the extent of tribal adjudicative jurisdiction over
non-Indians must first be litigated ("exhausted") in tribal court.'64 This so-
called "tribal exhaustion" requirement funneled many non-Indian litigants
into tribal court, although it did establish a mechanism for the federal
courts to review tribal court determinations as to jurisdiction. 65
This deference to tribal courts came to a screeching halt in 1997 with
the Supreme Court's decision in Strate v. A-i Contractors. 11 Strate began
when Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert were involved in the same traffic
accident on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota. 67 The
accident itself occurred on a state highway running through the reservation
pursuant to a right-of-way granted to the state by the United States."6
Fredericks was not herself a tribal member, but her deceased husband and
her five children were all members of the tribe. 69 Stockert was driving a
gravel truck owned by his employer, A-1 Contractors (anon-Indian owned
16 This Article compares a state's jurisdiction within its borders to a tribe's
jurisdiction within its borders. For an examination of tribal, federal, and state
adjudicatory jurisdiction in Indian Country, see Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in
Indian Country: The Confusing Parameters of State, Federal, and Tribal
Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539 (1997).
1 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (action by non-Indian to collect debt
incurred by Indian on the reservation). For a closer look at this case, see Dussias,
supra note 119, at 46-49.
6 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (action by tribal member
alleging her tribal government had violated the Indian Civil Rights Act).
" See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (concerning federal
diversity jurisdiction); Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845
(1985) (concerning federal question jurisdiction).
165 For a closer look at the tribal exhaustion doctrine, see Koehn, Civil
Jurisdiction, supra note 110. For a closer look at post-exhaustion review in the
federal courts, see Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion
Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (1998).
'" Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). See, e.g., Pommersheim,
supra note 1, at 128 ("This credo ofrespectand comity [appearedto be the Court's
approach toward tribal courts] .... Yet, a short ten years later, the Court in Strate
v. A-i Contractors appeared to veer sharply away from this model of engagement
to one of raw power....").
167 Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
161 Id at 442-43.
169Id. at 443.
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business), 7 ' and at the time of the accident, A-I Contractors was subcon-
tracted to do work for the tribe, although the record did not indicate
whether Stockert was working on that subcontract when the accident
occurred."' Fredericks filed suit in tribal court against both A-I Contrac-
tors and Stockert, seeking to recover for her injuries suffered in the
accidentY"
The case wound its way to the Supreme Court, which held that, at least
with respect to nonmembers, "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction."1" The Court also declared Montana's
test for tribal civil legislative jurisdiction was the appropriate test for
determining the extent of tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction.' 4 As to the
facts of the litigation itself, the Court held that, despite the fact that the
state highway came within the statutory definition of"Indian Country," the
highway should be considered the same as non-Indian fee land. 7 The state
highway was the legal equivalent of non-Indian fee land, thus activating
Montana's presumption that the tribe lacked civil jurisdiction over non-
Indian activity on the land. 76 The tribe could rebut this presumption by
satisfying either the consensual relationship or direct effects test. The
Court found that the first exception, consensual relations, did not apply to
the accident" and that the tribe had not satisfied the second exception,
the direct effects test."~ Thus, the tribe was deemed not to possess
adjudicative jurisdiction over an on-reservation auto accident between the
widow/mother of tribal members and a subcontractor working for the
tribe.
79
In reaching its decision, the Court did not explicitly state whether its
decision was based on subject matter or personal jurisdiction.' Given the
170 Id
171 Id
72Id at 443-44.
" Id at 453. For a critique of the decision to conflate these two types of
jurisdiction, see Reynolds, supra note 161, at 580-86.
74 Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.
'75 Id at 454-56.
176 Id at 456.
'7 Id at 456-57.
17 1 Id at 457-59.
17' For another look at the flaws of the Court's reasoning concerning the place
of the tribal courts in our federal system, see Pommersheim, supra note 1.
"' Cf Reynolds, supra note 161, at 583 ("[T]he recent confusion between
legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction is but a continuation of a long series of
Indian law opinions in which the Court has dealt with various tribal jurisdictional
2001-20021
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tenor and basis of the Court's decision, however, the Court quite likely
viewed this as a subject matter jurisdiction case, as it focused on the
Court's ability to hear the substance of the case, rather than to issue a
decision binding on the parties. And since the non-Indian plaintiffhad filed
the suit in tribal court, she would be deemed to have consented to tribal
court jurisdiction, thus leaving the tribal court's authority over the non-
Indian defendant the only issue. Since the court continually referred to the
subject matter of the lawsuit, as well as to the fact that Fredericks, Stockert,
and A-I Contractors were all non-Indian, the Court was probably not
focused simply on personal jurisdiction."1
The Court's recent decision in Nevada v. Hicks' reinforces this
interpretation. Hicks is, in fact, the Court's latest statement on tribal
adjudicative jurisdiction, and while it clarifies many principles, it does so
in a very disturbing way. The case began in 1990 with Nevada game
wardens suspecting that Floyd Hicks killed a California bighorn sheep, a
protected species, off the reservation.8 3 Hicks is a member of the Fallon
Paiute-Shoshone Tribes and resides on tribally-owned trust land on the
tribes' reservation in western Nevada.' Throughout the course of their
investigation, Nevada state officials obtained two state search warrants for
Hicks' home. Before executing those warrants, however, state law
enforcement also obtained a tribal search warrant each time, and the actual
searches were jointly conducted by state and tribal law enforcement.8 5
Neither search revealed any evidence of wrongdoing.1,
After the second search, Hicks filed suit in tribal court against the tribal
judge, the tribal officers, the state wardens in their individual and official
capacities, and the state of Nevada.'87 The suit alleged that officers had
damaged Hicks' property and that the second search exceeded the bounds
of the warrant.'88 The suit wound its way first through the tribal and then
through the federal court system, finally reaching the U.S. Supreme Court.
The primary issue before the Court was whether the tribal court "has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged tortious conduct of state wardens
issues without clarifying the type of jurisdiction at issue.").
"81 For a look at how some tribal courts have approached the question of their
personal jurisdiction, see Newton, supra note 110, at 322-26.
's2Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001).
'l Id at 2308.
'84 Id
185 Id
Is&Id
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executing a search warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime; and,
as to the [federal law claim], whether the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 is9
The justices of the Supreme Court issued five opinions: a majority
opinion, 90 two concurring opinions,"9 an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment," and an opinion that concurred only in the
judgment.'" Three of those opinions are likely to prove pivotal-the
majority opinion, the concurring opinion by Justice Souter, and the opinion
by Justice O'Connor concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment. My
analysis will, therefore, focus on those three opinions. I will first summa-
rize the key portions of each opinion and then turn to an analysis of the
impact of the decision.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by five
other justices. The opinion begins by reiterating the Court's statement in
Strate v. A-1 Contractors"94 that a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction. 9 The opinion
therefore turns to an examination of the tribe's legislative jurisdiction on
these facts, as a determination that the tribe lacks legislative jurisdiction
would effectively end the inquiry."9 The opinion also drops an early
189 Id at 2309. Section 1983 is a federal statute that provides a procedural
mechanism for persons to file suit claiming that state officials have violated rights
secured by the federal constitution and statutes. For more on the workings of §
1983 suits, see Koehn, The New American Caste System, supra note 120.
" Justice Scalia authored the opinion, and wasjoined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2307.
"' One by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, id at 2318
(Souter, J., concurring); and one by Justice Ginsburg writing only for herself.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion was short, only two paragraphs, and simply reiterated
that the majority's decision was limited to the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over
state law enforcement officers enforcing state law; it did not purport to resolve the
issue of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants generally. Id at 2324
(Ginsberg, J., concurring).
" Authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer.
Id at 2307 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113 Authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Stevens'
opinion focused on the issue of tribal court ability to hear § 1983 suits, arguing that
tribal courts do possess authority to entertain those suits. Id at 2332-34 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
'94Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
195 Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309.
" Id In bothStrate and Hicks, the Court found no tribal legislativejurisdiction.
It is not clear what form the next stage of the analysis would take should the Court
find that a tribe does possess legislative jurisdiction. In other words, will the tribe
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footnote stating that the opinion is "limited to the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law."'"
The opinion begins the Montana analysis by reinterpreting that case
and by rewriting the test in a way not previously understood. Justice Scalia
is, of course, notorious for performing this type of re-analysis. " This time,
Justice Scalia's brand ofreworking results in the statement that the general
rule of Montana limits tribal jurisdiction over all non-Indians, and the
"status of the land... is only one factor to consider in determining whether
regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 'necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations.' "" If such regulation is
not necessary, the tribe will lack legislative jurisdiction over non-Indians,
even on trust land. °° Justice Scalia does concede, however, that sometimes
the status of the land can be dispositive, but that will not automatically be
SO.
2 0 1
The majority opinion thus turns to an analysis of the Montana
exceptions, that is, whether the consensual relationship or direct effects test
will reverse the standard presumption and allow the tribe to exercise
regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers. These tests too, however, have
been subsumed as part of a larger inquiry into whether tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers on these facts is "'necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.' ,,2O2 The opinion quickly
dismisses the consensual relationship test as irrelevant, declaring that it
applies only to private consensual arrangements, and not to official
exercises of state law enforcement authority.
203
That left only the direct effects test, which the opinion launches into
with the ominous declaration that" 'Ordinarily,... an Indian reservation
is considered part of the territory of the State.' "204 The Court supports this
automatically have adjudicative jurisdiction or will some test be developed to
determine whether a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction is less than its legislative
jurisdiction?
1
97 Id at 2309 n.2. Somewhat sinisterly, though, that footnote opens by noting
that the Court has never held that a tribal court has jurisdiction over a nonmember
defendant. Id
198 For example, see Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19 Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 23 10.
2
00 Id.
201 Id
202 Id (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
203 Id at 2310 n.3.
204 Id at 2311 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 510
(1958)).
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bizarre statement, which is inconsistent with the express policies of
Congress and the executive branch, by citing to three sources. The first is
the 1958 edition of Federal Indian Law, which is not only an old (and
outdated) edition of that treatise, but is an edition that has been roundly
criticized as biased since it was written by the U.S. Department of the
Interior acting pursuant to an old, and since repudiated, federal policy of
terminating tribes.2" The second source is a 116 year-old Supreme Court
opinion that also does not account for changes in federal policy over the
last one hundred years.2 6 Finally, the third source was a 1962 Supreme
Court decision concerning Alaskan natives.2 7 The sovereignty of Alaskan
natives and the status of their land is governed largely by the Alaskan
Native Claims Settlement Act and is completely different than the land
status of tribes in the continental United States.'"
With this proposition established, the Court then conducted its analysis
of whether the actions by state law enforcement officials intruded on tribal
self-government, but it never identified or examined a single tribal
governmental interest. Instead, the Court focused exclusively on the interest
of state law enforcement in investigating off-reservation crime. 9 That
interest was sufficient to give state officials the ability to enter into the
reservation, onto tribally-owned trust land, and conduct their investigation.
Not once in its analysis does the majority opinion refer back to the fact that
prior to both searches the state officials obtained a tribal warrant or that
tribal police were also present at both searches. The Court concluded that
the tribal government lacked the ability to regulate the actions of the state
law enforcement under these circumstances, and therefore lacked
adjudicative authority absent some federal delegation of authority 1 The
Court found no such delegation.
The Court then turned to an examination of whether tribal courts had
the power to hear § 1983 cases.211 The Court held that they do not because
tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction and because allowing
them to hear § 1983 actions "would create serious anomalies," such as with
removal jurisdiction." 2 The majority concluded its analysis by loosening
205 Id
206 Id (citing Utah & N.R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885)).
207 Id (citing Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962)).
208 See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
209 Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2311-13.
210Id at 2313.
211 Id at 2313-14.
212 id at 2314.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the tribal exhaustion doctrine and holding that the defendants were not
required to exhaust their tribal court remedies in this case.
2 13
Justice Souter's concurring opinion went even further than the
majority's. Justice Souterjoined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued
for a general rule that tribes do not possess civil jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers absent one of the two Montana exceptions.2 4 The concurring justices
would not limit their holding, as did the majority, to state law enforcement
officers acting in their official capacity.2 5 This new rule would make the
identity of the defendant the primary jurisdictional fact, with the status of
the land relevant only insofar as it relates to one of the exceptions. 26 To
support its conclusion, the concurring opinion engaged in a highly suspect
review of precedent and history, taking decisions and statements out of
context, citing dissenting opinions, and referring to language in treaties
with tribes other than the one at bar.
217
The crux of its rationale, however, lies not in this analysis, but rather
in some statements made near the end of the opinion, where Justice Souter
writes:
A rule generally prohibiting tribal courts from exercising civiljurisdiction
over nonmembers, without looking first to the status of the land on which
individual claims arise, also makes sense from a practical standpoint, for
tying tribes' authority to land status in the first instance would produce an
unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt.
218
This statement blithely ignores two critical facts. First, it was the Court that
introduced this "unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt" in the first instance
with its decision in Montana v. United States.1 9 That the Court can create
a complex maze and then remove tribal jurisdiction based on that complex-
ity seems odd. Justice Souter's opinion also ignored the fact that the crazy
quilt could be reversed in a different direction-by returning territorial
integrity to the tribes and giving tribal governments full sovereignty within
their geographic territory. Indeed, this result would be much more consis-
213Id at 2315.
214 Id at 2318 (Souter, J., concurring).
215 Id (Souter, J., concurring).
216 Id (Souter, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 2319-22 (Souter, J., concurring).
21S Id at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring).
219 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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tent with current federal policy as established by both the legislative and
executive branches.22
The reason for Justice Souter's failure to explicitly consider this
possibility is likely found in his next three paragraphs, discussing the
"'special nature of Indian tribunals.' "' The opinion referenced the fact
that tribal courts have different structures and different substantive laws,
"which would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.'" Anyone
who comes into a state's territory is required to follow its laws, even if an
understanding of those laws rests on the interrelationship of some arcane
statutes, regulations, and court decisions. As other scholars have discussed,
however, this does not seem to be a problem when state jurisdiction is at
issue.' Escaping the fact that the Supreme Court's recent Indian law
decisions rest largely on racist presumptions about the nature of tribal
governments in general and tribal courts in particular is becoming
increasingly difficult."2
'o See, e.g., Royster, supra note 141, at 63-76. It would also be more consistent
with Supreme Court precedent prior to 1978. See generally, Frickey, A Common
Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 123; Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling
Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal
Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 3 81 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling Past
and Present]. For additional critiques of the current Supreme Court's Indian law
jurisprudence, see Dussias, supra note 119, at 18-43; Getches, supra note 121;
Gould, supra note 123.
221 Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676,693 (1990)).
222 Id (Souter, J., concurring).
2m Joseph William SingerSovereignty andProperty, 86Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
224 See generally Koehn, The New American Caste System, supra note 120; John
P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminshment ofEx Parte Young Expansion
ojfHans Immunity, and Denial oflndian Rights in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 787 (1999); Royster, supranote 141, at 253; Singer, supra note 223. Cf Frickey,
A Common Lawfor OurAge ofColonialism, supra note 123, at 7 ("It is the Court, not
Congress, that has exercised front-line responsibility for the vast erosion of tribal
sovereignty. The coherence that underlies the doctrinal confusion in the cases is a
strong, albeit largely unarticulated and undefended, judicial aversion to basic claims
of tribal authority over nonmembers that is implicitly projected upon Congress as
well. ). For a different perspective, suggesting that the Court's decisions are an effort
to further its own agenda regarding principles of federalism, see Alex Tallchief
Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its
Impetfect Notion ofFederalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267 (2000).
While there have been instances of unfair treatment by tribal governments and
tribal courts, states are also not free from these types of influences. The Supreme
Court recently heard a case in which a state judge was convicted of misusing his
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Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, is
little better. Despite the fact that it is labeled an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor's opinion is in large
measure a dissenting opinion, as it accuses the majority of issuing a
"sweeping opinion [that], without cause, undermines the authority of tribes
to 'make their own laws and be ruled by them.' "" Justice O'Connor
would, however, follow the majority in ruling that Montana is the
appropriate test for analyzing tribal "civil jurisdiction over nonmembers
both on and off tribal land." ' 6 She parts ways with the majority with
respect to the manner in which they applied that test; she views the
majority's analysis as inconsistent with precedent.? 7
To support her conclusion, Justice O'Connor reviewed prior cases
applying the Montana test and concluded that the status of the land, as
either trust or fee, is a very important part of that analysis and should play
a much larger role than it was accorded by the majority." She argues in her
opinion that:
powerto sexually assault and sexually harass women. See United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259 (1997). Also inrecentyears, a federaljudge has been impeached forbribery;
the highest judicial officer in the state of New York was convicted of essentially
stalking his former mistress; ajustice of another state supreme court was accused of
using his law clerks to acquire drugs to feed his addiction; and several members of the
Vermont Supreme Court have been embroiled in accusations ofjudicial misconduct.
And that list does not even begin to address the flagrant politicization of state elected
judiciaries, particularly in election years and during election campaigns. Why are
concerns of judicial competence and neutrality of paramount importance for the
jurisdiction oftribal courts, but bear little, if any, relevance to the jurisdiction of state
courts? In addition, perceived'"mfairness" of tribes is not limited justto nonmembers.
See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (in which the Supreme
Court found no federal jurisdiction to hear a case alleging that a tribe had illegally
discriminated against a tribal member on the basis of gender). As is true for any type
ofprejudice, education is the primary weapon to combatthese misunderstandings. For
an excellent look behind the prejudice against tribal courts, and an effort to use
education to reverse that prejudice, see Newton, supra note 110.
= Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2324 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,459 (1997)).
"' Id at 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
, Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor also would have not taken such a limited approach to the
consensual relations test, as she argues that it cannot be dismissed out of hand since
states and tribes do enter into consensual relationships with each other through the
process of compacting and interjurisdictional cooperative agreements. Id at 2327-
29 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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If Montana is to bring coherence to our case law, we must apply it with
due consideration to land status, which has always figured prominently in
our analysis of tribal jurisdiction....
•.. The Tribes' sovereign interests with respect to nonmember
activities on its land are not extinguished simply because the nonmembers
in this case are state officials enforcing the law.... The actions of state
officials on tribal land in some instances may affect tribal sovereign
interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than the actions of private
parties.229
Justice O'Connor does not, however, engage in an independent analysis of
what impact the status of the land had on the present case. She would,
instead, use basic principles of official and qualified immunity to solve the
dispute.?0 Since the lower courts did not consider this issue, and in light of
the tribal exhaustion doctrine, she would have remanded the case for
further proceedings."
What is now clear after Hicks is that Montana's general rule preempt-
ing tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers applies throughout Indian
Country, with land status used only as a factor in determining whether one
of the Montana exceptions has been met. What is not clear, however, is the
way in which land status will factor into this analysis. The majority opinion
performed no real analysis of land status, as it focused almost exclusively
on the fact that the defendants were state law enforcement officials
investigating an off-reservation crime. The majority gave no hint of how to
analyze land status when the defendant is not an official state actor. Justice
Souter, writing for two other members of the Court, appears to give short
shrift to land status, focusing primarily on the identity of the defendant.
Justice O'Connor, also writing for two other members of the Court, would
give much more significant weight to land status. Accordingly, we have a
3-3 split, with the other three justices (Scalia, Rehnquist, and Ginsburg)
giving no indication of how they would factor land tenure into a more
typical case.
In any event, the seeming agreement by all of the Justices that Montana
controls tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers throughout the reservation
turns the rationale of that decision on its head. In Montana, the Court
justified treating trust and fee land differently by examining how fee land
came into being. The Court found that when Congress opened reservations
Id. at 2329 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
230 Id. at 2330 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 2330-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to non-Indians, and sold reservation lands to them, Congress intended to
remove that fee land from tribal jurisdiction. No such justification can be
proffered as to trust land because Congress indicated an intent, in both the
Allotment Act and the IRA, to keep that land in Indian hands. Thus, the
Court's decision in Hicks to extend Montana to trust lands is without any
legal foundation. 2
The Hicks decision also pulls the Oliphant decision out of context
when it uses that case as an example of tribes' lack of jurisdiction over
nonmembers. Oliphant, however, rested on the Court's determination that
the federal government had made a conscious decision to create different
rules for tribes in the criminal jurisdiction arena than in the civil jurisdic-
tion arena. Hicks thus continues the Court's trend of developing federal
Indian law in a manner that directly contravenes the policy of the other two
branches of federal government, the branches which are supposed to have
primary responsibility for setting Indian policy. 3 Increasingly apparent is
the conclusion that the only possiblejustifications for the Court's decisions
are its own arrogant confidence in its "correctness" and its racist views of
tribal courts."
Regardless of any lack ofjustification, however, Hicks is now the law.
As a result, tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction is no broader than tribal
2 This is not the first time, however, that the Court has taken a particular ruling
in a prior Indian law case out of context and turned it into a more general rule. See,
e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and Indian A djudication: An Essay
on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV.
543 (1985); Robert N. Clinton, The Curse of Relevance: An Essay on the
Relationship ofHistoricalResearch to Federal Indian Litigation, 28 ARIZ. L. REV.
29 (1986); Judith V. Royster, DecontextualizingFederalIndian Law: TheSupreme
Court's 1997-98 Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 329 (1999).
13 For further critique about the ways in which the Supreme Court has given
undue influence to the allotment policy, see Frickey, A Common Lawfor OurAge
of Colonialism, supra note 123; Getches, supra note 121, at 1622-26. Professor
Judith Royster has written an excellent article devoted to tracing and critiquing this
trend. See Royster, supra note 141. In that article, she notes "[t]he allotment policy
is reminiscent of a horror movie villain, defeated in the final scenes and officially
dead. But as the closing credits roll, the faint continuing throb of a heartbeat can
be detected, and soon sequel after sequel resurrects the villain to continue its course
of destruction." Id at 20.
"34 See, e.g., LaVelle, supra note 224; Resnik, supra note 1; Singer, supra note
223. For an argument that the Court's decisions are based on efforts to further its
views of federalism, see Skibine, supra note 224.
As is true for any type of prejudice, education is the primary weapon to combat
ignorance. For an excellent look behind the prejudice against tribal courts, and an
effort to use education to reverse that prejudice, see Newton, supra note 110.
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regulatory jurisdiction, and both use the same test. That test, as now
interpreted, declares that tribes generally do not possess civil jurisdiction
of any sort over nonmembers anywhere on the reservation unless the tribe
can demonstrate that the actions of the nonmembers imperil tribal self-
government or internal relations. The consensual relationship and the direct
effects test will help guide this inquiry.
Now that the boundaries of tribal criminal and civil adjudicative
jurisdiction are clear, I will turn to an examination of how those boundaries
create difficulties for tribal governments faced with implementing the full
faith and credit requirements of the Violence Against Women Acts. Tribal
governments face many difficulties states do not, and Congress's failure to
directly address these complexities will inevitably lead to problems for
persons holding protection orders and who travel, live, or work in Indian
Country.
III. TRIBAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
VAWA's FULL FAITH AND CREDIT PROVISIONS
All tribal and all state governments must now implement the VAWA's
full faith and credit requirements. In the process of implementing this federal
statute, states and tribes must make a number of decisions.? 5 These decisions
must focus both on the government as the enforcing jurisdiction and on the
government as the issuing jurisdiction. After all, each government now has an
incentive to ensure that its protection orders qualify forthe VAWA's full faith
and credit protection. Tribes and states face similar issues when acting as the
issuing jurisdiction, and these issues are briefly highlighted in the first
subsection of this part. As is probably apparent from the discussion of
jurisdiction rules in the previous section, tribes face much more complicated
issues when it comes to being the enforcing jurisdiction. Those issues will be
explored in more detail in the second subsection of this part.
.4. Tribes as the "Issuing Jurisdiction"
In the VAWA, Congress mandated that all states and all tribes give full
faith and credit to any qualifying protection order issued by any other state
25 This portion of the Article grows out of my work with the Michigan
Working Group on Full Faith and Credit. My primary role within the Working
Group was as co-chair of the tribal jurisdiction subcommittee. The tribal
jurisdiction subcommittee explored several possible courses of action, but decided
that the primary need was to draft a model tribal code, which could then be adapted
and adopted by the various tribes in Michigan. A copy of that code is attached as
an appendix infra.
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or tribe. The VAWA also defines what constitutes a qualifying protection
order. Those requirements, however, are basic and straightforward. The
actual definition of "protection order" is quite broad and covers almost
every conceivable way to issue a protection order-by a civil or criminal
court, as a temporary or final order, and as a result of a dedicated proceed-
ing for the purpose of obtaining a protection order or as part of another
legal proceeding.3 6 The court issuing the protection order must have
possessed both personal and subject matter jurisdiction"' and must have
provided the respondent with due process.3 Finally, the VAWA puts strict
limitations on mutual protection orders. 9 Somejurisdictions issue mutual
protection orders-orders that direct both parties to stay away from each
other-almost as a matter of course. The VAWA's full faith and credit
requirements do not include these orders, at least not the protection order
automatically issued to the respondent. The petitioner's order still qualifies
for full faith and credit. More specifically, the mutual protection order
issued to respondent (against the petitioner) does not qualify under the
VAWA unless it was issued as a result of cross or counter petitions and the
issuing court made specific findings that each party was entitled to the
order.' °
Congress drafted the VAWA's definitions and prerequisites to cast a
broad net and reach as many legitimate protection orders as possible. With
this backdrop, a court can issue a protection order that qualifies under the
VAWA with relative ease. Nevertheless, there are some steps that an
issuing court can take to ensure that another jurisdiction will give full faith
and credit to the protection order. 4 The first suggestion, and a step often
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000).
The term 'protection order' includes any injunction or other order issued for
the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against,
or contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another person,
including any temporary or final order issued by a civil and criminal court
... whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente Ite
order in another proceeding so long as any civil order was issued in
response to a complaint, petition or motion filed by or on behalf ofa person
seeking protection.
Id
2 7 l § 2265(b)(1).
23 Id § 2265(b)(2).
239 d § 2265(c).
240 Idt
41 A full discussion of the methods and procedures for issuing protection orders
is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this subsection is limited to discussing
those aspects of a protection order necessary to qualify for full faith and credit
under the VAWA. For more about domestic violence codes and protection orders
in general, see LEHRMAN, supra note 23; NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22;
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overlooked, is to use clear language in the protection order, language that
is concise and specific. 42 It is impossible to train police officers in all of
the possible permutations of fifty different types of state protection
orders2'3 and over two hundred different tribal orders, not to mention
adding in the permutations of the District of Columbia and U.S. common-
wealths, possessions, and territories. By using clear language that is easily
understood, a court can ensure not only that both the petitioner and
respondent understand the terms of the order, but also that the order can be
easily interpreted by law enforcement officers and courts throughout the
country.
Within the body of the order, the court should also explicitly indicate
whether the protection order satisfies the VAWA's requirements of
jurisdiction and due process. In addition, if the order is a mutual protection
order, the court should declare whetherthe VAWA's prerequisites are met.
Just to make sure there is no misunderstanding, the issuing court should
also include in the protection order a specific statement that the order
satisfies the requirements of the VAWA and is due full faith and credit
under that statute (assuming, of course, that the order does qualify).
These steps are not, however, the end of the measures that an issuing
court can use. The body of the order should also clearly list the duration of
the order, when it takes effect and when it expires. The duration of
protection orders varies greatly among jurisdictions and this prevents
guessing games by the police officer called out to enforce a foreign
protection order, usually under circumstances that make legal research
difficult, if not impossible. The issuing court may also want to include
some sort of contact information for the officer who needs to verify the
validity of the foreign protection order. This contact information may take
the form of a state registry or may simply be the phone number and hours
of the court clerk.
In addition, the issuing court should comply with all relevant laws on
child custody,2" again explicitly stating in the body of the order whether it
THE N.W. TRIBAL COURT JUDGES ASS'N, supra note 22.
242 The suggestions here are drawn largely from the judge's bench card
developed by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. See
Violence Against Women Online Resources: Full Faith and Credit-A Judge's
Bench Card, at http'//www.vaw.umn.edu/FinalDocuments/judgefin.htm (last
modified Feb. 11, 2000).
243 Fifty would be the bare minimum. In all likelihood the number will be much
greater when you factor in the disparities in form and content of the cities and/or
counties within each state.
44For a brief discussion of the intricacies of child support and child custody
laws in connection with the VAWA, see infra notes 294-302 and accompanying
text.
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satisfies those requirements. It has also been recommended that the issuing
court make mention in the order of the relevant federal laws. As mentioned
above, the VAWA also created a number of new federal crimes regarding
interstate domestic violence. By noting these laws in the order, the court
can further put the respondent on notice of the consequences of violating
the protection order. Indeed, a court issuing a protection order should
explain to all the parties the scope of the order and the consequences for
violating it. Finally, the court should provide each party, particularly the
petitioner, with a certified copy of the order. A certified copy of the order
will assist the petitioner in obtaining enforcement of that order.
B. Tribes as the "Enforcing Jurisdiction"
The VAWA directs the enforcing jurisdiction to enforce a protection
order issued by another state or tribe as if it were the order of the enforcing
jurisdiction. As generally interpreted, this mandate means thatthe enforcing
jurisdiction sets the procedures for enforcement, as well as the penalties for
violations. The enforcing jurisdiction cannot refuse to enforce, however, on
the grounds that its own laws would not have allowed the petitioner to
obtain the order or that its own laws do not provide for a certain type of
provision present in the protection order. In other words, an enforcing
jurisdiction cannot refuse to act because the protection order is invalid
under its own law. The only questions are whether the issuing court
possessed the jurisdiction to issue the order and provided respondent with
the necessary due process. The VAWA does not, however, excuse the
enforcing government from standard jurisdictional requirements. In other
words, the enforcing government must possess both legislative and
adjudicatory jurisdiction over an alleged violator before that government
can punish a violation of a foreign protection order.
As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court has used different ap-
proaches for analyzing state and tribal jurisdiction. The language of the
VAWA's original full faith and credit provisions contained an ambiguity
with respect to tribal enforcement of foreign protection orders. The
ambiguity arises from the fact that Congress failed to recognize the
differences in state and tribal jurisdiction on the face of the VAWA.
Section 2265(a) provides that
[a]ny protection order issued that is consistent with subsection (b) of this
section by the court of one State or Indian tribe (the issuing State or
Indian tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another
State or Indian tribe (the enforcing State or Indian tribe) and enforced as
if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.245
241 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (1994), amended by id § 2265 (2000).
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The problem is with the language "enforced as if it were the order of the
enforcing State or tribe."
Under the Supreme Court's jurisdictional rules, states possess
territorial jurisdiction, but tribes do not. The Court's rulings as to tribal
jurisdiction, however, explicitly recognize that Congress has the power to
change those default rules, giving tribes more jurisdiction.4 Did Congress
intend to exercise this power when it equated states and tribes in the
language of the VAWA's full faith and credit requirement? In other words,
one interpretation of the key language is that Congress intended to grant
tribes the ability to enforce all foreign protection orders, thereby changing
the default rules that limit tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Another possibility, however, is to interpret the language to ascribe no
such intent to Congress. Under this interpretation, Congress did not add any
jurisdictional authority to what tribes already possess, but rather left both
states and tribes to ask the initial question "do we have the necessary
jurisdiction in this case?" under the standard rules ofjurisdiction. The first
interpretation, that Congress intended to grant broaderjurisdiction to tribes,
would make the most sense given the legislative intentions behind the
statute, which was to ensure that protection orders were valid throughout
the United States. On the other hand, Congress should know by now that
courts generally want to see an explicit statement from Congress before
they will hold that Congress has altered standard legal rules and presump-
tions. This consideration would cut against finding a broader grant of
jurisdiction, as Congress made no statement in the Act's legislative history
that it was intending to extend tribal jurisdiction over all persons who
violate protection orders in Indian Country.
This ambiguity left tribes in a quandary as to how to enforce the
VAWA's full faith and credit requirements. Indeed, just what those
requirements were when it came to tribes was not clear--do they enforce
all foreign protection orders or must they first conduct the complicated
jurisdictional analysis to determine whether the tribe has power over the
violator? Fortunately, Congress recognized this dilemma and has taken
some action, albeit imperfect, to address the question as part of the VAWA
2000.247
As finally enacted, the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 declared
that "tribal court[s] shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection
246 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676,686 (1990); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,557-63 (1981); Oliphant
v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
247 Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
orders, including authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt
proceedings, exclusion of violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate
mechanisms, in matters arising within the authority of the tribe."2' The
legislative history ofthis section is somewhat sparse. The conference report
says simply that these provisions "clarif~y] that tribal courts have full civil
jurisdiction to enforce protection orders in matters arising within the
authority of the tribe."249 What is likely clear after this amendment,
however, is that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
under this statute. In other words, VAWA does not alter the contours of
existing tribal criminal jurisdiction. If Congress had intended to expand
tribal criminal jurisdiction, surely itwould have said something about tribal
criminal jurisdiction in the VAWA 2000. This conclusion is reinforced by
an examination of two other bills introduced into the House of Representa-
tives on this topic.
House Bill 357 actually went the farthest in favor of expanding tribal
jurisdiction. As written, that bill provided:
For purposes of enforcement, a tribal court may exercise civil and
criminal jurisdiction over any person, Indian or non-Indian, who violates
a protection order within the tribal court's jurisdiction, if the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with the Indian Civil Rights Act.... The exercise
of criminal jurisdiction under this paragraph is subject to Federal court
habeas corpus review under [ICRA] after tribal court remedies are
exhausted.20
The bill also flatly declared that "a Federal, State or tribal court may not
refuse to enforce a tribal court order on the grounds that the tribal court
lacks jurisdiction over the defendant because of the defendant's status as
a non-Indian or nonmember Indian." 1 This bill, however, died in
committee.
House Bill 1248 also addressed issues of full faith and credit for
protection orders, and the committee report in conjunction with that bill
contains a letter from an Assistant Attorney General urging Congress to
"reinforce that protection orders issued by tribes are entitled to full faith
and credit, and make it clear that Indian tribes have jurisdiction to enforce
'A' 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) (2000) (amending id. § 2265 (1994)).
249H.R. REP.No. 106-939, at 104 (2001).
2 H.R. 357, 106th Cong. § 411 (a)(2) (1999).
2s1 Id § 41 1(b)(2).
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protection orders against Indian and non-Indian offenders." 2 The absence
of any language in the ultimate VAWA 2000 regarding criminal jurisdic-
tion is certainly likely to be interpreted by the courts as meaning no
Congressional intent to expand tribal criminaljurisdiction, especially as the
"Duro fix" legislation shows that Congress knows how to write legislation
on that topic.
The question, then, is whether Congress has altered the general status
quo of tribal civil jurisdiction. The VAWA 2000 declares that "tribal
court[s] shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders,
including authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt proceed-
ings, exclusion of violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate
mechanisms, in matters arising within the authority of the tribe." ' 3 This
language is somewhat circular, as it states that tribal courts have full civil
jurisdiction over matters within their authority.
One interpretation of this language is thatthe final phrase "over matters
within their authority," signals that Congress did not intend to expand tribal
civil jurisdiction past the default limitations established by the Supreme
Court. This argument can be bolstered by pointing to the fact that the
legislative history says that the section is intended to "clarify" tribal civil
jurisdiction rather than to expand or to redefine it.' Even under this
interpretation, however, tribes do have full authority to impose all civil
penalties overany offender, oncethetribe establishesjurisdiction underthe
Supreme Court's precedent.
This interpretation is by no means the only one. This language can also
be read as intending to give tribal civil jurisdiction over all those who
violate foreign protection orders within the tribe's Indian Country. Perhaps
the strongest argument in support of this second interpretation is to look at
what happens if the language in the VAWA 2000 is interpreted as not
altering the default rules for tribal jurisdiction. The following subsection,
therefore, examines the issues that would confront tribes if they must
enforce Congress's mandate within existing jurisdictional limitations. After
exploring these problems, the Article will return in Part IV to the argument
that this second, broader interpretation of the language in the VAWA 2000
must be the proper one.
Regardless of whether tribes are looking at their civil or their criminal
jurisdiction, they must always keep the key dictate of the VAWA in mind.
That dictate provides that a valid foreign PPO shall be "enforced as if it
211 H.R REP. No. 106-891, at 46 (2000).
21 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
2- H.R. REP. No. 106-939, at 104 (2001).
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were the order of the enforcing... tribe.""5 While this language contains
several ambiguities, particularly in the case of tribes, the federal statute
clearly intends that a tribe treat a foreign protection order as if it were
issued by the tribal court. This means, at a minimum, that whatever
penalties the tribal court imposes for a violation of its own protection order
shall also apply to violations of a foreign protection order. Otherwise, the
tribe will be enforcing foreign protection orders differently than its own,
which is inconsistent with the VAWA. Thus, a tribe must be careful to
create only one schedule of penalties for violating a protection order. As
discussed below, that schedule of penalties should be applied both to
violations of tribal protection orders and to violations of foreign protection
orders.
1. Addressing Criminal Jurisdiction Under the VAWA
Clearly, then, tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians who violate foreign protection orders in Indian Country.0 6 That
does not mean, however, that tribes should have no criminal laws prohibit-
ing and punishing violations of protection orders. Tribes still possess
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, and it is certainly possible that a
person who violates a foreign protection order may be an Indian. Thus, a
tribe should consider whether criminal penalties are consistent with tribal
tradition and culture. If they are, a tribe may want to create criminal
penalties, with the understanding that those penalties are subject to two
limitations. First, any criminal penalty cannot exceed the limitations
established by the Indian Civil Rights Act. 23 Second, those criminal
penalties cannot be applied to non-Indians. Thus, a tribe will certainly want
to establish some sort of civil penalties for violating foreign protection
orders. These civil penalties could then be applied to any person who
violates a foreign protection order in Indian Country, provided, of course,
that the tribe has jurisdiction over that person.
If a tribe does decide to establish criminal penalties, it must also
examine its laws regarding the abilities and powers of tribal police
2s 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
0
6 See Part ll.B.1; see also Christopher B. Chaney, The Effect of the United
States Supreme Court's Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth
Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 173 (2000).
27 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000) (limiting a tribe's ability to impose criminal
penalties to a maximum of $5000 and/or one year in jail).
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officers." Tribes will particularly want to determine whether their police
officers have the authority to investigate and to detain all persons for any
potential violation of tribal law, as well as to examine the contours of the
arrest authority provided to their police officers. Specifically, do tribal
police have the authority to perform warrantless arrests for violations of
protection orders? Many states classify violations of protection orders as
misdemeanors, and common law generally provides that police officers
may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor only if it was committed
in their presence. Thus, state police officers may not possess authority to
make warrantless arrests of all those who violate protection orders, absent
specific statutory authorization." 9 Tribal law may or may not contain
similar restrictions. Tribes will also want to consider other methods their
police might use to handle these situations and ensure that tribal law will
allow officers to take those actions. For example, tribal police could escort
the person offthe reservation, establish some other procedure for bringing
the alleged violator before the tribal court, or turn the alleged violator over
to state or federal authorities for prosecution.
Any police officer dealing with a protection order situation should also
keep in mind that other laws may be pertinent, not simply those rules speci-
fic to violations of protection orders. This is especially true for tribal police
officers given the lack of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Some tribal police officers may operate as federal officers, and others may
be cross-deputized as state officers, allowing them to act to enforce federal
and/or state law. This situation requires that tribal police be familiar not
only with tribal law, but also with state and federal law.2" Federal law
especially has been in flux, with the VAWA creating a number of new
domestic violence crimes, such as interstate domestic violence261 and
" For a look at some of the challenges and problems facing tribal police, see
STEWART WAKELING ET AL., POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (2001); Eileen M. Luna, Law
Enforcement Oversight in the American Indian Community, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y
REv. 149 (1999).
259 See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 2.
'6o It also requires that some sort of procedures be put in place to coordinate
activities of tribal, state, and federal law enforcement and prosecution officials.
See, e.g., Paziotopoulos, supra note 33, at 24-25 ("Once it is determined that a
federal crime under VAWA was committed, communication between the city and
state prosecutors and the U.S. attorneys will facilitate charging decisions involving
what to charge abuser with and where to file charges. In some cases, an abuser may
be charged under the laws of several jurisdictions.").
261 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2000) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994)).
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interstate violation of a protection order.262 In addition, the Supreme Court
has continually recognized thattribal police may arrestand detain offenders
for purposes of turning them over to the appropriate jurisdiction for
prosecution, even if the tribe itself lacks criminal jurisdiction. 63
Finally, tribal police officers may act in a civil, regulatory capacity and
not only in their capacity as enforcers of criminal laws. The next section
explores tribal civil jurisdiction over persons accused of violating foreign
protection orders.
2. Addressing Civil Jurisdiction Under the VAWA
To recap, one interpretation of the VAWA 2000 is that before a tribe
can enforce a foreign protection order, it must first determine whether it has
262 Id. § 2262(a)(1). These are just two of the new federal crimes. For a more
complete look at these, and other, federal crimes related to domestic violence, see
Id §§ 922(g), 2261, 2261A, and 2262.
26' Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990) (declaring that tribal law
enforcement possessed authority "to restrain those who disturb public order on the
reservation, and if necessary, to eject them"; if the tribe itself does not possess
jurisdiction to try and punish an offender, "tribal officers may exercise their power
to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities [for prosecu-
tion]"); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (acknowledging
continued ability of Suquamish Indian Tribe's power to detain offenders and turn
them over to the federal government for prosecution); United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544 (1975) (a tribe's inherent sovereignty includes the power to exclude
from tribal lands persons whom they deem to be undesirable). See also Ortiz-
Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding tribal officer's
stop, search, and detention of a non-Indian believed to be violating state or federal
law on public roads running through the reservation, and turning him over to the
DEA after finding marijuana in his camper); State v. Haskins, 887 P.2d 1189
(Mont. 1994) (tribal officers did not exceed their authority when they investigated
non-Indian's drug trafficking activities on reservation and turned evidence over to
state authorities for use in his criminal prosecution); State v. Pamperien, 967 P.2d
503 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding tribal officer's authority to stop, arrest and
detain non-Indian for on-reservation violations of state speeding law); State v.
Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332 (Wash. 1993) (upholding ability of tribal police to stop
a driver on reservation for possible violation of tribal law and determine if the
driver is an Indian subject to the tribe's jurisdiction; upon learning the speeding
offenderwas non-Indian, tribal officerhad inherent authority to detain and turn him
over to the Washington State Patrol). A tribe may, of course, also want to do both,
as the double jeopardy clause does not bar punishment by two (or three) different
sovereigns. Tribes are sovereign entities for purposes of the double jeopardy
clause. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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jurisdiction over the person accused of violating the order. That analysis
will turn on the identity of the offender and possibly on the nature of the
land where the violation occurred. The previous section analyzed tribal
criminal jurisdiction. This section focuses on the analysis for tribal civil
jurisdiction. Under the current test established by the U.S. Supreme Court,
if the alleged violator is a member of the tribe, and the violation occurred
within the tribe's Indian Country, the tribe will have full civil jurisdiction
over the alleged violator. If the person is not a member of the tribe,264
however, the tribe must engage in a complex analysis to determine whether
it possesses legislative and/or adjudicative jurisdiction.
Before engaging in that analysis, the tribe must first examine whether
it has voluntarily limited its own jurisdiction. Some tribes, either as a
matter of tribal constitutional or statutory law, have disclaimed jurisdiction
over non-Indians. These limitations were generally not "voluntary" in the
true sense of the word, as the disclaimers were often inserted by attorneys
at the Bureau of Indian Affairs during the process of proposing, reviewing,
and approving tribal constitutions and laws. Many tribes have removed
these provisions, but some still remain. The rest of this section will proceed
on the assumption that a tribe exercises civil jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by federal law. Each tribe, however, must conduct a survey of its
own law to ensure the truth of that assumption.
As discussed above in Part II, the same legal test governs both a tribe's
civil regulatory and civil adjudicative jurisdiction. To exercise civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian Country, a tribe must show that
the non-Indian either (1) engaged in consensual relations with the tribe or
an individual member of the tribe, or (2) that the non-Indian's action has a
direct effect on the core integrity of the tribe. In making this showing, a
tribe should identify the status of the land where the violation was
committed. If the land is tribal trust land, then the tribe is more likely to
possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on that land. If the land is fee
land, however, a tribe is less likely to have jurisdiction.2 6
To maximize their civil jurisdiction under this test, tribes must be
prepared to make an evidentiary showing on either or both of these two
2 As discussed supra note 152, the Court has consistently used the terms
"member" and "nomnember" in its civil jurisdiction cases. This is a different
division than that made in criminal cases after the Duro fix legislation. Since the
Courthas not been explicitly confronted with the question, it is unclear whether the
relevant distinction is between members and nonmembers or between Indians and
non-Indians.
2'5 See supra Part II.B.
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Montana exceptions. One method to assist in that showing is for tribes to
enact strong purpose language as part of any tribal code concerning the
enforcement of foreign protection orders. As is true with any legislation,
"purpose language" can assist future courts in understanding the legisla-
ture's thinking and the rationales underlying the statute. Within the context
of tribal civil jurisdiction, strong purpose language can promote awareness
of the ways in which violations of protection orders by nonmembers satisfy
both of the Montana exceptions.
Whether a particular situation satisfies the Montana exceptions is a
factually based determination. Thus, a tribe must make a factual record of
the ways in which a person who violates a foreign protection order has
engaged in consensual relations under the first prong of Montana and/or
has directly impacted the health and welfare of the tribe under the second
prong of Montana. One method of demonstrating that these tests are
satisfied is for the tribe to make legislative findings regarding these two
issues.
In making these findings, the tribal council should look at a wide
variety of things, including tribal tradition and culture, the rate of domestic
violence on tribal lands, and at the quantity of tribal resources spent
combating domestic violence. In examining these factors, the council
should keep in mind questions such as:
1) Does anything in tribal tradition or culture reference marriage or
intimate relationships as a consensual relationship that draws the spouse
or partner into the web of tribal society?
2) Is domestic violence committed in disproportionate numbers by
non-Indians?
3) Are violations ofprotection orders committed in disproportionate
numbers by non-Indians?
4) What types and quantities of tribal resources are spent combating
domestic violence and its impacts? This question could focus on factors
from tribal police activities to intervention by tribal child welfare services
to medical expenses incurred by the tribe.
The tribal council should document the hearing(s) in which these findings
are made by making some type of written or electronic record. The council
should also incorporate the findings into the text of the code itself. The goal
is to provide a record to which the tribe can point as part of any possible
future litigation challenging tribal civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian who
violated a protection order in Indian Country.
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Once a tribe determines it does possess civil jurisdiction over a
particular individual accused ofviolating a protection order, the tribe must
have some sort of procedure for handling these cases. For example, if a
violation ofa foreign protection order is classified as a civil infraction, how
will those cases come before the tribal court? Can the tribal police arrest a
person for a civil infraction and bring the person before the court? Does the
prosecutor file a charge for the civil infraction? Can the person harmed by
the violation directly petition the tribal court requesting that the court
impose sanctions for the violation? How will the defendant be given notice
of these proceedings? Can the tribal court issue a bench warrant under these
circumstances? What rules exist for hearing these cases? All of these
questions are primarily matters of tribal law and will require some thought
and attention by each tribe to develop a method that best suits the circum-
stances of the tribe.
Finally, once an alleged violator has been brought before the tribal
court, the court determines it has jurisdiction, and the court conducts a
hearing, the court must then decide what penalties to impose upon an
individual found to have violated a foreign protection order. In the VAWA
2000, Congress explicitly stated that once the tribe determines that it has
jurisdiction, it may exercise the full range of civil penalties, including civil
contempt powers, exclusion from tribal lands, and other civil penalties
authorized by the tribe.' This power exists regardless of the identity of the
offender as a member or nonmember.
Congress's declaration merits a closer look, particularly at civil
contempt sanctions. Generally speaking, civil contempt sanctions include
both fines and imprisonment, although imprisonment is less common for
civil contempt than for criminal contempt. A tribe that chooses to impose
imprisonment upon a non-Indian for civil contempt may run the risk of
having that action overturned by the federal courts, which have authority
to review the tribal court's action through the habeas corpus provisions of
the Indian Civil Rights Act.267 The Supreme Court has expressed great
reservations at the prospect of tribes putting non-Indians in jail.268 This
reluctance could lead to a flat ruling that tribes cannot impose imprison-
ment as a penalty for a non-Indian, even for a civil infraction. On the other
hand, incarceration is an accepted penalty for civil contempt in several
circumstances, and the VAWA 2000 explicitly recognizes that tribal courts
can impose penalties for civil contempt. That statement, coupled with
266 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
2 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000).
2 See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 684-92; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-11.
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existing law on tribal civil jurisdiction, should be sufficient to support a
tribal court's decision to impose jail time. "Should," however, does not
always carry the day in federal Indian law decisions.269 In any event, the
tribe may want to provide civil penalties other than imprisonment, so that
it will have a penalty to impose upon a non-Indian who violates a foreign
protection order, particularly since imprisonment is rare for civil contempt.
Even if "should" does carry the day, and tribes are able to impose the
full range of penalties for civil contempt, the primary problem with this
interpretation of the VAWA 2000 is that it undercuts the spirit and
purposes of the VAWA's full faith and credit provisions.270 Congress
clearly intended those provisions to create a system in which each and
every protection order (as that is defined in the federal statute) is valid
throughout the United States.27 To achieve this goal, Congress required
that all states and all tribes must enforce every valid protection order,
regardless of which state or tribe issued the order. This creates a blanket of
protection across the entire United States. If the restrictive interpretation is
adopted, thus keeping the current limitations on tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians intact, Congress will have created holes in that blanket
-pockets of territory where a person cannot rely on the coverage of his or
her protection order."
269 See supra Part II.B.2.
... For a fuller discussion of this problem, see infra Part IV.
271 See Susan B. Carbon et al., The Role ofJudges in Enforcing Full Faith and
Credit, at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/FFC/Chapter6.html (last modified Nov. 5,
1999) ("The purpose and rationale [of the VAWA] is simple: Women who receive
protection from any court, be it tribal or state, ought to be entitled to protection
throughout the United States and Indian country without having to repeat the
process. Whether she is crossing state or reservation lines for business or pleasure,
or fleeing form her batterer, she is entitled to the protections afforded by the
original state or tribal protective order.").
272 There is one other possible issue with respect to the penalties imposed by an
enforcing jurisdiction. The VAWA is unclear about what "enforcing" a protection
order entails, as the statute simply states that a valid foreign protection order shall
be "enforced as if it were the order ofthe enforcing... tribe." 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)
(2000). Does enforcement include just the explicit terms of the order (for example,
"don't go near the petitioner") or does enforcement also include any penalties
contained on the face of the order ("if you do, you may spend up to 60 days in
jail")? The statute does not give any guidance about how to answer that question.
This ambiguity also potentially collides with the limited criminal penalties a
tribe may impose, even upon a defendant who is subject to the tribe's jurisdiction.
It is possible that a foreign jurisdiction's protection order might call for a fine
and/or jail term that exceeds that permitted by the Indian Civil Rights Act. Of
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3. Other Issues Tribes Must Confront
While the above issues are the most difficult and troubling in terms of
jurisdiction, there are a number of other issues that tribes must confront due
to their special legal situation. Specifically, tribes must make decisions
about whose orders will be recognized, how to handle civil and criminal
protection orders, how to handle child support and custody orders, whether
to extend statutory immunity to law enforcement officers, and whether to
create a registration system. States must also confront all five of these
issues, but each of the issues contains at least one extra layer in the tribal
context. What follows is a brief discussion of these issues, intended to
highlight the scope of the problem. This section of the Article does not
attempt to be comprehensive and provide answers for all of the problems.
The model code and commentary set forth in the appendix does provide a
look athow the Michigan Working Group on Full Faith and Creditresolved
the issues and provides some statutory language tribes might wish to use.
a Whose Orders Will Be Recognized
The VAWA requires that states and tribes recognize and enforce valid
protection orders issued by the court of any other state or tribe.273 The
statute defines "state" as "a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and a commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United
States."274 The word "tribe" is not explicitly defined, but likely has a
common meaning of all federally recognized tribes.
It is often said that the purpose of the VAWA was to make sure that
protection orders are good anywhere within the United States. But the
VAWA's full faith and credit requirements do not cover all courts issuing
protection orders. The obvious gap is that federal protection orders are not
listed. This may seem natural, as family law and family violence are not
course, this also brings up the issues discussed above as to the tribe's ability to
impose a criminal penalty upon a non-Indian. The general consensus after
discussing this issue with many experts is that the VAWA requires enforcement of
the substantive terms of the protection order, with the penalties left to the laws of
the enforcing jurisdiction.
273 Id
Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection (b) of this
section by the court of one State or Indian tribe (the issuing State or Indian
tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State or
Indian tribe (the enforcing State or Indian tribe) and enforced as if it were
the order of the enforcing State or tribe.
274 Id. § 2266(8).
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traditional subjects for federal courts, but some federal courts do handle
these issues, particularly in the context of criminal proceedings. Federal
courts may issue protection orders as part of a release order in a criminal
case or may directly issue a protection order under 18 U.S.C. § 1514, which
grants federal courts the power to issue a civil order protecting the victim
or a witness in a federal criminal case. 5 These orders would not be
automatically entitled to full faith and credit under the VAWA's provi-
sions, although states and tribes are certainly free to choose to recognize
them.
In addition, some specialized federal courts do routinely handle family
violence issues. It appears that most military protection orders are issued
by commanding officers rather than by military courts, but that does not
mean that no military courts issue protection orders. Any protection order
issued by a military court also falls outside of the VAWA's mandates.
But the important gap as far as tribes are concerned may be Courts of
Indian Offenses, which are federal courts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
began establishing Courts of Indian Offenses, also known as CFR courts,276
in the second half of the nineteenth century as a method of maintaining law
and order on the reservations. 2' As federal policy toward Indian tribes
changed in the twentieth century to a policy of self-governance rather than
assimilation, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act,278 which
authorized tribes to create (actually, re-establish)279 their own courts to
replace the CFR courts. Many tribes chose to take advantage of this
opportunity to supplant the CFR courts, but some of these courts still
remain today, exercising authority to adjudicate disputes, including issuing
protection orders.280 Since these protection orders are issued by a federal
court sitting on a reservation, rather than an actual tribal court, they very
2751 d § 1514.
276 These courts are so named becausethe laws and regulations governing them
are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations. See Law and Order on Indian
Reservations, 25 C.F.R. § 11 (2001).
277 VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 113-15 (1983).
27 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
279 Tribes operated their own courts and dispute resolution mechanisms for
centuries before the Europeans set foot on this continent. For a brief history of
tribal courts, see Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction, supranote 110. For a more current look
at the workings of tribal courts, see POMMERSHEIM, supra note 110, at 57-135;
Newton, supra note 110.
"o For a list of the Courts of Indian Offenses, see 25 C.F.R. § 11.100.
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likely do not fall under the VAWA's full faith and credit provisions.
Remember, those provisions refer only to "state" and "tribal" courts.
Thus, a tribe implementing the VAWA's requirements may want to
provide broader recognition than is required. Since tribal governments are
sovereign entities, possessing the ability to enact and enforce laws, they are
certainly able to recognize and enforce protection orders issued by CFR
courts. Nothing in the federal statute provides that only tribal and state
protection orders are entitled to full faith and credit; rather, the federal
statute sets a floor, not a ceiling. To account for the historical vacillations
of federal Indian policy and to ensure all protection orders issued in Indian
Country are given full faith and credit, tribes may want to include CFR
courts within their definition of"issuing courts." Of course, states may also
want to consider CFR courts in their statutes, especially those states in
which CFR courts are located.
Finally, protection orders issued by other countries are also not listed
in the VAWA. This omission is much more understandable, as orders and
judgments of foreign courts are not automatically recognized by U.S.
courts.28 But the drawing of international borders, particularly those with
Mexico and Canada, arbitrarily divided some Indian tribes. Groups that had
been part of one people are now separated by lines they had no part in
drawing."
Obviously, given the proximity of Michigan and Canada, many tribes
in Michigan are closely related to tribes in Canada and may have at one
time been part of a single Indian nation. As a result of this problem, the
tribal jurisdiction subcommittee of the Michigan Working Group on Full
Faith and Credit explored the possibility of including Canadian protection
orders in its model tribal code. The first question, of course, is whether
Canadian courts even issue protection orders. A survey of Canadian law
reveals that at least two provinces, Saskatchewan and Prince Edward
Island, have adopted a domestic violence act that includes a provision for
protection orders.28
What is not clear is the form and content of these orders-what do they
look like and what do they say? How should police recognize and handle
28 For an overview of the treatment of foreign country judgments, see Linda
Silberman, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in the
United States, 648 PLI/Lit 255 (2001).
' For a look at some of the issues and problems presented by this history, see
Richard Osbum, Note, Problems and Solutions Regarding Indigenous Peoples
Split by International Borders, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 471 (2000).
"3 See, e.g., Dolgopol v. Dolgopol, [1995] 127 Sask. R. 237, available at 1995
ACWSJ LEXIS 46464.
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these orders if and when the police are confronted with them? After some
discussion and hesitation, the committee determined that some of the issues
were inherent in the VAWA's requirements and both those, as well as any
remaining issues, can be resolved. Adding Canadian protection orders into
the mix does not add much more variety than already exists when one
considers that the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements encompass
over two hundred tribal courts, fifty state courts (more, if you count the
individual cities and counties), the District of Columbia courts, and the
courts of all U.S. territories, commonwealths, and possessions. Also, the
VAWA, as well as the model tribal code, contains two provisions to help
deal with this variety.
The first provision is the intentionally broad definition of a protection
order. The VAWA casts a broad net of coverage in its definition:
The term "protection order" includes any injunction or other order issued
for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment
against, or contact or communication with or physical proximity to,
another person, including any temporary or final order issued by a civil
and criminal court... whether obtained by filing an independent action
or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding so long as any civil order
was issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on
behalf of a person seeking protection.'
As is clear, this definition includes both civil and criminal orders,
temporary and final orders, and orders issued in a stand alone proceeding,
as well as orders issued as part of any other legal proceeding. This would
encompass just about any method and form that Canada might use to issue
protection orders.
The second provision is the due process requirement. In defining "valid
protection order," that is, a protection order that must be given full faith
and credit, the VAWA requires that the issuing court provide due process
to the respondent.2 These basic requirements of notice and an opportunity
to be heard should minimize potential unfairness to the respondent and
ensure that the protection order was issued as a result of a fair proceeding.
There is no requirement in the VAWA that states and tribes recognize
protection orders issued by foreign countries." 6 Indeed, there may be many
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000).
2Id. § 2265(bX2).
' There may, however, be international law provisions, including treaties, that
speak to this issue. An exploration of international law is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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countervailing concerns, such as determining the form and content of the
protection order and ensuring that due process was provided. In addition,
there is the standard presumption in U.S. law against enforcing foreign
protection orders. On the other hand, these problems can be controlled and
recognizing foreign protection orders would give effect to the spirit of the
VAWA that a person covered by a protection order be able to travel freely
and rely on the protection of that order. Again, states (particularly border
states) may also want to consider these issues; however, since tribes were
arbitrarily divided by state borders, they may have a more significant
interest in doing so.
b. Which Orders Will Be Recognized
As discussed in the prior subsection, the VAWA contains a very broad
definition of "protection order," encompassing civil and criminal orders,
temporary and permanent orders, and orders issued both in separate
proceedings and as part of other legal proceedings.2 This broad definition,
particularly the portion of the definition requiring enforcement of orders
issued by both civil and criminal courts, can create numerous problems for
the enforcing jurisdiction.
The problem is not with civil court, but rather with criminal courts.
Criminal courts may include protection provisions as conditions of release,
probation, or parole; criminal courts may also issue them as part of an anti-
stalking case. It is not standard practice for one jurisdiction to enforce
another's criminal laws, including these types of provisions. This lack of
enforcement is the result of a number of problems, including difficulties
verifying the terms of the order and a lack of statutory enforcement
authority. This lack of authority generally takes two related forms. First,
many legislatures have not enacted statutes permitting (or requiring) the
prosecution of individuals who violate criminal orders issued by another
jurisdiction. Second, and often a corollary to the first, most jurisdictions
have not given their law enforcement officers authority to arrest those who
violate anotherjurisdiction's criminal orders.
A variety of measures exist to address these issues. For example, one
possibility is for each jurisdiction to enact a law making it an offense
(either civil or criminal) to violate any protection order issued by another
jurisdiction. This statute could even specifically indicate that it covers
protection orders issued by criminal courts. As part of this approach, a
jurisdiction could also require that criminal and civil protection orders be
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5).
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treated the same. This would minimize some of the difficulty of handling
disparate types of orders and would comply with the VAWA's full faith
and credit requirements. The enforcingjurisdiction would then be enforcing
its own laws when it punishes a violation of a protection order, and not the
criminal laws of the issuing jurisdiction.
Another possibility is for a jurisdiction to extradite the offender to
answer for his actions before the court that issued the protection order. This
possibility, however, brings with it two additional problems. The first is
that extradition is not truly "enforcement" of the criminal protection order,
thus violating the VAWA's requirements. The second is that criminal and
civil orders are being treated differently, with one enforced and the other
not enforced. Obviously, this again violates the VAWA's intent that all
valid protection orders be effective throughout the United States.
A final possibility that has been suggested is for a jurisdiction to
implement the VAWA by enacting a statute that provides for enforcement
only of civil foreign protection orders. This approach is the one embodied
in the Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic-Violence Protection
Orders Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Section 2(5) ofthat Uniform Act defines "[p]rotection
order" as "an injunction or other order, issued by a tribunal under the
domestic-violence or family-violence laws of the issuing State.... ." 8 This
definition is clearly narrower than the one contained in the VAWA,
particularly in the omission of any mention of orders issued pursuant to
criminal laws." 9
This omission is reinforced in Section 3(b) of the Uniform Act, which
declares that "[a] tribunal of this State2' may not enforce a foreign
protection order issued by a tribunal of a State that does not recognize the
standing of a protected individual to seek enforcement of the order."291
Although this statutory language is somewhat cryptic, the drafters'
comment makes the intention clear. In the comment, the drafters state that
this subsection is designed to "address [ ] the problem of the enforcement
28 UNIF. INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE PROTECTION
ORDERS ACT, supra note 76, § 2(5).
289 This not only omits all protection order conditions that might be part of
release, probation or parole for assault and battery, but also omits any possibility
of a protection order under an anti-stalking statute.
29 "State" is defined by the Uniform Act as including an Indian tribe or band.
UNIF. INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS
ACT, supra note 76, § 2(7).
291 Id § 3(b).
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of protection orders issued by criminal courts."'2 According to the
comment, the Constitution prohibits one jurisdiction from enforcing
another's criminal protection order, as "a criminal protection order is one
that provides a remedy to the public as a whole," as opposed to an
individual.
This statement shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of
criminal protection orders. Although they are issued as part of a criminal
proceeding, they are designed to protect a specific individual, and that
individual has the right to rely on such protection. In essence, that right is
at the heart of the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements. Granted, the
traditional punishment for violating conditions of release, probation, or
parole is the revocation of that freedom. The VAWA, however, does not
require that the enforcing jurisdiction enforce the foreign protection in the
same manner as the issuing jurisdiction would. Instead, the VAWA states
that an enforcing jurisdiction must enforce the order as if it were issued by
a court of the enforcing jurisdiction. That means the enforcing jurisdiction
can create its own mechanisms for handling the violation, such as through
the first suggestion discussed above. Congress mandated full faith and
credit to both civil and criminal orders. Compliance with the federal statute
is a must, unless there is simply no constitutional method of doing so. Since
there is a constitutional method of handling criminal protection orders, a
failure to enforce foreign criminal protection orders is aviolation offederal
law.
c. Child Support and Custody Orders
In the previous two subsections, the open issues confronting tribes and
states were very similar, although an extra layer of complexity existed for
tribes. In this section, the issues are once again somewhat similar, but the
open issues confronting tribes are much more difficult and unique. The
problems revolve once again around the different possible contexts and
contents of protection orders.
Protection orders may be issued, among other ways, as part of a divorce
action, a child custody proceeding, or a separate procedure instituted
specifically for the purpose of obtaining a protection order. Since all of
these actions may result in protection orders, as well as orders regarding
child support and child custody, they can create a number of problems for
courts. Both the original and amended language of the VAWA complicate
these problems.
2Id § 3(b) cmt
m Id.
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The 1994 VAWA's definition of a protection order contained a
parenthetical excluding "support or child custody orders."294 This paren-
thetical raised a number of questions, the most important of which is
identifying the "support or child custody orders" Congress intended to
exclude from coverage. Two possibilities exist. First, protection orders
themselves may contain provisions related to child custody and support.
Congress could have intended to excerpt these provisions from the ones
entitled to full faith and credit. In other words, the enforcing jurisdiction
should enforce all the provisions of the protection order except any support
or custody provisions. Second, child support and custody orders themselves
may include a protection order provision. Thus, the protection order is not
a separate document, but is one element of the custody and/or support
decree. Congress might have been intending to exclude these types of
protection orders from the VAWA's mandates, or may have simply
intended to explain that the protection order provision is entitled to full
faith and credit under the VAWA, but that the VAWA does not automati-
cally reach out and encompass the rest of the custody and support decree.
The 2000 VAWA attempted to resolve this ambiguity with new
language in the parenthetical exclusion. As amended, the statute now states
that a protection order does not include "a support or child custody order
issued pursuant to State divorce and child custody laws, except to the
extent that such an order is entitled to full faith and credit under other
Federal law."295 This amendment did clarify which child custody and child
support orders were being discussed. The problem is that the amendment
introduced an extra layer of complexity concerning tribes.
The parenthetical now refers to support and custody orders issued
pursuant to "state" divorce and child custody laws. Tribes also issue
divorce and custody orders pursuant to tribal divorce and child custody
laws. Was the omission of "tribes" inadvertent or deliberate? The
legislative history is not helpful on this issue. Some inferences, however,
can be drawn.
The key is the last clause of the parenthetical, the one stating "except
to the extent that such an order is entitled to full faith and credit under other
Federal law." Crossjurisdictional enforcement of child support and custody
orders is governed by a complex web of statutes,29 including, but not
294 18 U.S.C. § 2266, para. 3 (1994), amended by id § 2266 (2000).
295 Id § 2266(5) (2000).
29 A full discussion of the rules concerning child custody jurisdiction and
enforcement in the tribal context are complicated and outside the scope of this
Article, so this section will be limited to an examination of the child support and
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limited to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("-UCCJA"),297 its
updated version, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act ("UCC]EA"),298 the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act ("PKPA"),
and the Indian Child Welfare Act' ° On top of these statutes are added any
variations states may have added when adopting the uniform laws and any
relevant tribal laws.
It is possible that Congress referred only to states (and not tribes) in the
parenthetical because it was concerned with the PKPA, which is the
primary federal law setting standards forgiving full faith and credit to child
support and custody orders. The PKPA is arguably inapplicable to tribes,
as it refers to "states" and defines that term to include states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions;301 tribes are
not included on that list. Courts, however, have split over the applicability
of the PKPA to tribes." As a result, there is no clear answer to how tribes
should handle foreign protection orders contained in other tribes' child
custody and support orders. One possibility is for a tribe to enforce only the
protection portion of the order, and not the custody and support provisions.
It is also possible, however, that Congress did not intend even the
protection portions of these orders to be given full faith and credit unless
the orders otherwise qualify for full faith and credit. Congress simply has
custody issues raised by the VAWA. For a start in understanding the complexity
of these issues, see In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d I (Mont. 1998); Barbara
Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdic-
tionalAmbiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1051 (1989); Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity
andAssimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal Power Over Children, 83 MINN.
L. REv. 927 (1999); Patricia M. Hoff, TheABC's ofthe UCCJEA: Interstate Child-
Custody Practice Under the NewAct, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267 (1998); David M. Ujke,
Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Domestic Relations Matters Involving Indian
Children: Not Just a Matter of Comity, 66-AUG WIs. LAW. 10 (1993); see also
WEINTRAUB, supra note 82, at 327-45.
29 UNw. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 261 (1999).
298 UNF.CHLDCUSTODYJURiSDIcTIONANDENFORCEMENTACT, 9 U.L.A. 649
(1999).
299 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
30 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
301 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(8).
3 See, e.g., Larch v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989)
(tribe is a state under PKPA); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977) (tribes are not bound by the full faith and credit provision of § 1738
because Indians are not "territories or possessions" of the United States); In re
Guardianship of Chewiwi, 1 Navajo Rptr. 120 (1970) (same).
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not provided enough guidance, and courts will have to deal with these
orders on a case by case basis.
d. Immunity
The law enforcement community is inextricably bound up in the
success or failure of the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements 33
Police are often the first called when there are allegations that a protection
order has been violated) °4 The officers on the scene must determine the
best method of handling the problem and take the appropriate actions.
According to the VAWA, those actions must be the same regardless of
whether the protection order involved was issued by thatjurisdiction or by
another jurisdiction.
Since the passage of the VAWA, police have been concerned about a
whole new wave of liability stemming from enforcement of foreign
protection orders. 5 The officer standing on someone's front lawn at 2:00
a.m. in the pouring rain, reading a strange protection order with different
phraseology and a different format, may also have her job complicated by
worries of false arrest claims should she arrest the respondent only to find
out later that the protection order was invalid."°
The problem is further complicated by the fact that by not acting on a
valid protection order, the police officer may be opening herself up to a suit
by the petitioner. Police are unaccustomed to liability for failure to act,
especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County. 7 In that case, a social worker chose not to remove a
boy from his home, despite repeated instances of abuse. 3 The boy's
stepfather ultimately beat him so badly that he ended up with permanent
303 Klein, supra note 31, at 264-65.
3o Immunity issues arise for all government actors involved in enforcing
foreign protection orders. The issues are particularly acute for police officers,
however, as they will often be called upon to act in situations and under time
constraints such that they are not able to fully gather all evidence. In addition,
common law and statutory immunities for prosecutors and judges tend to be
broader than immunity for police officers. Thus, this section will focus on
immunity for police. Any statutory immunity provision should, however,
encompass all governmental actors and not just police officers.
305 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 31, at 264-65.3
1 Woo, supra note 5, at 409.
307DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).30 1 Id at 192-93.
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and severe brain damage2' The boy's mother filed suit on his behalf under
§ 1983, seeking damages. ° The Court held that the social worker's failure
to act was not actionable under § 1983, as she was under no duty to act to
protect the boy."' The difference under the VAWA, however, is that
jurisdictions are statutorily bound to enforce foreign protection orders as
they would their own. So a failure by police to arrest for a violation of a
foreign protection order, when they would arrest for a similar violation of
a domestic protection order, is a violation of that statutory duty.
Accordingly, law enforcement officers feel caught in a catch-22, open
to liability both for enforcing and for failure to enforce a foreign protection
order. Police do usually possess some sort of common law good faith
immunity for both statutory and common law torts, but many police groups
have pushed for explicit statements of immunity for their actions with
respect to foreign protection orders. 312 The counter argument often offered
for this proposal is that an explicit statement of immunity in one statute
may imply a lack of immunity elsewhere. This is a problem, however, that
can be neutralized by the language used in the immunity provisions.
One issue concerning immunity is the same for both state and tribal
governments-should an immunity provision cover only good faith actions
or should it also cover good faith refusals to act? The attorneys with the
Full Faith and Credit Project, as well as others in the field, have strongly
argued that any immunity provision should protect only those who in good
faith take action to enforce a foreign protection order. 3 These attorneys
argue that the purpose of the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements is
to mandate enforcement of foreign protection orders and that, therefore, the
presumption should be in favor of enforcement. Providing immunity for
omissions or non-enforcement, they argue, would undercut that presump-
tion.
This argument does have some force, but I believe it is ultimately
outweighed by the counter argument. Yes, the presumption should be in
favor of enforcement, and police should be encouraged to enforce foreign
protection orders. Situations will certainly arise, however, in which a police
311Id at 193.
3 1 0
Id
311 Id at 199-202.
32 Many states also provide statutory immunity for actions police take pursuant
to domestic violence statutes. See Klein, supra note 31, at 264-65.
313 Letter from Mary Malefyt, Senior Attorney for the Full Faith and Credit
Project, to Gail Kreiger, Michigan Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual
Violence (Mar. 6, 2001) (on file with author).
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officer makes a good faith determination that the foreign protection order
does not exist or is invalid. For example, suppose an officer is called out to
the scene of a domestic dispute and the woman informs the officer that she
has a protection order that requires her ex-husband to stay a certain distance
from her. Since the two are standing face to face on the same front lawn,
that protection order is currently being violated. Suppose further that the
woman does not have a copy of the protection order to show to the officer.
A physical copy of the order is not required under the VAWA as a
prerequisite to enforcement. Indeed, most police are being trained in
methods to verify the existence and terms of foreign protection orders.
Suppose all those verification efforts turn up nothing-no evidence the
order exists, but no evidence that it does not, either. The officer should still
enforce the foreign protection order, provided the officer has reasonable
cause to believe the woman is being truthful about the existence and terms
of the order. But what if the woman is drunk or high on drugs or both? That
type of impairment, depending on the degree and the physical manifesta-
tions, may lead the police officer to discount the woman's credibility. In
those circumstances, the police officer should certainly take all necessary
steps to keep the peace, including arresting the ex-husband for any pertinent
offense such as trespass or breach of the peace or even public drunkenness.
The officer may, however, make a reasonable determination under the
circumstances not to arrest the ex-husband for a violation of the protection
order. In these circumstances, provided the officer's decisions were
reasonable and taken in good faith, the officer should not be open to
liability should it later be proven that the foreign protection order did, in
fact, exist. Police officers should be taught to enforce foreign protection
orders whenever it is reasonable to do so (and they should not be allowed
to get away with crabbed definitions of "reasonable"), but they should not
be required to enforce foreign protection orders when they legitimately and
reasonably believe that the order does not exist. Thus, I would recommend
immunity both for good faith failures to enforce as well as for good faith
actions to enforce foreign protection orders.
Finally, liability and immunity for tribal law enforcement can be more
complicated than for state officers, lending further impetus to the need for
an explicit statement of immunity. While by definition, tribal police
officers act pursuant to tribal law, and are thus subject to tribal tort claims,
tribal officers may also act as federal and/or state officers. Tribal officers
may be cross-deputized as state officers. In addition, some tribal officers
may also operate as BIA officers, thus making them federal officers. Thus,
the liability and immunity of tribal officers may depend on a complex
interrelationship of tribal, state, and federal law. All three of these
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jurisdictions have both statutory and common law methods for holding
governmental officials responsible for their actions, as well as the ability
to spread the sovereign's defense of immunity to help shield those officers
from liability for good faith actions. A full analysis of these complexities
are both outside the scope of this Article and impossible to resolve absent
more facts. 14 What is possible, however, is for a tribe to head off some of
these problems by including an explicit statement of immunity in the tribal
statute implementing the VAWA's full faith and credit requirements.3"'
e. Registration
A final issue arising under the VAWA's full faith and credit provision
revolves around registration of foreign protection orders. The 1994 VAWA
said nothing about registration, leaving the states to take diverse paths, with
some allowing registration, some requiring it, and some not creating a
registration mechanism 6 Many argued, however, that registration was
inconsistent with the purposes of the VAWA and with the language of 18
U.S.C. § 2265(a), which states that qualifying protection orders "shall be
afforded full faith and credit,"3 7 without mentioning prior steps such as
registration.""3
The problem is twofold. First, the VAWA requires full faith and credit,
but does not prescribe the procedures for accomplishing that task. Rather,
it simply directs states and tribes to enforce foreign protection orders as
they would their own protection orders.1 This leaves each jurisdiction
broad latitude to create those procedures, and regardless of the VAWA's
demands, there is no doubt that each jurisdiction will have to create some
procedures specific to foreign protection orders. At a minimum, each
jurisdiction will have to create training procedures for law enforcement
officers and courts regarding the demands of the VAWA and how to
recognize qualifying protection orders. Several states, however, went even
"4 For a start on that analysis, see Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1253
(10th Cir. 2000) and authorities cited therein (analyzing the Indian Law
Enforcement Act in context of a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act); United
States v. Bettelyoun, 16 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Indian Law Enforcement
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f) (2000); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1)
(2000).
315 For an example of such a provision, see infra Section V and accompanying
commentary of the model tribal code set out in the appendix.316 See Klein, supra note 31, at 257-65.
317 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000).
31 See Klein, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263-64.
31 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
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further in the years after the VAWA's passage and set up more elaborate
procedures for foreign protection orders, including registries.
The second aspect of the problem revolves around the fact that there
are strong arguments both for and against registration procedures. In the
typical registration procedure, a person holding a protection order takes a
certified or other official copy of that order to the courts of the new
jurisdiction. 2 The courts of the new jurisdiction then verify that the
protection order qualifies for full faith and credit under the VAWA and
enter an order declaring that the foreign protection order so qualifies.
Both the foreign protection order and the attached recognition order are
then filed with the new jurisdiction's courts and law enforcement offi-
cials.
These procedures have the advantage of relieving law enforcement
officers of resolving the uncertainty of the existence and/or validity of a
foreign protection order.3 2' The registration process creates a standard
recognition form and a paper trail that facilitates full faith and credit by
both police and courts.
At the same time, however, this paper trail may cause officers to
become overly reliant on the standard form. As a result, police may fail to
enforce a valid protection order that has not been registered with the new
jurisdiction. Thus, registration may become a de facto requirement for
enforcement. Such a requirement would seem to violate the provisions of
the 1994 VAWA, as it would create additional hurdles for a person covered
by a protection order. After all, the primary purpose of the VAWA's full
faith and credit requirements was to minimize those hurdles. Requiring
registration, moreover, would come perilously close to saying that a foreign
protection order is invalid unless and until it is registered, which would also
seem to violate the terms of the VAWA.32 Finally, registration brings with
it the perils that notice may be sent to the respondent, thus revealing the
location of the petitioner at a potentially dangerous time. 3
The ability of enforcing jurisdictions to require registration was put to
rest with the VAWA 2000. In that statute, Congress explicitly mandated
that, while ajurisdiction may provide for an optional registration process,
registration cannot be a prerequisite to enforcement of a valid foreign
320 For an example of a typical registration procedure, see infra Section VII and
accompanying commentary of the model tribal code set out in the appendix.
321 See Klein, supra note 31, at 263.
32 See id at 256-57, 263-64.
323See id at 256-57.
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protection order." Thus, in implementing the VAWA's full faith and credit
requirements, each jurisdiction must decide for itself whether it will create
an optional registration process. Those jurisdictions that do decide to
establish such a process must also keep in mind that the VAWA 2000
explicitly forbids notifying the respondentunless the petitioner specifically
requests notification.3"
IV. THE CASE FOR A BROADER INTERPRETATION OF THE VAWA 2000
As Part III makes clear, tribal governments must overcome a number
of obstacles before they can implement the VAWA's full faith and credit
provisions. Some ofthose obstacles are shared, albeit to a lesser degree, by
state governments. For example, both state and tribal governments must
make decisions involving enforcement of foreign criminal protection
orders, regarding immunity for governmental employees involved in the
enforcement decision, and regarding the creation ofa voluntary mechanism
for registering foreign protection orders. While these decisions are a bit
more complicated for tribal governments, they are not unknown to state
governments.3" Indeed, these shared issues are also of the type commonly
faced by those who must implement any statute. Most statutes leave some
holes or gaps or unanswered questions that must be resolved by administra-
tive agencies charged with enforcing the new requirements. Although these
types of questions can present thorny issues, they are not insurmountable
obstacles to fulfillment of the legislature's purpose.
Tribes, however, also face some additional obstacles to implementation
of the VAWA's full faith and credit provisions, obstacles that states do not
share. These are the obstacles that could prove deadly, undermining the
entire purpose of the statutory scheme. These obstacles are, of course, the
jurisdictional differences between a tribal and a state government. If we
3 4 "Any protection order that is otherwise consistent with this section shall be
accorded full faith and credit, notwithstanding failure to comply with any
requirement that the order be registered or filed in the enforcing State or tribal
jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 2265(dX2).
3"A State or Indian tribe according full faith and credit to an order by a
court of another State or Indian tribe shall not notify or require notification
of the party against whom a protection order has been issued that the
protection order has been registered or filed in that enforcing State or tribal
jurisdiction unless requested to do so by the party protected under such
order.
I d § 2265(dXl).
326 For a more detailed examination of these shared issues, and how the issues
differ in the tribal context, see supra Part III.B.3.
2001-20021
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
stay with the factual circumstances ofa protection orderviolation delimited
above, that is, when a respondent restrained by a protection order is
physically present in the enforcing jurisdiction at the time of the violation,
then once a state resolves the standard issues referenced above, the state
faces no other obstacles to enforcing the foreign protection order. The fact
that a protection order was violated (or allegedly violated) within the state
by a person physically present within the state is sufficient to give the state
both criminal and civil jurisdiction over the offender. That is not, however,
true of tribal governments.
As explained in Part II, a series of Supreme Court decisions has limited
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even when those persons are physically
present within the tribe's Indian Country. Tribes no longer possess criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians present within the tribe's borders, and tribes
may also lack civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.327 A tribe possesses civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians only if the tribe can demonstrate that the non-
Indian engaged in consensual relations with the tribe or its members or if
the tribe can establish that the non-Indian's conduct has a direct effect on
the health and integrity of the tribe. The Supreme Court has consistently
stated, however, that these rules are subject to change by Congress.
The relevant question, then, is whether Congress intended to alter these
rules for purposes of the VAWA's full faith and credit provisions. As
explained above in the introduction to Part III.B, the original language of
the VAWA's full faith and credit provisions did not address this question,
and the amendments in the VAWA 2000 address it in an ambiguous
fashion. The issue, then, is how to resolve this ambiguity.
As a reminder, the amendments in the VAWA 2000 state that "tribal
court[s] shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders,
including authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt proceed-
ings, exclusion of violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate
mechanisms, in matters arising within the authority of the tribe."328 It is
clear that Congress did not intend to change the default rules for tribal
criminal jurisdiction.329 The open question is the effect of this amendment
327 Again, as noted supra Part II.B., the Supreme Court has used the term
"nonmember" in the civil jurisdiction context, which encompasses both non-
Indians and those Indians who are members of other tribes. The Supreme Court
used asimilar distinction in criminal cases, but Congress overturned that distinction
via statute. The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed whether the proper
distinction in the civil context is Indian/non-Indian (as it is in the criminal context)
or whether the proper distinction is member/non-member.
32 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
329See supra Part IIl.B.
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on tribal civil jurisdiction, particularly with respect to interpreting the
phrase "in matters arising within the authority of the tribe.""33
There are two possible interpretations for this phrase, one narrow and
one broad. Under the narrow interpretation, "authority of the tribe" is
equated with "jurisdiction of the tribe," as that phrase is defined in the
Supreme Court's default rules. This is the interpretation set forth in Part
III.B.2 above. To reiterate, this interpretation means that before a tribe can
impose civil penalties on a non-Indian for violating a foreign protection
order, the tribe must first establish sufficient facts to satisfy either the
consensual relationship or direct effects test. The Supreme Court has made
satisfaction of these tests very difficult.
Under the broader interpretation, "authority of the tribe" is equated
with "the tribe's Indian Country." In other words, for purposes of the
VAWA's full faith and credit provisions, a tribe would possess civil
jurisdiction over all persons physically present within its borders,
regardless of the person's identity as an Indian or non-Indian. An examina-
tion of Congress's purpose, and the consequences of the narrow interpreta-
tion, clearly argue in favor ofthe broader interpretation ofthe VAWA 2000
amendment.
First, a look at the statutory language clearly indicates Congress's
intent to include both tribes and states within the full faith and credit
provisions. The original full faith and credit provisions mentioned both
states and tribes. When questions arose about the extent of tribal jurisdic-
tion, Congress amended the statute to make it clear that tribes possessed
full civil jurisdiction for purposes of the VAWA's full faith and credit
requirements. The amendments clearly affirm the civil jurisdiction of tribal
courts. Most fundamentally, if a tribe does not possessjurisdiction, then it
cannot give full faith and credit to a foreign protection order. A narrow
interpretation of the amendment means a narrowing of the full faith and
credit provisions, with the consequence of reduced enforcement of foreign
protection orders.
If a tribe does not possess civil jurisdiction over all persons present
within its borders who violate protection orders while in the tribe's
territory, many women will be left unprotected, despite having obtained a
valid protection order. An Indian woman involved with an abusive non-
Indian cannot retreat to the safety of her tribe and her tribal government, for
the tribe would be powerless to protect her. Furthermore, it is uniformly
recognized that the most dangerous time for a woman is when she leaves
the abusive relationship, and it is equally clear that the most dangerous
330 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
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respondent is the one who will physically pursue the woman during her
attempt to leave.
The federal government will lack jurisdiction in these circumstances,
unless it can prove all the elements of one of the new domestic violence
crimes and/or unless the respondent injures the petitioner so badly that his
conduct rises to the level of a "major" crime under the Major Crimes Act.
I doubt Congress intended to limit a woman's protection to circumstances
where she is gravely injured or even killed. That is a bit like shutting the
barn door after the horse is gone. Even if the federal government does
possess jurisdiction, a U.S. Attorney must be willing to pursue the case.
Few U.S. Attorneys have the budget or the inclination to do so. Domestic
violence often ranks below terrorism, drugs, and white collar crime on the
U.S. Attorney priority list. The state government might possessjurisdiction
in certain special circumstances, but those circumstances would have to be
proven, and again, a district attorney would have to be willing to devote the
time and resources to the case. A state would also possess jurisdiction (at
least criminal jurisdiction) if both the petitioner and respondent are non-
Indian. Again, though, these limitations severely constrain the class of
persons who can claim protection of the VAWA's full faith and credit
provisions in Indian Country.
It is very difficult to believe that a Congress so concerned with
women's safety, and so determined to make a valid protection order
enforceable throughout the United States, would deliberately leave women
to the uncertain safety net of tribal jurisdictional default rules, especially
when Congress specifically addressed the situation and opted to declare
that tribal courts possessed full civil jurisdiction overmatters arising within
its authority. It is clear that Congress did not intend tribes to possess
criminal jurisdiction in these circumstances, but it must also be equally
clear that Congress considered and approved of tribal civil jurisdiction in
these circumstances. "Over matters arising within its authority" must refer
to matters arising within the tribe's territory, that is to persons who are
physically present within the tribe's Indian Country and who violate a
foreign protection order while there.
This conclusion is further reinforced if one considers the rationale
behind the Supreme Court's decisions limiting tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians. The Court has expressed great reluctance to permit tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, largely on two bases. First, the Court has
argued that non-Indians cannot vote in tribal elections and are not true
members of the tribal polity. But a man who lives in Oklahoma and follows
his ex-wife to New Mexico where he violates an Oklahoma protection order
is also not a member of the New Mexico polity. That is no barrier to New
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Mexico's enforcement ofthe Oklahoma protection order. It should likewise
not be a barrier to the Navajo Nation's enforcement of the Oklahoma
protection order.
Second, the Supreme Court has also expressed great reluctance about
subjecting non-Indians to the "unfamiliar" vagaries of tribal law, with its
"strange" and "different" customs and culture. But there is nothing
"unfamiliar" or "strange" about a tribal law which prohibits violation of a
valid foreign protection order. Indeed, thattribal law is mandated by federal
law. And that federal law applies uniformly throughout the United States.
Indian Country should not be and cannot be allowed to become a haven for
abusive persons who may violate protection orders with impunity. That is
certainly not in keeping with either the letter or the spirit of the VAWA's
full faith and credit requirements. All of these considerations point toward
the broader, rather than the narrower, interpretation of the VAWA 2000
amendments.
CONCLUSION
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has consistently
eroded the sovereignty of Indian tribes, largely by limiting theirjurisdiction
over persons who are not members of the tribe. The Supreme Court has
continued on this path, despite repeated statements by Congress and
presidents from Nixon through Clinton reiterating the sovereignty of tribes
and announcing intentions to deal with tribes on a government to govern-
ment basis. These decisions have created different sets of jurisdictional
rules for tribes, states, and the federal government, resulting in a complex
set of rules that is difficult to master even for lawyers who work regularly
in Indian law.
The full faith and credit requirements of the Violence Against Women
Act are a paradigmatic example of the problems stemming from these
complicated rulings. As one article put it: "The message should be clear
and unequivocal: 'In the United States, your order of protection is good
anywhere; don't leave home without it.""' The problem, of course, is that
the special jurisdictional rules for tribes have tripped up Congress's efforts
to create a national blanket of coverage for those individuals holding
protection orders. A person moving in and out of Indian Country for work,
travel, recreation, or family purposes cannot automatically rely on a
preexisting order of protection.
331 Lutz & Bonomolo, supra note 31, at 28.
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Even under optimal conditions, the effectiveness of the VAWA's full
faith and credit requirements is heavily dependent on training both law
enforcement officers and courts about the VAWA's requirements and how
to comply with them. Without necessary training and education, it is
possible for a wide variety of people and institutions to with ease stymie
Congress's intentions by violating both the letter and spirit of the VAWA.
But even without purposeful (or negligent) obstructive actions, the built in
limitations of tribal jurisdiction mean that a person must often obtain both
a tribal and a state protection order to be fully covered. 32 That is contrary
to the purposes and intentions of VAWA--that an individual needs only to
obtain one protection order, which then applies throughout the United
States.
APPENDIX:
PROPOSED MODEL CODE FOR USE BY MICHIGAN INDIAN TRIBES:
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PROTECTION ORDERS
INTRODUCTION
Across America, tribal and state courts are working to curtail domestic
violence. A key component of that effort is the issuance of protection
orders. To assure that those orders will serve their intended purpose in this
mobile society, in 1994 Congress enacted the full faith and credit provision
of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
In 2000, Congress amended the VAWA as part of the Victims of Traffick-
ing and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464. The law requires tribes and states to enforce valid protection orders
issued by other tribes and states as if the orders had been issued by the
enforcing jurisdiction. Many of the details of that enforcement are left to
tribes and states.
During a two year period beginning in early 2000, the Michigan
Working Group on Full Faith and Credit drafted a recommended model
enforcement code for tribes in Michigan to consider. The "Enforcement of
Foreign Protection Orders" model code, which follows, concerns how a
tribe would enforce a "foreign protection order," that is, a protection order
issued by a different tribe or by a state. It does not pertain to a tribe's
decision to issue or enforce its own protection orders.
332 Indeed, this is already happening. See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional
Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D.
L. REV. 311 (2000).
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On the pages that follow the model code, the Working Group offers
commentary regarding legal issues involved in formulating a tribal code
covering enforcement of foreign protection orders. As explained in the
commentary, significant issues remain unresolved. While atribe's authority
to enforce a protection order that binds one of its members is evident,
questions concerning its civil and criminal authority over others continue
to pose challenges, as does the applicability of the VAWA full faith and
credit provisions to protection orders containing child custody provisions.
Certainly, Congress intends that tribes enforce foreign protection orders.
However, the details of that enforcement are clouded by larger jurisdic-
tional issues, which are discussed in the commentary.
Like any model code, this proposal is designed to serve as a starting
point. A tribe wishing to draft a code that meets its needs should follow its
customary procedures when adopting any tribal law, which undoubtedly
include consulting tribal counsel and considering existing tribal laws,
relevant federal laws, treaties or Acts of Congress, state laws, and its
relationship with federal, local, and state law enforcement.
PROPOSED MODEL CODE FOR USE BY MICHIGAN INDIAN TRIBES:
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PROTECTION ORDERS
Section L Purpose and Findings
A. Domestic violence is immoral conduct that is contrary to the values
of this Tribe. It is devastating to its victims and to any family in
which it happens. It also harms the entire community, because
violence endangers everyone's physical, mental, emotional, and
spiritual health.
B. We will not allow domestic violence among our people or in the
lands that we govern. In other chapters of our law, we explain how
we issue and enforce protection orders. In this chapter, we explain
how we enforce protection orders issued by other tribes, states, and
nations.
C. Our own public policy and federal law (18 U.S.C. § 2265) require
us to enforce a valid foreign protection order. We enact this Code
to enable us to fully enforce valid foreign protection orders in a
consistent manner.
D. We have the authority to enact this chapter of our law. We have the
inherent sovereign right to enact laws for the welfare and protec-
tion of our Tribe and our people, and of all persons within the
lands that we govern. Therefore, this chapter applies to violations
of foreign protection orders within the lands that we govern.
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Section I Definitions
A. When we say "this Tribe," "our people," or "our Tribal court," or
when we use words like "we," "us," "our," and "ourselves," we are
referring to _ [insert the formal name of the Tribe], and its
Tribal council, Tribal law enforcement, and Tribal court, as the
context requires.
B. "Dating relationship" means frequent, intimate associations
primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional involve-
ment, and shall be adjudged by the Tribal court upon consideration
of factors such as the length of time of the relationship; the type of
relationship; the frequency of interaction between the parties; and,
if the relationship has been terminated by either of the parties, the
length of time since the termination of the relationship. This term
does not include a casual relationship or an ordinary fraternization
between two individuals in a business or social context.
C. "Foreign protection order" means a protection order issued by any
issuing court except our Tribal court.
D. "Issuing court" means a courtthat has issued a protection order and
includes a court of any tribe; Canada; a province of Canada; a
territory of Canada; the United States; a state of the United States;
the District of Columbia; or a commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States.
E. "Lands that we govern" means all our land that qualifies as Indian
Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
F. "Mutual order" means a protection order issued against both the
respondent and a petitioner who has petitioned, filed a complaint,
or otherwise filed a written pleading seeking a protection order
against abuse by a spouse or intimate partner.
G. "Petitioner" means the person who has petitioned, filed a com-
plaint, or otherwise filed a written pleading seeking a protection
order.
H. "Protection order" means any order or judgment of any kind
entered by an issuing court to prevent violence, threats, harass-
ment, contact, communication, or physical proximity to another
person. A protection order can be permanent or temporary; it can
be civil or criminal; it can be issued in a case filed for the sole
purpose of obtaining the protection order, or a case that has been
filed for other purposes so long as any civil order was issued in
response to a complaint, petition or motion filed on behalf of the
person seeking protection. A protection order includes a "mutual
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order" as defined in subsection 1(F), but enforcement against the
petitioner is permissible only if the conditions set forth in subsec-
tions III(E) and IV(F) are satisfied. A protection order does not
include a support or child custody order issued pursuant to state
divorce and child custody laws of the issuing court except to the
extent that such an order is entitled to full faith and credit under
other federal law.
I. "Respondent" means the person against whose conduct the
petitioner seeks a protection order.
J. "Spouse or intimate partner" means: (1) a spouse or former spouse,
(2) a person who shares a child in common, (3) a person who has
or has had a dating relationship, or (4) a person residing or having
resided in the same household.
Section III. Judicial Enforcement of Foreign Protection Orders
A. If a foreign protection order is valid, as defined in subsection
III(D), we will enforce it as if it were issued by our Tribal court, at
no cost to the petitioner.
B. A person protected by a foreign protection order does not need to
register it with our Tribal court.
C. A proceeding to enforce a foreign protection order may be started
in our Tribal court by several methods, including:
1. a motion filed by the petitioner holding the foreign protection
order, alleging that respondent has violated the protection
order and requesting that the Tribal court enforce the order;
and/or
2. an action filed by the Tribal prosecutor alleging that respon-
dent has violated the foreign protection order.
D. Ifa foreign protection order bears the name of an issuing court, the
persons to whom it applies, a judge's signature or an equivalent
sign, terms and conditions against the respondent, and does not
bear an expiration date that has passed or any other obvious
indication that it is not authentic, it will be deemed valid, and we
will enforce it, unless the party against whom the order is to be
enforced proves, as an affirmative defense, that:
1. the issuing court did not have jurisdiction over the parties or
the dispute under the law of the issuing court; or
2. the respondent was not given due process, which means
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. If the foreign
protection order was originally entered ex parte, notice and
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opportunity to be heard must be provided within the time
required by the law of the issuing court, and in any event
within a reasonable time after the order is issued, sufficient to
protect the respondent's due process rights; or
3. the protection order is a support or child custody order issued
pursuant to State divorce and child custody laws that is not
entitled to full faith and credit under other federal law.
E. A mutual order is enforceable against the respondent. A mutual
order is enforceable against the petitioner only if(l) the respondent
filed a cross or counter petition, complaint, or other written
pleading seeking a protection order against the petitioner, and (2)
the issuing court made specific findings that the respondent was
entitled to a protection order.
Section IV. Role of Law Enforcement
A. A law enforcement officer shall enforce a foreign protection order
in the same manner as he or she would enforce a protection order
issued by our Tribal court.
B. A law enforcement officer may rely on a copy of a foreign
protection order that is provided to the officer from any source, and
may rely on the statement of a person protected by a foreign
protection order or any other reliable source that the order remains
in effect.
C. If a copy of a foreign protection order is provided to the officer
from any source, the officer shall enforce the order if it appears to
the officer to be authentic. An officer shall treat a foreign protec-
tion order as authentic if it:
1. bears the names of the issuing court and the persons to whom
it applies, terms and conditions against the respondent, and a
judge's signature or an equivalent sign; and
2. does not bear an expiration date that has passed or any other
obvious indication that it is not authentic.
The fact that the foreign protection order cannot be verified in the
manner described in the following paragraph does not mean that
the order is not authentic.
D. If a person claiming to be protected by a foreign protection order
does not have a copy of the order, the law enforcement officer shall
take reasonable steps to verify the existence of the order, the names
of the issuing court and the persons to whom it applies, the terms
and conditions against the respondent, and that the order does not
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bear an expiration date that has passed or any other obvious
indication that it is not authentic. If the law enforcement officer
verifies this information, the officer shall enforce the foreign
protection order. Examples of reasonable steps to verify the order
include consulting the issuing court or law enforcement in that
jurisdiction, the Law Enforcement InformationNetwork ("LEIN"),
the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), a registry
operated by the issuing jurisdiction, or any similarly reliable
source.
E. If a person claiming to be protected by a foreign protection order
does not have a copy of the order and the law enforcement officer
cannot verify the existence of the order through other reliable
sources, the officer shall maintain the peace and take any other
lawful action that appears appropriate to the officer.
F. A mutual order is enforceable against the respondent. A mutual
order is enforceable against the petitioner only if(1) the respondent
filed a cross or counter petition, complaint or other written
pleading seeking a protection order against the petitioner, and (2)
the issuing court made specific findings that the respondent was
entitled to a protection order.
Section V Immunity
A. No Tribal judge, Tribal law enforcement officer, Tribal court
employee, or other Tribal government official who in good faith
takes, or refrains from taking, any action to enforce a foreign
protection order can be sued in a civil suit or prosecuted in a
criminal action.
B. The fact that we make this statement of immunity does not imply
an absence of immunity elsewhere. The Tribe and all its officials,
employees, and agents retain all available immunity in all settings,
unless specifically and explicitly waived in writing.
Section VI Penalties
A. When, following a hearing, our Tribal court finds that a person has
violated a foreign protection order within the lands that we govern,
our Tribal court may impose any penalty provided by Tribal law
for violating a protection order issued by our Tribal court.
B. The determination whether a foreign protection order has been
violated is made in accordance with the procedures governing
criminal and civil cases in our Tribal court.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
PROPOSED MODEL CODE FOR USE BY MICHIGAN INDIAN TRIBES:
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PROTECTION ORDERS
COMMENTARY
General
This model code is designed to provide tribes with a mechanism to
implement the full faith and credit provision of the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA") of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2265, and its related
provisions, as amended by the Violence Against Women Act of 2000. See
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. The model code was drafted by the tribal
jurisdiction subcommittee of the Michigan Working Group on Full Faith
and Credit. This Working Group was a comprehensive committee
consisting of representatives of federal, state, and tribal governments and
attorneys in private practice. During the drafting process, the tribal
jurisdiction subcommittee consulted with tribal attorneys, tribal judges,
tribal police officers, and tribal domestic violence victim advocates, as well
as other knowledgeable persons.
The VAWA is a federal statute containing a number of methods to
address violence against women. The full faith and credit provision was
enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the Full Faith and Credit
clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
The VAWA's full faith and credit requirements can be found at 18
U.S.C. § 2265, with some relevant definitions codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2266.
Essentially, this statute requires that all states and all tribes give full faith
and credit to valid protection orders issued by any other state or tribe.
These requirements, however, are not fully self-executing; rather, each state
and tribe must determine how it will implement the statute's requirements.
In making these determinations, each jurisdiction must focus on two areas:
(1) crafting enforceable protection orders when the tribe is the "issuing
jurisdiction," and (2) determining how to enforce foreign protection orders
when the tribe is the "enforcing jurisdiction."
The tribal jurisdiction subcommittee concentrated its efforts on the
tribe as the "enforcing jurisdiction," and the model code presumes that a
tribe has an existing body of tribal law governing issuance and enforcement
of its own protection orders. The National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges has prepared a judge's bench card briefly addressing both
enforcement and issuance aspects of the VAWA. See Violence Against
Women Online Resources: Full Faith and Credit-A Judge's Bench Card,
at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/FinalDocuments/judgefin.htm (last modified
Feb. 11, 2000). That bench card contains useful suggestions for crafting an
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enforceable protection order, recommending thatjudges issuing protection
orders:
1) use clear, concise, and specific language;
2) specify whether the respondent had notice and an opportunity to be
heard;
3) comply with relevant laws on child custody;
4) provide contact information for verification purposes;
5) specify the duration of the protection order;
6) if the order is mutual, indicate whether terms of the VAWA are
satisfied;
7) inform all parties of the scope of the protection order;
8) specify if the order is due full faith and credit under the VAWA;
9) specify relevant federal laws in the protection order, and that
possession of a firearm while subject to the order, even if the order does not
prohibit firearm possession, or interstate travel to violate the order, may
subject the party to federal prosecution;
10) provide the parties with a certified copy of the order.
When the tribal jurisdiction subcommittee began its work, it first
examined work done by others in this area. That led the subcommittee to
two primary sources: a model tribal code drafted by B.J. Jones of the
Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Training Institute, and a model state code.
The subcommittee also reviewed variations on these two models. These
sources were used as a starting point in formulating the model code
accompanying this Commentary. The tribal jurisdiction subcommittee also
worked closely with the Working Group's subcommittee drafting proposed
enabling legislation for implementation of the VAWA's full faith and credit
provisions in Michigan. In 2001, the Michigan legislature enacted into law
a comprehensive package of domestic violence legislation which includes
many of the recommendations of the Working Group. A summary of the
legislation appears at http://www.mfia.state.mi.us/CFSAdmin/dv/domestic
_violence.html. The full text of each Public Act can be found on the
Michigan legislature's web site, located at http://www.michiganlegislature.
org under House Bill 5275 or Senate Bill 729.
Tribes considering this model code should be aware that the model
code was prepared using the assumption that the tribe exercises jurisdiction
to the full extent permitted by federal law. Thus, each tribe should review
its constitution and laws to make sure that the tribe's jurisdiction has not
been limited. In particular, some tribal constitutions disclaim all jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians. If a tribe's constitution contains such a limiting
provision, then the tribe should adjust the model code as needed before
adopting it unless a constitutional amendment is planned.
This model code is designed to be adopted as a separate section of an
existing tribal domestic violence code. The model code is not a substitute
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for a domestic violence code, as it does not contain procedures for issuing
protection orders; rather, the model is concerned only with enforcing
protection orders issued by other jurisdictions. There are several points at
which the model code will intersect with an existing domestic violence
code; these points are specified in the Commentaiy. Consideration should
be given to whether adoption of the model code will necessitate amend-
ments to any provisions of an existing domestic violence code and/or other
existing tribal law.
Some Michigan tribes have enacted an ordinance or court rule to fulfill
the reciprocity requirement of Michigan Court Rule 2.615, which provides
a mechanism for enforcement of tribal judgments in Michigan state courts.
MICH. CT. R. ("MCR") 2.615 applies only if a tribe has enacted a
reciprocal measure to recognize state court judgments and orders, and
explicitly states that it "does not apply to judgments or orders that federal
law requires be given full faith and credit." Id. at 2.615(D). The VAWA's
full faith and credit requirements for protection orders are just such a
federal law. Thus, Michigan state or tribal courts presented with a foreign
protection order would enforce it not under MCR 2.615, but under the
VAWA and any laws, codes, rules, or procedures that may be enacted to
enforce foreign protection orders pursuant to federal law.
Before adopting this model code, a tribe should review any existing
tribal law regarding recognition of foreign judgments, but it is probable that
any provision enacted with respect to MCR 2.615 does not fully satisfy the
VAWA. The tribal law may be limited to Michigan state orders or contain
a reciprocity requirement. The VAWA full faith and credit provision
applies notjust to protection orders issued by state courts in Michigan, but
to valid protection orders issued by jurisdictions throughout the United
States. See Model Code, Section H(D) (defining "issuing court"). Reciproc-
ity is inherent in the VAWA, which requires each state and tribal jurisdic-
tion to recognize and enforce valid protection orders issued by another state
or tribal jurisdiction.
SECTION I. PURPOSE AND FINDINGS
Subsections 1(A) and I(B), "Purpose " Language
These two subsections are designed to serve as "purpose" language,
explaining the motivations and intentions behind enacting this code.
Purpose language is always important as it gives the public, and particularly
the courts, an indication of legislative intent. Purpose language is especially
important here in light of the United States Supreme Court decisions
limiting tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
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Under current federal law, tribes have no independent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, although Congress is free to authorize tribes
to exercise broader criminal jurisdiction. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribal courts cannot exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians except in a manner acceptable to Congress).
Tribes also possess limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, although
again, Congress can authorize broader jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 121
S. Ct. 2304 (2001) (tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is governed by
the test developed in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981));
Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001) (limiting Indian tribes'
civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians); Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997) (limiting Indian tribes' civil adjudicatory jurisdiction
over non-Indians); Montanav. UnitedStates, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting
Indian tribes' civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians). As discussed
below in subsection VI, under existing Supreme Court precedent, it is
probably not feasible for a tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians to enforce a foreign protection order. See Christopher B. Chaney,
The Effect ofthe United States Supreme Court's Decisions During the Law
Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14
BYU J. PUB. L. 173 (2000). It is, however, quite possible under current
federal law for a tribe to use its civil jurisdiction to enforce foreign
protection orders against non-Indians.
The same legal standard governs both a tribe's civil regulatory and civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001); Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Tribes clearly possess civil
jurisdiction over their own members. To exercise civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians, a tribe must show that the non-Indian either (1) engaged in
consensual relations with the tribe or an individual member of the tribe, or
(2) that the non-Indian's action has a direct effect on the core integrity of
the tribe. In making this showing, a tribe should identify the status of the
land where the violation was committed. If the land is tribal trust land, then
the tribe is more likely to possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on that
land. If the land is fee land, however, a tribe is less likely to have jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001); see also Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981).
Strong purpose language is important in establishing civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians. The purpose language is important because it promotes
awareness over the ways in which violations of protection orders satisfy
both of the so-called "Montana exceptions" (the consensual relations and
the direct effects test). Whether a particular situation satisfies the Montana
exceptions is a factually based determination. Thus, a tribe must make a
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factual record of the ways in which a person who violates a foreign
protection order has engaged in consensual relations under the first prong
of Montana and/or has directly impacted the health and welfare of the tribe
under the second prong of Montana. One method of demonstrating that
these tests are satisfied is for the tribe to make legislative findings
regarding these two issues. Some of the possible topics for these findings
include:
(A) Look at the rate of domestic violence on tribal lands-is it high
compared to other jurisdictions? Are domestic violence and/or
violations of protection orders committed in disproportionate numbers
by non-Indians? If so, incorporate that information into the purpose
language.
(B) Look to tribal tradition and culture-incorporate anything that
relates to marriage (or other intimate relationship) as a "consensual
relationship" with the tribe (current case law usually references some
sort of contractual relationship--anything that establishes a voluntary
relationship between the non-Indian and the Tribe), or to domestic
violence as an offense against the tribe itself.
(C) Look at tribal resources that are spent on combating domestic
violence-again, incorporate anything that might establish that
domestic violence and protection order violations directly affect the
tribe's ability to govern itself or directly impacts upon the health and
welfare of the tribe (and not just individual tribal members).
Legislative findings should be documented in a recorded form, such as
a written or electronic transcript of the hearing, and incorporated into the
text of the code itself, most likely in the purpose and findings section. The
subcommittee has not proposed language in this area, as each tribe's
findings will be unique, and include tribal history and culture.
SUBSECTION II. DEFINITIONS
Subsection 11(D), Issuing Court
The definition of "issuing court" has been expanded beyond the scope
of the VAWA. The VAWA does not require full faith and credit for
protection orders issued by a province of Canada, the Dominion of Canada,
or for a protection order issued by the United States. Federal courts may
issue protection orders as part of a criminal release order or independently
under 18 U.S.C. § 1514, and some CFR courts issue protection orders as
well. Accordingly, the committee included courts of the United States as
part of the definition of "issuing court." If a tribe does not want to go
beyond the actual requirements of the federal statute, it should delete
references to these three jurisdictions when adopting a code.
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In addition, given the proximity of Michigan to Canada, the tribal
jurisdiction committee thought that full faith and credit to Canadian
protection orders would further the spirit and purposes of the statute.
However, the form or status of protection orders issued in Canada is
unclear, which creates a potential for confusion if a Canadian order were
presented to a tribal officer orjudge for enforcement. Research on the issue
of Canadian protection orders has produced limited information regarding
Canadian protection order law. Research did disclose The Victims of
Domestic Violence Act, a 1994 Saskatchewan law that took effect in 1995.
It seems that Prince Edward Island is the only other province that has
adopted this law. It is described in Dolgopolv. Dolgopol, [1995] 127 Sask.
R. 237, available at 1995 ACWSJ LEXIS 11936, as "a novel piece of
legislation intended to protect domestic antagonists from violence one
against the other and, in an emergency, to provide immediate relief from a
turbulent predicament." Given the limited information gathered about the
form and content of Canadian protection orders, the subcommittee had
some initial hesitation about including them within the model code. After
some discussion, it was decided that the answer to the concern about
confusion lies in the model code itself. First, there is the intentionally broad
definition of protection order found in subsection 1(H). Second, there is the
due process requirement of subsection III(D)(2). These sections define a
valid protection order entitled to enforcement.
For an overview of the law concerning enforcement of foreign country
judgments, see Linda Silberman, Enforcement andRecognition ofForeign
Country Judgments in the United States, 648 PLI/LIT 255 (2001).
Subsection 11(E), "Lands that we govern"
Consistent with the VAWA, the Indian Country definition contained in
18 U.S.C. § 1151 is used. Tribes should consider how that definition
pertains to their tribal lands in light of existing case law. Some decisions
worthy of consideration are:
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
(tribally owned fee lands are not "dependent Indian community" because
the lands had to be set aside by the United States and be under federal
superintendence);
Cardinal v. United States, 954 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1992) (all lands within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation are Indian Country under 18
U.S.C. § 115 1(a) regardless of who owns the land, and therefore, federal
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jurisdiction existed under Major Crimes Act for rape committed by an
Indian on reservation even if land within the reservation was patented to
a non-Indian; observing in dicta that if the land had been patented to a
non-Indian prior to creation of the reservation, it might not be within §
1151 (a)'s definition, and that such a result would create "checkerboard
jurisdiction" and confusion Congress specifically tried to avoid in
enacting § 1151);
People v. Bennett, 491 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (state has
criminal jurisdiction over a tribal member for driving while under the
influence of alcohol where arrest occurred on land within exterior
boundaries of reservation because the right-of-way was not Indian
Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (a); the right-of-way was patented to non-
Indians before the effective date of the Treaty ofOctober 18, 1864, which
created the reservation and, therefore, was not "unsold lands within the"
reservation created by the treaty);
See also Oklahoma Tax Comm "n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S.
505 (1991); United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); United States v.
Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108
(2000).
Subsection 11(F), Mutual Orders
Consistent with the VAWA, this subsection is intended to exclude from
full faith and credit domestic relation "mutual orders" which have been
issued against a petitioner unless it is clear that the respondent, in obtaining
the order against the petitioner, filed a cross or counter petition and the
court made specific findings that each party was entitled to the protection
order. A mutual order is enforceable against the respondent and entitled to
full faith and credit as provided by subsections Im(A)-(D) (judicial
enforcement) and subsections IV(A)-(E) (law enforcement role).
Note that a petitioner is defined differently for purposes of "mutual
orders." Compare subsection 11(F) (for purposes of "mutual orders" only,
petitioner means the person who has petitioned, filed a complaint, or
otherwise filed a written pleading seeking a protection order against abuse
by a spouse or intimate partner) with subsection II(G) ("Petitioner" means
the person who has petitioned, filed a complaint, or otherwise filed a
written pleading seeking a protection order"). Thus, the "mutual order"
definition is not implicated in the rare instance where the petitioner has
"petitioned, filed a complaint, or otherwise filed a written pleading seeking
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a protection order against abuse by someone other than "a spouse or
intimate partner." (See discussion below concerning broad definition of
"spouse or intimate partner").
In subsection II(F) the "cross or counter petition" language contained
in the VAWA is used. Subsections 11(B) and H(J) include a definition of
"spouse or intimate partner" consistent with the language contained in the
proposed enabling legislative bill drafted by the state legislative subcom-
mittee. The "spouse or intimate partner" definition mirrors the "domestic
relationship" definition contained in Michigan's domestic relationship
personal protection order statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. ("M.C.L.A.")
§ 600.2950(1) (West 2000), rather than the definition in the VAWA. 18
U.S.C. § 2266. Note that § 600.2950(1) has been amended by the 2001
legislative amendment. See H.B. 5299, pt. 200 (Mich. 2001).
Michigan's definition includes categories of people not included in the
VAWA such as siblings, roommates, parent/adult child, and those dating
but not residing together, and affords broader protections than the VAWA.
This has been done to create uniformity in application by law enforcement
officers and judges in Michigan. Subsection II(B)'s "dating relationship"
definition is consistent with the definition found in M.C.L.A. §
600.2950(3OXa), but also incorporates additional guidance fortribaljudges
in determining whether such a relationship exists. Additionally, the effect
of using Michigan's broader definition is that a larger category of
petitioners will be exempt from arrest than under the VAWA's definition
of "spouse or intimate partner."
Subsection IV(F) (discussed below) requires that responding law
enforcement officers address whether or not a mutual order is entitled to
enforcement against the petitioner because it satisfies the requirements in
Subsection IV(F), that is, (1) the respondent filed a cross or counter
petition, complaint or other written pleading seeking a protection order
against the petitioner, and (2) the issuing court made specific findings that
the respondent was entitled to a protection order. The tribal subcommittee
believes this is the intent of the VAWA, and it is also consistent with the
views and recommendations of the state legislative subcommittee. This
means that if a law enforcement officer in the field is presented with a
situation involving a mutual order, the officer would enforce it against the
respondent consistent with subsection IV(A)-(E). However, it would not be
enforceable against the petitioner unless the officer saw evidence that the
respondent filed a cross-pleading and the court made specific findings that
each party was entitled to protection. As indicated in subsection III(E), a
judge must also examine this issue when confronted with a mutual order.
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Subsection II(H), "Protection Order" Includes Civil and Criminal Orders
Consistent with the VAWA definition of"protection order," the model
code's definition includes both civil and criminal orders of protection. See
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5). Although most protection orders are issued in a civil
proceeding, the full faith and credit provision applies to valid criminal
orders of protection, which are issued by some jurisdictions as a condition
of release, probation or parole. Such orders may be difficult to enforce
because of verification problems, because of a lack of arrest authority inthe
enforcing jurisdiction, and because most jurisdictions do not have laws
which allow for prosecution of offenders who violate criminal orders issued
by another jurisdiction. These difficulties may be further compounded in
tribal courts, which lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Neverthe-
less, Congress clearly intended that all valid orders of protection, whether
issued in a civil or criminal proceeding, be accorded full faith and credit.
Some jurisdictions consult with the issuing jurisdiction to determine if
extradition is necessary when presented with a violation of the issuing
jurisdiction's criminal order. Other jurisdictions may have statutes which
make it unlawful to violate a criminal protection order issued by another
jurisdiction. See Commentary, Sections IV and VI (describing law
enforcement responses and penalties for protection orderviolations in tribal
jurisdictions). Another approach is to treat the protective order provision
of a criminal order the same way such protective provisions are treated
when contained in a civil order. See Section VI (penalties for violating
protection orders). While limiting the definition of "protection order" to
civil orders has been suggested by some, see UNIFORM INTERSTATE
ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS ACT § 3(b)
(2000) and accompanying Comment, the tribal jurisdiction subcommittee
rejected this approach because it is contrary to the VAWA and creates a
gap in protections that should be afforded to domestic violence victims.
Subsection A(I), "Protection Order" and Support and Child Custody
Orders
The "protection order" definition incorporates the VAWA 2000's
parenthetical exclusionary language concerning support or child custody
orders issued pursuant to State divorce and child custody laws. Such orders
are not entitled to full faith and credit under the VAWA "except to the
extent that such an order is entitled to full faith and credit under other
federal law." 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5). The meaning of the exclusionary
language was the topic of much discussion within the Working Group. See
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Proposed Michigan VAWA Full Faith & Credit Legislation, Commentary,
Section 2, Child Custody or Support Provisions Within Protection
Orders.
The VAWA 2000 modified the language, but did not resolve questions
surrounding its meaning, and in at least one way caused more confusion by
referring to only "State" divorce and child custody laws, omitting reference
to "Tribal" laws. Compare VAWA 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2266 (" 'protection
order' includes ... (other than support or child custody orders)") with
VAWA 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (" 'protection order' includes... (other
than a support or child custody order issued pursuant to State divorce and
child custody laws, except to the extent that such an order is entitled to full
faith and credit under other Federal law)") (emphasis added).
The tribal subcommittee does not know if the omission of "Tribal" law
was inadvertent given the applicability of the VAWA full faith and credit
provision to tribal and state protection orders. The model code follows the
language of the VAWA, however, because the primary controlling federal
law, the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act ("PKPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 173 8A,
is arguably inapplicable to Tribes (see discussion below).
The issue ofwhether custody or support provisions in protection orders
are entitled to full faith and credit is complex, and a detailed analysis is
beyond the scope of this Commentary. The tribal subcommittee has
attempted to address some of the issues tribal courts could face when
presented with a foreign protection order that contains provisions granting
custody of the parties' minor children to the petitioner, temporary custody
provisions, and/or visitation provisions which could result in conflicting
support or child custody orders.
The issue of whether such provisions are entitled to enforcement may
turn on several laws, including, but likely not limited to, the VAWA, the
PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1901-63, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"), 9 V.L.A.
261 (1999), and its updated version, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), 9 V.L.A. 649 (1999), and if the
foreign protection order was issued by a tribal court, the issuing tribal
court's codes, tribal constitution and other written law.
Each state has adopted its own version of either the UCCJA or the
UCCJEA, but tribal governments likely have not adopted such a "uniform"
law. Only the UCCJEA makes reference to tribal court proceedings (see
UCCJEA, 9 V.L.A. 261, § 104), meaning those states that have enacted a
provision modeled after section 104 would be required to treat tribes as if
they were states, and tribal court custody proceedings as if they were sister
state court proceedings. Michigan adopted the UCCJEA, including section
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104, in late 2001 as part of the comprehensive package of domestic
violence legislation discussed in the "General" Section of this Commentary.
See H.B. 4855, pt. 195 (Mich. 2001). Michigan's version of the UCCJEA
becomes effective on April 1, 2002, and may be found at the Michigan
legislature's website, http://www.michiganlegislature.orgunderHouseBill
Number 4855 (affecting M.C.L.A. §§ 600.651 - 600.673).
While facially the PKPA does not appear to be applicable to tribal-state
jurisdictional conflicts because "state" is defined as, "[a] State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
or a territory or possession of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(bX8),
there is a conflict of authority on its applicability. Compare Brown v.
Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (tribes are not bound
by the full faith and credit provision of § 1738 because Indians are not
"territories or possessions" of the United States), andIn re Guardianship
of Chewiwi, 1 Navajo Rptr. 120 (1970) (same), with Larch v. E. Band of
Cherokee Indians, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989) (tribe is a state under
PKPA). The following additional authorities discuss custody jurisdiction
rules and enforcement procedures, and may provide further guidance:
In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d I (Mont. 1998);
Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and
Abuses ofJurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1051 (1989);
Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity andAssimilation: ChangingDefinitions of
Tribal Power Over Children, 83 MINN. L. REV. 927 (1999).
Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC's of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody
Practice Under the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267 (1998);
David M. Ujke, Tibal Court Jurisdiction in Domestic Relations Matters
Involving Indian Children: Not Just a Matter of Comity, 66-AUG WIS.
LAW. 10 (1993);
These sources do not address the specific issue concerning the
applicability of the full faith and credit provision of the VAWA to
protection orders containing custody provisions. They do provide a helpful
starting point to understanding the issues of conflicting decrees and the
existing body of law upon which the VAWA provision must be understood.
This information will be useful to tribes as they consider and decide how
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they will treat foreign protection orders containing custody provisions
within their code.
SECTION I. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PROTECTION ORDERS
Subsection 1L(A), Judicial Enforcement of Foreign Protection Orders
This section contains the VAWA requirement that a tribe enforce all
foreign protection orders in the same manner that it enforces it own
protection orders. This is one place where the code is designed to intersect
with existing tribal law concerning the enforcement of protection orders.
A tribe considering adopting this code should consult with tribal attorneys
and judges to determine how the tribal court is enforcing its own protection
orders. Wherever those procedures are found, be it a tribal ordinance, code,
or court rule, is where the tribal court must look when enforcing foreign
protection orders. The code is designed to supplement, ratherthan supplant,
existing tribal law and procedures.
Subsection Ill(C), Judicial Proceedings to Enforce Foreign Protection
Orders
A tribe adopting this code may want to omit subsection III(C) if
existing tribal law already contains a similar set of procedures. The
committee was concerned with providing a method for a petitioner to bring
an enforcement action personally, rather than depending on tribal prosecu-
tors, particularly if the procedure is civil rather than criminal.
Subsection 11(D), Affirmative Defenses to Judicial Enforcement ofForeign
Protection Orders
The code provides that the tribal court will "enforce" the order.
Penalties for violating a foreign protection order are discussed in section
VI. What is missing is a detailed discussion of the methods of enforcement.
This is left to existing tribal law, which likely includes some type of
hearing with both parties present, an ex parte hearing leading to a bench
warrant, etc. A tribe considering this model code should also note that 18
U.S.C. § 2265(e) explicitly provides that "[flor purposes of this section, a
tribal court shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders,
including authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt proceed-
ings, exclusion of violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate
mechanisms, in matters arising within the authority of the tribe." (emphasis
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added). This provision is discussed in more detail in the Section VI
Commentary addressing penalties.
Subsection IH(D) contemplates that judges, not responding law
enforcement officers, will address questions about the issuing court's
jurisdiction, reasonableness of notice and opportunity to be heard, and
whether child custody/support provisions are entitled to enforcement. Such
issues should be raised as affirmative defenses, and proof of these matters
would not be part of the movant's case-in-chief.
SECTION IV. ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Subsection IV(A), Tribal Officer's Role in Enforcing Foreign Protection
Orders
All subsections within this section should be carefully considered with
input from the law enforcement community, as issues will likely arise in
this area. In particular, subsection IV(A) is another place where the model
code intersects with existing tribal law regarding enforcement of the tribe's
own protection orders. In light of the contours of federal law on this
subject, tribal law becomes of key importance. Particularly, what authority
has the tribe given its law enforcement officers? Tribes must examine their
own law and determine whether their police officers have the authority to
investigate and detain all persons for any potential violation of tribal law,
and tribes will also want to examine the contours of the arrest authority
provided to their police officers. Specifically, do tribal police have the
authority to perform warrantless arrests for violations of protection orders?
How else might the police handle the situation? For example, tribal police
could escort the person offthe reservation, establish some other procedure
for bringing the alleged violator before the tribal court, or turn the alleged
violator over to state or federal authorities for prosecution. It is important
to remember that police officers can act both in their capacity as enforcers
of tribal criminal laws and in their capacity as enforcers of tribal civil
regulations. Although the VAWA does not expand tribal civil or criminal
authority, in VAWA 2000 Congress explicitly recognizes that tribal courts
"have full civil jurisdiction to enforce protection orders, including authority
to enforce any orders through civil contempt proceedings, exclusion of
violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate mechanisms, in matters
arising within the authority of the tribe." 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
In addition to examining existing tribal law (as the VAWA requires
tribal police to enforce foreign protection orders in the same mannerasthey
enforce their own such orders), the following cases may be worthy of
consideration:
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Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990) (recognizing that tribal law
enforcement authority existed to restrain those who disturb public order
on the reservation, and if necessary, to eject them; where jurisdiction to
try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may
exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper
authorities);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), and United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (holding that intrinsic in a tribe's inherent
sovereignty is their traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons
whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands). Oliphant is a
consolidation of two federal habeas corpus cases brought by non-Indians
who were criminally charged in the Suquamish Indian Tribal Court. The
Supreme Court held that the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes does not
extendto criminaljurisdictionto try and punish non-Indian offenders, and
that such jurisdiction exists only where there is an affirmative authoriza-
tion by Congress. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. At the same time, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the continued vitality of the Suquamish
Indian Tribe's power, reserved in Article 9 of the Treaty of Point Elliott,
to detain offenders and turn them over to government officials for
prosecution. Id at 206-08;
Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that intrinsic in a tribe's inherent sovereignty is the power to prescribe and
enforce internal civil and criminal laws, and to exclude trespassers from
the reservation; Papago Indian tribal officer's stop, search and detention
of a non-Indian believed to be violating state or federal law on public
roads running through the reservation, and turning him over to the DEA
after finding marijuana in his camper, was proper);
State v. Haskins, 887 P.2d 1189 (Mont. 1994) (holding that tribe had
"authority to enact ordinances regulating the conduct of [its] members and
to employ law enforcement officers to enforce such ordinances and to
maintain the peace"; Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal officers did
not exceed their authority by investigating and gathering evidence of non-
Indian's drug trafficking activities on the reservation and turning the
evidence over to State of Montana authorities for use in their criminal
prosecution);
State v. Pamperien, 967 P.2d 503 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding tribal
officer's authority to stop, investigate, arrest and detain non-Indian for on-
reservation violations of state speeding law; tribal officer's authority
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derives from the tribe's inherent power as sovereign to maintain public
order on the reservation).
State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332 (Wash. 1993) (holdingthat tribe retained
the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal and civil laws, which
necessarily included the power to stop a driver on the reservation for
possible violation of tribal law and determine if the driver is an Indian
subject to the tribe'sjurisdiction; upon learning the speeding offenderwas
a non-Indian, the tribal officer had the inherent authority to detain and
turn him over to the Washington State Patrol);
In addition, tribes should also consider their relationship with federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies and the existence of any cross-
deputization agreements. Federal domestic violence laws may be impli-
cated, and tribal authorities should use their standard process in referring
allegations of federal crimes to the appropriate federal agency. Under the
VAWA, it is a federal crime
* to travel "in interstate or foreign commerce or enter[ ] or leave[ ] Indian
country with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse or
intimate partner and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel,
commits or attempts to commit a crime of violence against that spouse or
intimate partner," 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1);
* to cause "a spouse or intimate partner to travel in interstate or foreign
commerce or to enter or leave Indian country by force, coercion, duress,
or fraud, and who, in the course of as a result of, or to facilitate such
conduct or travel, commits or attempts to commit a crime of violence
against such spouse or intimate partner," 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2);
* to travel "in interstate or foreign commerce or to enter or leave Indian
country, with the intent to engage in conduct that violates the portion of
a protection order that prohibits or provides protection against violence,
threats, orharassment against, contact or communication with, or physical
proximity to, another person, or that would violate such a portion of a
protection order inthe jurisdiction in which the order was issued, and then
engages in such conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1);
* to cause "another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce or
to enter or leave Indian country by force, coercion, duress, or fraud, and
in the course of, as a result of, or to facilitate such conduct or travel, the
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perpetrator engages in conduct that violates the portion of a protection
order that prohibits or provides protection against violence, threats, or
harassment against, contact or communication with, orphysical proximity
to, another person, or that would violate such a portion of a protection
order in the jurisdiction in which the order was issued," 18 U.S.C. §
2262(a)(2);
* to travel "in interstate or foreign commerce or within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or enter[ ] or
leave[ ] Indian country with the intent to kill, injure, harass or intimidate
another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel places
that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to,
that person, a member of the immediate family (defined in 18 U.S.C. §
115) of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that person," 18
U.S.C. § 2261A;
* "with the intent (A) to kill or injure a person in another State or tribal
jurisdiction or within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the
United States; or (B) to place a person in another State or tribal jurisdic-
tion or within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United
States in reasonable fear of death of, or serious bodily injury to (i) that
person; (ii) a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115)
of that person; or (iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that person, use the
mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a
course of conduct [defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2)] that places that person
in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to, any person
described in (i) through (iii)," 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2).
TheVAWA 2000 became effective on October 28,2000. The statutory
changes include creation of a "cyberstalking" provision, 18 U.S.C. §
2261A(2) (described above). Although the statute does not specifically
identify stalking by means of a computer as a prohibited activity, the
legislative history makes it clear the phrase "mail or any facility of
interstate or foreign commerce" was meant to encompass stalking by
telephone or by computer attached to the Internet. See 146 CONG. REC.
S10193 (Oct. 11, 2000); H.R. REP. No. 106-939, at 105 (2000); 146 CONG.
REC. S10219 (Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham). The
cyberstalking statute reaches criminal conduct against the person stalked,
a member of that person's immediate family, or an intimate partner of the
stalked person. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B).
Other notable changes under the VAWA 2000 include:
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* the jurisdictional nexus in the interstate domestic violence, interstate
stalking and interstate violation of a protection order statutes now focuses
on traveling in interstate or foreign commerce (or entering or leaving
Indian country) whereas prior to VAWA 2000 the focus was on crossing
state lines. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261,2261A, 2262. This language is intended to
clarify that the statutes reach persons crossing United States borders as
well as crossing state lines. 146 CONG. REc. S10193 (Oct. 11, 2000);
H.R REP. No. 106-939, at 105 (2000);
* removal of the requirement from 18 U.S.C. § 2261 that the defendant
complete a crime of violence and cause bodily injury. The government
must prove that the defendant either committed or attempted to commit a
crime of violence. The statute also removes the bodily injury requirement
from 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(2). These changes make "the nature of the
'harm' required for domestic violence, stalking, and interstate travel
offenses consistent by removing the requirement that the victim suffer
actual physical harm from those offenses that previously had required
such injury." 146 CONG. REC. S10193 (Oct. 11, 1993); H.R. REP. No.
106-939, at 105 (2000);
* broadening the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 2262, which formerly reached
conductthat violated portions of protection orders that involve "protection
against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily
injury." The amended § 2262 reaches conduct that violates the portion of
a protection order "that prohibits or provides protection against violence,
threats, orharassment against, contact or communication with, orphysical
proximity to, another person";
* removal from the interstate violation of a protection order statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2262(a)(2), the requirement that the victim be an intimate partner
of the defendant. This corrected the inconsistency in the statute that
required an intimate partner relationship under § 2262(a)(2), but did not
require such a relationship under § 2262(a)(1);
* adding "or to facilitate such conduct or travel" to 18 U.S.C. §§
226 1(aX2) and 2262(a)(2), to clarify that "federal jurisdiction to ensure
reach to battery or violation of specified portions of protection order
before travel to facilitate the interstate movement of the victim." 146
CONG. REc. S10193 (Oct. 11, 1993); H.R. REP. No. 106-939, at 105
(2000).
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In addition to the VAWA statutes, the Gun Control Act makes it a
federal crime in certain situations for domestic abusers to possess firearms
or ammunition. It is a federal crime under the Gun Control Act
* for persons subject to a "qualifying protection order" to possess a
firearm or ammunition, to ship or transport firearms or ammunition in
interstate or foreign commerce, to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been so shipped or transported, or to have seized firearms
returned, 18 U.S.C. § 922(gX8);
* for persons convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence" to possess, ship, or transport a firearm or ammunition. 18
U.S.C. § 922(gX9).
Subsection IV(B), Officer's Reliance on Information
The model code explicitly states that the officer may rely on a copy of
the order provided from any source and that the officer may also rely on the
statement of the protected person that the order remains in effect. The
model code does not require that officers determine whether the respondent
was given notice of the protection order. Although notice is required for a
valid protection order, the code makes lack of notice an affirmative defense
to be raised before the tribal court, and does not require officers on the
scene to sort out issues of notice.
Some tribes have modeled their personal protection order law after
Michigan's law, which allows forthe issuance ofexparte protection orders
in some situations. See M.C.L.A. § 600.2950; M.C.L.A. § 600.2950a; MCR
3.705(A). Under these laws, ifthe individual restrained or enjoined has not
been served, police officers responding to a dispute alleging a protection
order violation must serve the respondent with a true copy of the order or
provide verbal notice. M.C.L.A. § 600.2950(22), M.C.L.A. §
600.2950a(l 9). However, a tribal officer would not need to provide written
or verbal notice if the petitioner or respondent states that service has been
made, and therefore, consideration should be given to adding this sentence
to subsection IV(B): "A law enforcement officer may also rely on the
statement of the petitioner or respondent that respondent has received
notice of the order."
While verification of the existence or validity of a protection order can
be accomplished in some instances by accessing Michigan's Law Enforce-
ment Information Network ("LEIN") and/or the National Criminal
Information Center ("NCIC"), this form of verification is not required for
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enforcement of a valid protection order. See Model Code, Section IV(A)-
(E). The LEIN does allow for entry of protection orders, and some
Michigan tribes may be entering their protection order information into the
LEIN. The NCIC now has a Protection Order File into which thirty-seven
states enter their protection orders. As of the drafting of this code and
commentary, Michigan was not one of the states entering protection order
information in the NCIC.
Subsection IV(F), Mutual Orders
This subsection requires that responding law enforcement officers
address whether or not a mutual order is entitled to enforcement against the
petitioner because it satisfies the requirements in subsection IV(F), that is,
(1) the respondent filed a cross or counter petition, complaint or other
written pleading seeking a protection order against the petitioner, and (2)
the issuing court made specific findings that the respondent was entitled to
a protection order. See also Model Code, Subsection II(F) and Commen-
tary. This means that if an officer in the field is presented with a situation
involving a mutual order, the officer would enforce it against the respon-
dent consistent with subsections IV(A)-(E). However, it would not be
enforceable against the petitioner unless the officer saw evidence that the
respondent filed a cross-pleading and the court made specific findings that
each party was entitled to protection. While this does place a burden on law
enforcement officers, the subcommittee believes this procedure is required
under the VAWA. To help ease this burden, law enforcement officers must
be trained on how to recognize a mutual order and how to determine if it
satisfies the VAWA requirements.
SECTION V. IMMUNITY
There was some concern about this immunity language. The law
enforcement community (both tribal and state) have concerns about being
sued for enforcing (or not enforcing) these orders, and favored an explicit
provision providing immunity for good faith actions. However, some
people were concerned that an express statement of good faith immunity in
this portion of a tribal code could imply that immunity did not exist for
other governmental actors unless explicitly provided. The model code
attempts to account for both perspectives.
Another concern was whether or not to provide immunity for non-
enforcement of a protection order. The subcommittee considered this
concern, and while it does not want to encourage non-enforcement of
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protection orders, decided there could be rare circumstances where a good
faith decision not to enforce an unverifiable order might occur. Therefore,
the immunity language was drafted as it appears in the model code, keeping
in mind the code also contains procedures for law enforcement officers to
follow when taking all reasonable steps to verify a foreign protection order.
As with all provisions of this model code, each tribe must decide whether
the suggested language meets the needs of the tribe. Review of the
following may also provide useful information when considering the
immunity issues that may be implicated:
* Inherent tribal sovereign immunity as applied to suits against tribes and
tribal officials in their official capacities. See Dry v. United States, 235
F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2000), and authorities cited therein.
* The Indian Law Enforcement Act ("ILEA"), 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f). See
United States v. Bettelyoun, 16 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1994).
* The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. See
Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing ELEA
in context of a claim under the FTCA).
SECTION VI. PENALTIES
Once again, this is a place where the model code intersects with
existing tribal law. The VAWA provides that a valid foreign protection
order shall be "enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing... tribe."
18 U.S.C. § 2265(a). This language contains several ambiguities, particu-
larly in the case of tribes. The federal statute clearly intends that a tribe
treat a foreign protection order as if it were issued by the tribal court. This
means, at a minimum, that whatever penalties the tribal court imposes for
a violation of its own protection order shall also apply to violations of a
foreign protection order. Otherwise, the tribe will be enforcing foreign
orders differently than its own orders, which is inconsistent with the
VAWA. Given the VAWA's requirements and the ambiguities discussed
below, a tribe may want to reexamine its current penalties for protection
order violations.
It is important to recall that under current federal law, tribes have no
independent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribal courts cannot exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians except in a manner acceptable to Congress).
Tribes also possess limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, although as
2001-20021
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
with criminal jurisdiction, Congress can authorize tribes to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (limiting Indian tribes' civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-
Indians); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting Indian
tribes' civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians). One question initially
surrounding the VAWA's full faith and credit provision was whether
Congress intended to authorize tribes to exercise jurisdiction over all
persons who violate protection orders, regardless of their identity. The
language Congress used in the 1994 VAWA was ambiguous; it could be
interpreted to authorize tribes full jurisdiction in this area, and it could also
be interpreted not to expand tribal jurisdiction further than that allowed by
the Supreme Court in Hicks, Oliphant, Montana and Strate.
The 2000 amendments to VAWA provide some clarification. Those
amendments declare that"tribal court[s] shall have full civil jurisdiction to
enforce protection orders, including authority to enforce any orders through
civil contempt proceedings, exclusion of violators from Indian lands, and
other appropriate mechanisms, in matters arising within the authority of the
tribe." 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e). This language is somewhat unclear and
apparently circular. It offers no guarantee that courts will interpret the
amended statute to expand either the civil or criminal jurisdiction of tribes.
Basically, this means that before a tribe can enforce a foreign protec-
tion order, it must first determine whether it hasjurisdiction over the person
who has allegedly violated the order. In the context of imposing penalties,
the tribal court must determine whether the violator is Indian or non-Indian,
which will determine whether the court can impose criminal penalties. If
the alleged violator is an Indian, then the tribal court can likely apply the
full panoply of possible penalties, both civil and criminal, that it has
enacted for violators of its own protection orders. If the alleged violator is
non-Indian, then the tribal court must proceed to use the analysis discussed
above to determine whether it has civil jurisdiction over the alleged
violator. See Commentary, Subsections I(A) and I(B). For these reasons, a
tribe that has not already done so may want to consider providing both civil
and criminal penalties for a violation of a protection order.
It is up to the tribe whether it wants to impose criminal penalties for
violation of a protection order. The tribe may already do so. If it does not
already impose those penalties, it should decide whether criminal penalties
are consistent with tribal tradition and culture. Despite the limitations on
its jurisdiction with respect to non-Indians, a tribe possesses criminal
jurisdiction over many potential offenders. If a tribe decides to allow for
criminal penalties, it must keep two things in mind. First, any criminal
penalty cannot exceed the limitations in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
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U.S.C. § 1302(7), which limit a tribe's ability to impose criminal penalties
to a maximum of $5000 or one year in jail. Second, those criminal penalties
probably cannot be applied to non-Indians. Tribes that have criminal
penalties should also have civil penalties, as the civil penalties create an
enforcement mechanism against any person over whom the court has
jurisdiction. The subcommittee was not able to locate information about
criminal penalties imposed by tribes. States, however, impose a wide
variety of criminal penalties, making a violation of a protection order
punishable by penalties ranging from criminal contempt to misdemeanors
or felonies. Under current Michigan law, criminal contempt penalties for
violation of a personal protection order are imprisonment for not more than
ninety-three days, and the possibility of a fine of not more than $500.
M.C.L.A. §§ 600.2950(23), 600.2950a(20).
For any violator, Indian or non-Indian, Congress has explicitly stated
that once the tribe determines that it has jurisdiction, it may exercise the
full range of civil penalties, including civil contempt powers, exclusion
from tribal lands, and other civil penalties authorized by the tribe. 18
U.S.C.§ 2265(e). Civil contempt powers generally include both fines and
imprisonment, although imprisonment is less common for civil contempt.
See M.C.L.A. § 600.1715 (Michigan's general penalty provisions for civil
contempt, which subject persons found guilty of civil contempt for
violation of a personal protection order to a fine of not more than $250, or
imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court). A tribe that chooses
to impose imprisonment upon a non-Indian for civil contempt may run the
risk of having that action overturned by the federal courts, which have
authority to review the tribal court's action through the habeas corpus
provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303. The Supreme
Court has expressed great reservations at the prospect of tribes putting non-
Indians in jail. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990) and Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). On the other hand,
incarceration is an accepted penalty for civil contempt in several circum-
stances, and the 2000 amendments to the VAWA explicitly recognize that
tribal courts can impose penalties for civil contempt. That statement,
coupled with existing law on tribal civil jurisdiction, should be sufficient
to support a tribal court's decision to impose jail time. "Should," however,
does not always carry the day in federal Indian law decisions. In any event,
the tribe may want to provide civil penalties other than imprisonment, so
that it will have a penalty to impose upon a non-Indian who violates a
foreign protection order.
It is still not clear, however, that a tribe will always have the civil
jurisdiction to enforce a foreign protection order against a non-Indian.
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Before a tribe can impose civil penalties on a non-Indian, it must first
determine whether it has jurisdiction over the violator under the Montana
exceptions (the consensual relations and direct effects tests). At this point,
the "purpose" language discussed above in Section I will become particu-
larly important, as will the nature of the land (trust or fee) where the
violation occurred. See Commentary, Subsections I(A) and I(B). If the tribe
determines it does not have jurisdiction to enforce the protection order
itself, it may have the ability to arrest/detain the alleged violator and turn
him or her over to the appropriate state or federal authorities. See
Commentary, Subsection IV(A).
SECTION VII. OPTIONAL REGISTRATION
The model code does not contain a procedure by which a person
holding a foreign protection order can register it with the tribe. The
omission was a conscious decision. For those tribes that wish to offer such
an option, proposed language follows along with a brief discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of a registration procedure.
On the advantages front, a registration procedure creates a method for
both law enforcement and persons holding protection orders to avoid
uncertainty about the existence of a protection order. A registration
procedure would create a recognizable paper trail for police officers and
courts.
On the disadvantages front, a registration process presents one more
hurdle for a battered person to overcome in seeking protection to which he
or she is otherwise entitled. Police and persons protected by foreign
protection orders could become overly reliant on the registration proce-
dures. In particular, police could be reluctant to enforce a valid foreign
protection order simply because it is not accompanied by the registration
form. This reluctance would undercut the protections put in place by the
VAWA, and indeed would be illegal under the VAWA.
If a tribe chooses to offer the option of registration, the tribe should be
aware that as part of the VAWA 2000, Congress explicitly mandated that
if a jurisdiction decides to create an optional registration procedure, it
cannot notify the respondent that a protection order has been filed in the
enforcing jurisdiction unless the petitioner explicitly requests it. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2265(dXl). Tribes that are utilizing the LEIN to enter their protection
orders should proceed with particular caution before creating a registration
procedure for foreign protection orders because entry into the LEIN under
Michigan law in place prior to the 2001 legislative amendments resulted in
the issuance ofthe "gun letter," see M.C.L.A. § 28.422b, which effectively
provides notice to the respondent. Section 28.422b has been amended
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effective April 1, 2002 to alter the timing of the firearms restriction notice
required by this statute. The notice should not be sent by the Department
of State Police until the Department receives notice that the respondent has
been served with or received notice of the protection order. See H.B. 5278,
PA 1999 (Mich. 2001). The tribal jurisdiction subcommittee recommends
that a tribe simply prohibit notification, and that a tribe avoid entering
foreign protection orders into LEIN as long as doing so results in issuance
of the "gun letter" to a respondent before that respondent has notice of the
protection order.
Finally, the proposed Section VII omits a procedure for a petitioner to
affirm that the protection order is still valid. The tribal jurisdiction
subcommittee considered requiring an affidavit or some other form, but did
not come to a consensus on handling this issue. If the tribe chooses to
create a form for the petitioner to use in registering a foreign protection
order, the tribe may want to consider including a section in which the
petitioner affirms that to the best of the petitioner's knowledge, the
protection order is still valid.
SECTION VII. OPTIONAL FILING AND REGISTRATION
A. As indicated in Subsection III(B), above, a person protected by a
foreign protection order does not need to register it with our Tribal
court. However, a petitioner may do so. To register a foreign
protection order, a petitioner gives a certified copy, a true copy, or
a copy with some other indication of authenticity to a clerk of our
Tribal court. There is no fee for this service.
B. Notice to the respondent that a foreign protection order was filed
with the Tribal court shall not be provided by the Tribal court or
any other Tribal employee.
C. When a foreign protection order is filed with the Tribal court, a
judge of the court shall promptly review the order to determine
whether it, (I) bears the name of an issuing court, the persons to
whom it applies, terms and conditions against the respondent, and
ajudge's signature or an equivalent sign; and (2) does not bear an
expiration date that has passed or any other obvious indication that
it is not authentic. If so, the judge shall enter the order of our
Tribal court recognizing the foreign protection order.
D. A clerk of our Tribal court shall give the petitioner a copy of the
recognition order.
E. A clerk of our Tribal court shall give our Tribal law enforcement
officers a copy of the recognition order attached to a copy of the
foreign protection order.
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